United States District Court, D. Maryland, Southern Division
Charles B. Day, United States Magistrate Judge.
the Court is Defendants' Motion to Dismiss Pursuant to
Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) (“Defendants' Motion”).
ECF No. 13. The Court has reviewed Defendants' Motion,
the opposition thereto, and Defendants'
Reply. No. hearing is deemed necessary.
See Local Rule 105.6 (D. Md.). For the reasons set
forth below, the Court GRANTS IN PART AND DENIES IN PART
gist of Plaintiff's claims arise from her employment with
Norwood School which began in July 2012. Compl., ECF No. 1.
Plaintiff was hired as a Human Resources Payroll assistant.
Id. at ¶ 13. Plaintiff alleges that after she
informed Defendants Matthew Gould and William Teachum that
she had received an internship offer, she was asked to post
an advertisement for a position as Human Resources Manager.
Id. at ¶ 15-16. According to Plaintiff, she was
asked to post the advertisement despite telling Defendants
that she was willing to “continue working in Human
Resources . . .” Id. Plaintiff then alleges
that following the posting of the advertisement, Defendants
hired a Caucasian employee to serve as the Human Resources
Manager “to perform the exact duties as those performed
by [Plaintiff], but was compensated at [a] rate approximately
30% more than [Plaintiff].” Id. at ¶ 20.
Plaintiff alleges she was:
subjected to disparate treatment based on race
(African-American/Black) when employer hired an employee
(Caucasian) to perform the same and/or similar duties of her
position for approximately $18, 000.00 more in salary than it
offered plaintiff when she was hired to perform the same
and/or similar duties.
Id. at ¶ 2. Plaintiff further alleges that the
new employee was less qualified for the position than
Plaintiff because the new employee had minimal Human
Resources experience and had returned “to the workforce
after being a stay-at-home mom for 10 years.”
Id. at ¶ 21-23.
filing a claim with the United States Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”), the EEOC issued
Plaintiff a right-to-sue letter dated February 21, 2019. ECF
No. 1- 1. On June 5, 2019, Plaintiff filed the Complaint to
obtain relief from “employment discrimination in
violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as
amended 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. (‘Title
VII'), Maryland Human Relations Law, MD Code, Art. 49B,
§§ 1 et seq. And Montgomery County Human Relations Act,
(Montgomery Co. Code §§ 27-1 et seq.).”
Id. at ¶ 1.
Standard of Review
Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) provides for “the
dismissal of a complaint if it fails to state a claim upon
which relief can be granted.” Valencia v.
Drezhlo, No. RDB-12-237, 2012 WL 6562764, at *4 (D. Md.
Dec. 13, 2012). This rule's purpose “is to test the
sufficiency of a complaint and not to resolve contests
surrounding the facts, the merits of a claim, or the
applicability of defenses.” Id. (quoting
Presley v. City of Charlottesville, 464 F.3d 480,
483 (4th Cir. 2006)). In doing so, the Court must keep in
mind the requirements of Fed.R.Civ.P. 8, Bell Atlantic
Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007), and Ashcroft
v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009), when considering a motion
to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6). Specifically, a
complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of
the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,
” Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2), and must state “a
plausible claim for relief, ” as “threadbare
recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by
mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.”
Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678-79. See Valencia,
2012 WL 6562764, at *4 (discussing the standards of
Iqbal and Twombly.).
claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads
factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable
inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct
alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. A court
ruling on a motion to dismiss generally “must take all
of the factual allegations in the complaint as true, ”
however, a court is “not bound to accept as true a
legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation.”
Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 554);
See also Nemet Chevrolet, Ltd. v. Consumeraffairs.com,
Inc., 591 F.3d 250, 255 (4th Cir. 2009) (“[I]n
evaluating a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, a court accepts
all well-pled facts as true and construes these facts in the
light most favorable to the plaintiff in weighing the legal
sufficiency of the complaint.”).
court may dismiss a complaint on statute of limitations
grounds if the time bar is apparent on the face of the
complaint.” Ott v. Maryland Department of Public
Safety and Corr. Servs., 909 F.3d 655, 658 (4th Cir.
2019) (citing Dean v. Pilgrim's Pride Corp., 395
F.3d 471, 474 (4th Cir. 2005)).
Plaintiff's claim under Title VII is not time barred
because Plaintiff filed suit within 90 days after receipt of
the EEOC's right-to-sue letter.
aver that Plaintiff's claim of discrimination under Title
VII is time barred because Plaintiff failed to file her
Complaint within 90 days after the EEOC issued a right-to-sue
letter. Defs.' Mem. in Supp. of Defs.' Mot. 3-5, ECF
No. 13-1. Plaintiff contends her claims are not time barred
because the envelope in which the right-to-sue letter was
sent, was postmarked on March 5, 2019, which gives her 90
days from March 5, 2019 instead ...