United States District Court, D. Maryland
MEMORANDUM OPINION
George
L. Russell, III United States District Judge.
THIS
MATTER is before the Court on Bank of New York Mellon Trust
Co., N.A. (“BONY”) and Specialized Loan Servicing
LLC's (“SLS”) Motion to Dismiss and/or for
Summary Judgment (“BONY/SLS Motion”) (ECF No. 9);
the Motion of Ocwen Loan Servicing, LLC, as
Successor-in-Interest to Ocwen Federal Bank, FSB to Dismiss
Plaintiff's Complaint (“Ocwen Motion”) (ECF
No. 12); and J.P. Morgan Chase Bank, N.A.'s (“JP
Morgan Chase”) Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 23). The
Motions are ripe for disposition, and no hearing is
necessary. See Local Rule 105.6 (D.Md. 2018). For
the reasons outlined below, the Court will grant the Motions.
I.
BACKGROUND[1]
This
Court is familiar with many of the facts underlying Plaintiff
Paul C. Bird's Complaint from previous litigation, the
relevant portion of which follows:
On June 8, 1990, [Bird] and Brenda Lee Armstrong executed a
promissory note (“Note”) secured by a deed of
trust (“Deed”) in favor of Union Federal Savings
Bank (“Union Federal”) in the amount of $111,
481.00 to finance the purchase of real property located at
3416 Hopkins Avenue, Baltimore County, Maryland 21227 (the
“Subject Property”). The Deed was recorded among
the Land Records of Baltimore County in Liber 8504, folio
533.
On August 26, 1996, Union Federal assigned the Note to the
Secretary of the United States Department of Housing and
Urban Development (“HUD”), and the assignment was
recorded among the Land Records of Baltimore County at Liber
11787, folio 097. Subsequently, on October 27, 1997, an
allonge[2] to the Note was executed by HUD to Ocwen
Federal Bank, FSP (“Ocwen”). HUD assigned the
Deed to Ocwen that same day, and the assignment was recorded
among the Land Records of Baltimore County in Liber 12679,
folio 507.
On November 15, 2000, Ocwen assigned the Deed to JP Morgan
Chase Manhattan Bank as trustee c/o Residential Funding
(“JP Morgan Chase”), and that assignment was
recorded among the Land Records of Baltimore County at Liber
23237, folio 028. On that same day, Ocwen executed an
allonge that contained an open indorsement.
Subsequently, on December 20, 2000, Ocwen executed [the Lost
Note Affidavit][3] to Homecomings Financial Network
(“Homecomings”)…
Bird v. Specialized Loan Servicing LLC, No. CV
RDB-16-3743, 2017 WL 1001257, at *1-2 (D.Md. Mar. 15, 2017)
(internal citations and footnotes omitted). Because Bird had
stopped making payments on the mortgage, Homecomings's
appointee filed a foreclosure against Bird and Armstrong on
January 10, 2002. (Compl. Ex. L [“Deed of Trust
Analysis”] at 7, ECF No. 5-14). On February 6, 2003,
Bird filed a Chapter 13 bankruptcy case in the U.S.
Bankruptcy Court for the District of Maryland. See In re
Bird, No. 03-52010-JS, 2007 WL 2684265 (Bankr. D.Md.
Sept. 7, 2007). In that case, “Bird agreed that JP
Morgan was the true claimant.” Id. at *3.
Rejecting Bird's arguments, the Bankruptcy Court
concluded there was a clear chain of assignments and allonges
and no evidence that Ocwen intended to split the Note from
the Deed. Id. at *4. The Bankruptcy Court further
concluded that Ocwen had validly assigned the Deed and the
Note to JP Morgan Chase in November 2000 and that the Lost
Note Affidavit was valid. Id.
On
November 21, 2008, Bird filed three lawsuits in the Circuit
Court for Baltimore County against JPMorgan Chase and
Homecomings, among other defendants, for slander of title and
intentional infliction of emotional distress, among other
counts. See Bird v. GMAC Mortgage Corp., et al, Case
No. 03-C-08-012446 (Cir.Ct.Balt.Cty filed Nov. 21, 2008). The
Circuit Court dismissed the case, and Bird did not appeal.
(BONY Mot. Dismiss Exs. 17, 18, ECF Nos. 9-17, 9-18).
In
2013, Bird filed a Chapter 7 bankruptcy case in U.S.
Bankruptcy Court for the District of Maryland. See In re
Bird, Case No. 13-28238-NVA. Bird argued that both the
Deed and the Note were defective and sought to prevent
foreclosure on the Subject Property and quiet title. (BONY
Mot. Dismiss Ex. 19, ECF No. 9-20). The Bankruptcy Court
dismissed the case because Bird's challenge to the Deed
and the right to enforce it was barred by res judicata.
Id. at 3. This Court affirmed, (BONY Mot. Dismiss
Ex. 19, ECF No. 9-20), and the United States Court of Appeals
for the Fourth Circuit affirmed this Court, see 620
Fed.Appx. 205 (4th Cir. Oct. 22, 2015). In that same case,
SLS filed a motion for relief from stay so it could foreclose
on the Subject Property. Specialized Loan Servicing
LLC, 2017 WL 1001257, at *1. The Bankruptcy Court
granted the motion, and this Court affirmed that ruling.
