United States District Court, D. Maryland, Southern Division
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
J. HAZEL UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Eric Cade initiated this pro se action alleging
claims of wrongful foreclosure, violation of the Fair Debt
Collection Practices Act (“FDCPA”), 15 U.S.C.
§ 1692 et seq., violation of regulations
implementing the Truth in Lending Act (“TILA”),
12 C.F.R. pt. 226, breach of contract, slander of title and
slander of credit, and intentional or negligent infliction of
emotional distress, against Defendants Laura H.G.
O'Sullivan and McCabe, Weisberg & Conway, LLC
(“Defendants”). ECF No. 1. On November 12, 2019,
Plaintiff filed a motion seeking a temporary restraining
order (“TRO”) against Defendants, as well as
non-parties, to stop eviction proceedings filed against him
in state court. ECF No. 2. For the following reasons,
Plaintiff's motion is denied.
grant of a TRO or a preliminary injunction is an
‘extraordinary remedy that may only be awarded upon a
clear showing that the plaintiff is entitled to such
relief.'” Fowler v. Wells Fargo Home Mortg.,
Inc., No. GJH-15-1084, 2015 WL 2342377, at *2 (D. Md.
May 13, 2015) (quoting Dewhurst v. Century Aluminum
Co., 649 F.3d 287, 290 (4th Cir. 2011)). Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 65(b)(1) provides that the Court “may
issue a temporary restraining order without written or oral
notice to the adverse party or its attorney only if: (A)
specific facts in an affidavit or a verified complaint
clearly show that immediate and irreparable injury, loss, or
damage will result to the movant before the adverse party can
be heard in opposition; and (B) the movant's attorney
certifies in writing any efforts made to give notice and the
reasons why it should not be required.” Additionally, a
plaintiff seeking a TRO must establish “ that he is
likely to succeed on the merits,  that he is likely to
suffer irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief,
 that the balance of equities tips in his favor, and 
that an injunction is in the public interest.” See
Cantley v. W.V. Reg'l Jail & Corr. Facility
Auth., 771 F.3d 201, 207 (4th Cir. 2014) (quoting
Winter v. NRDC, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008)).
Plaintiff has not complied with the procedural requirements
of Rule 65(b)(1) because he has not certified in writing any
efforts that he made to give notice to Defendants, nor the
reasons why notice should not be required. Accordingly,
Plaintiff's motion for a temporary restraining order is
improper under Rule 65. See TFFI Corp. v. Williams,
Civil Action No. 8:13- cv-01809-AW, 2013 WL 6145548, at *3
(D. Md. Nov. 20, 2013) (denying an ex parte TRO
motion for failure to comply with the procedural requirements
of Fed.R.Civ.P. 65(b)(1)).
federal statutes and controlling doctrine bar the relief
Plaintiff seeks in requesting a TRO. Plaintiff petitions for
two related orders from the Court: an “injunction on
the unlawful eviction action”; and “an Injunction
and Restraining Order pursuant to Rule 65 . . . to force the
Banks attorneys [sic], the realtors, and the Property
Management Companies to cease and deSIST [sic] all
foreclosure and eviction efforts.” ECF No. 2 at 1.
Plaintiff insists that he “will suffer
‘irreparable injury' so the Judge must stop the
eviction, vacate the foreclosure judgment, and any
proceedings immediately [sic].” Id. at 11.
Based on allusions elsewhere in Plaintiff's filings, it
appears that the “foreclosure judgment” was a
state court's judicial ratification of a foreclosure sale
that took place on October 24, 2017, see ECF No. 1
at 11, 15, though Plaintiff has not identified a specific
ruling or docket. The filings do make clear that the
“unlawful eviction action” is a current
proceeding in the District Court for Prince George's
County, Docket No. 0501SP075442019. See ECF No. 1 at
According to the online docket for that matter, a hearing is
scheduled for November 14, 2019.
Court cannot grant either request for relief. First, the
Anti-Injunction Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2283, imposes on
federal courts “an absolute prohibition against
enjoining state court proceedings, unless the injunction
falls within one of [the] three specifically defined
exceptions.” Ackerman v. ExxonMobil Corp., 734
F.3d 237, 250 (4th Cir. 2013) (alteration in original)
(quoting Atl. Coast Line R.R. Co. v. Bhd. of Locomotive
Eng'rs, 398 U.S. 281, 286 (1970)). The statute thus
bars the Court from enjoining the ongoing eviction proceeding
against Plaintiff unless an exception applies, and Plaintiff
has not identified an applicable exception, nor could he.
Instead, Plaintiff asks the Court to enjoin banks, realtors,
and property management companies from proceeding with
foreclosure and eviction. But “[i]t is settled that the
prohibition of § 2283 cannot be evaded by addressing the
order to the parties or prohibiting utilization of the
results of a completed state proceeding.” Atl.
Coast Line R.R. Co., 398 U.S. at 287.
the court “vacate the foreclosure judgment”
against Plaintiff. ECF No. 2 at 11. Under the
Rooker-Feldman doctrine, federal courts lack subject
matter jurisdiction over “cases brought by state-court
losers complaining of injuries caused by state-court
judgments rendered before the district court proceedings
commenced and inviting district court review and rejection of
those judgments.” See Thana v. Bd. of License
Comm'rs for Charles Cty., 827 F.3d 314, 320 (4th
Cir. 2016) (quoting Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic
Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 284 (2005)). That
description squarely applies to the foreclosure judgment
Plaintiff has not shown a likelihood of success on the merits
of his claims. Success on a wrongful foreclosure claim is
impossible because no such cause of action exists in
Maryland. See Littlejohn v. BWW Law Grp. &
Assocs., No. PWG-14-1696, 2014 WL 6391119, at *4 (D. Md.
Nov. 14, 2014) (citing Davis v. Wilmington Fin.,
Inc., No. PJM- 09-1505, 2010 WL 1375363, at *7 (D. Md.
Mar. 26, 2010)). Although Plaintiff could be entitled to
monetary relief if he could prove a violation of the FDCPA,
the private cause of action under that statute does not allow
for equitable relief. See Vitullo v. Mancini, 684
F.Supp.2d 760, 763- 64 (E.D.V.A. 2010); Nott v.
Bunson, No. WMN-09-2613, 2009 WL 3271285, at *2 (D. Md.
Oct. 9, 2009); Bolin v. Sears, Roebuck & Co.,
231 F.3d 970, 977 n.39 (5th Cir. 2000) (collecting cases).
And a borrower who seeks to rescind a loan agreement because
the lender allegedly violated TILA's disclosure
provisions, as Plaintiff does here, must give notice to the
lender within three years. See Strickland-Lucas v.
Citibank, N.A., 256 F.Supp.3d 616, 629 (D. Md. 2017).
Plaintiff's filings state that he entered the loan
underlying this action in August 2007, but provide no
indication that he gave timely notice of TILA rescission to
the lender. ECF No. 1 at 8. Because Plaintiff's remaining
claims largely flow from these three, Plaintiff has failed to
show a sufficient likelihood of success on the merits for
reasons stated, it is ordered by the United States District
Court for the District of Maryland that Plaintiff's
Non-Judicial Temporary Restraining Order -
Permanent-Injunction & Demand for an Emergency Hearing
Because of the Pending Lawsuit, ECF No. 2, is
 The Court takes judicial notice of
this docket. See Brown v. Ocwen Loan Servicing, LLC,
No. PJM 14-3454, 2015 WL 5008763, at *1 n.3 (D. Md. Aug. 20,
2015), aff'd, 639 ...