United States District Court, D. Maryland
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
THOMAS
E. JOHNSTON, CHIEF JUDGE
On July
18, 2019, Defendant Ryan Russell Parks was convicted
following a jury trial on two counts of sex trafficking of a
minor in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1591(a) and one count
of use of interstate facilities to promote an enterprise
involving a prostitution offense in violation of 18 U.S.C.
§ 1952(a)(3). (See ECF No. 136.) Defendant now
moves for a detention hearing and release from custody
pending sentencing. (ECF No. 137.)
The
Court first notes that Defendant brings his motion pursuant
to 18 U.S.C. § 3142. (See ECF No. 137.)
However, that section only applies to pretrial detention.
See 18 U.S.C. § 3142(a) (“Upon the
appearance before a judicial officer of a person charged with
an offense, the judicial officer shall issue an order that,
pending trial, the person be . . .”); see
also United States v. Solerno, 481 U.S. 739,
746–47 (1987). As Defendant has already been convicted
and is awaiting sentencing, that statute cannot serve a basis
for Defendant’s motion for release pending
sentencing.[1]
18
U.S.C. § 3143 governs pre-sentence detention and
provides the following:
Except as provided in paragraph (2), the judicial officer
shall order that a person who has been found guilty of an
offense and who is awaiting imposition or execution of
sentence, other than a person for whom the applicable
guideline promulgated pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 994 does not
recommend a term of imprisonment, be detained, unless the
judicial officer finds by clear and convincing evidence that
the person is not likely to flee or pose a danger to the
safety of any other person or the community if released under
section 3142(b) or (c). . . .
§ 3143(a)(1). The statute further provides that a
judicial officer must order a defendant who has been found
guilty of, among other offenses, a violation of 18 U.S.C.
§ 1591, detained pending sentencing unless the following
conditions are present:
(A)
(i) the judicial officer finds there is a substantial
likelihood that a motion for acquittal or new trial will be
granted; or
(ii) an attorney for the Government has recommended that no
sentence of imprisonment be imposed on the person;
§ 3143(a)(2)(A). If a judicial officer finds the above
conditions exist, the judicial officer must further find by
clear and convincing evidence that the defendant is
“not likely to flee or pose a danger to any other
person or the community” before ordering the
defendant’s release. § 3143(a)(2)(B); United
States v. Taliaferro, 779 F.Supp. 836, 838 (E.D. Va.
1992).
Here,
as stated above, Defendant was convicted of two violations of
18 U.S.C. § 1591. As such, § 3143(a)(2)(A)
prohibits the Court from releasing him pending sentencing
unless a “substantial likelihood” exists that a
motion for a new trial or acquittal will be granted or the
Government recommends no sentence of imprisonment. 18 U.S.C.
§ 3143(a)(2)(A)(i)–(ii). Defendant has not moved
for a new trial or acquittal, nor is the Court aware of any
reason that such a motion would be substantially likely to be
granted. Further, the Government has not recommended a
sentence of no imprisonment in this case. See §
3143(a)(2)(A)(ii). As neither of these conditions are met,
the Court need not consider whether Defendant is likely to
flee or poses a danger to the community under §
3143(a)(2)(B). See Taliaferro, 779 F.Supp. at 839;
see also United States v. Lambert, No. 2:09-cr-15,
2008 WL 2550601, at *2 (W.D. N.C. June 20, 2008) (“As
Defendant meets neither of the two alternate conditions for
release under § 3143(a)(2)(A), the Court need not
address Defendant’s argument that he meets the second
mandatory condition under subsection (B).”). As such,
Defendant must remain detained pending sentencing.
Accordingly,
Defendant’s motion for a detention hearing and request
for release pending sentencing is DENIED,
(ECF No. 137.) See United States v. Irvin, 2 F.3d
72, 73 n.1 (4th Cir. 1993) (“[B]oth subsections (A) and
(B) must be satisfied in order to grant release pending
sentencing.”); see also Lambert, 2008 WL
2550601, at *2 (“[B]ecause Defendant cannot meet both
requirements listed in § 3143(a)(2), the Court holds
that the instant motion has no merit. It follows that the
Government’s request for a hearing on this matter is
unnecessary.”).
IT
IS SO ORDERED
The
Court DIRECTS the Clerk to send a copy of
this Order to the Defendant and counsel, the United States
Attorney, the United States ...