Id. This Court noted that Bird's arguments that
SLS “failed to provide a complete, unbroken chain of
title, and failed to bring forward the original note prior to
filing its motion” and “clearly failed to
demonstrate any standing to seek relief from the stay”
had already been rejected by the Bankruptcy Court, this
Court, and the Fourth Circuit. Id. at *5. As a
result, this Court concluded, such claims were res judicata.
Id.
Further,
in December 2013, SLS notified Bird that it would be
servicing his loan. (BONY Mot. Ex. 1 [“SLS Notification
Letter”] at 1-3, ECF No. 9-1). As part of informing
Bird about his rights under the Real Estate Settlement
Procedures Act (“RESPA”), 12 U.S.C. § 2601
et seq. (2018), the SLS Notification Letter stated
that “qualified written requests”
(“QWR”) needed to take a particular form and be
sent to an address in Littleton, Colorado. (Id. at
3). On January 12, 2017, SLS received what Bird called a
“qualified written request” at a different
address in Highlands Ranch, Colorado.
On
January 8, 2019, Bird sued BONY, SLS, Ocwen, Homecomings,
Fairbanks Capital Management, Inc., [4] Residential Funding Co.,
LLC, JP Morgan Chase, and Huntington National Bank, formerly
Union Federal. (ECF Nos. 1-2, 5). The ten-count Complaint
alleges against all Defendants: vacation of void assignments
due to violation of “Maryland Code 3-309(a)(b)”
(Count I); fraud in the concealment (Count 2); fraud in the
inducement (Count 3); intentional infliction of emotional
distress (Count 4); quiet title (Count 5); slander of title
(Count 6); declaratory relief (Count 7); violations of the
Truth in Lending Act (“TILA”) (Count 8);
violations of RESPA (Count 9); and recission of void contract
(Count 10). (Id. at 1, ¶¶ 94-199).
Defendants removed the case to this Court on February 15,
2019. (ECF No. 1).
On
February 21, 2019, BONY and SLS filed their Motion to Dismiss
and/or for Summary Judgment. (ECF No. 9). On March 6, 2019,
Bird filed a “Motion to strike defendants' motion
to dismiss, and Plaintiffs' Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, Rule 56 motion for summary judgment on stated and
undisputed claim relying on stipulations of undisputed facts
material to the settlement of this claim as admitted and
confessed in defendants' Affidavits of Lost Note”
(“First Bird Opposition and Motion”). (ECF No.
19). On March 15, BONY and SLS filed a Reply. (ECF No. 28).
On
February 26, 2019, Ocwen filed its Motion of Ocwen Loan
Servicing, LLC, as Successor-in-Interest to Ocwen Federal
Bank, FSB to Dismiss Plaintiff's Complaint. (ECF No. 12).
On March 14, 2019, Bird filed a “Motion to strike
defendant Ocwen's motion to dismiss, and Plaintiffs'
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 56 motion for summary
judgment on stated and undisputed claim relying on
stipulations of undisputed facts material to the settlement
of this claim as admitted and confessed in defendants'
Affidavits of Lost Note” (“Second Bird Opposition
and Motion”). (ECF No. 27). On March 29, 2019, Ocwen
filed a combined Opposition and Reply. (ECF No. 29).
On
March 12, 2019, JP Morgan Chase filed its Motion to Dismiss.
(ECF No. 23). On April 2, 2019, Bird filed “Motion to
strike defendant JPMorgan Chase Bank's motion to dismiss,
and Plaintiffs' Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 56
motion for summary judgment on stated and undisputed claim
relying on stipulations of undisputed facts material to the
settlement of this claim as admitted and confessed in
defendants' Affidavits of Lost Note” (“Third
Bird Opposition and Motion”) (collectively, with
Bird's First and Second Opposition and Motion,
“Bird's Motions to Strike and for Summary
Judgment”).[5](ECF No. 32). On April 8, 2019, JP Morgan
Chase filed a Reply. (ECF No. 33).
II.
DISCUSSION
A.
Standards of Review 1.Motion to
Dismiss
The
purpose of a Rule 12(b)(6) motion is to “test[ ] the
sufficiency of a complaint, ” not to “resolve
contests surrounding the facts, the merits of a claim, or the
applicability of defenses.” King v.
Rubenstein, 825 F.3d 206, 214 (4th Cir. 2016) (quoting
Edwards v. City of Goldsboro, 178 F.3d 231, 243 (4th
Cir. 1999)). A complaint fails to state a claim if it does
not contain “a short and plain statement of the claim
showing that the pleader is entitled to relief, ”
Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2), or does not “state a claim to
relief that is plausible on its face, ” Ashcroft v.
Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl.
Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). A claim is
facially plausible “when the plaintiff pleads factual
content that allows the court to draw the reasonable
inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct
alleged.” Id. (citing Twombly, 550
U.S. at 556). “Threadbare recitals of the elements of a
cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do
not suffice.” Id. (citing Twombly,
550 U.S. at 555). Though the plaintiff is not required to
forecast evidence to prove the ...