United States District Court, D. Maryland
MEMORANDUM OPINION
PETER
J. MESSITTE, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Pending
before the Court is self-represented Petitioner Robert Andrew
Reed’s Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, alleging
that his term of confinement was incorrectly calculated,
causing his illegal incarceration beyond the term of his
sentence and seeking his release. Respondents have filed an
Answer seeking dismissal of the Petition, arguing that it is
unexhausted and without merit. Reed filed a Reply with his
affidavit. Having considered the submitted materials, the
Court finds that no hearing is necessary. See D. Md.
Local R. 105.6. For the reasons set forth in this Memorandum
Opinion, the Court will deny and dismiss the Petition.
BACKGROUND
Reed
was convicted in the Circuit Court for Prince George’s
County, Maryland of second degree sex offense and assault and
battery. State v. Reed, No. CT922030X (Cir. Ct.
Prince George’s Cty. 1993). On April 27, 1993, the
Circuit Court sentenced Reed to twenty-years of incarceration
with all but 12 years suspended to begin on November 15,
1992, pursuant to his conviction for second degree sex
offense. Additionally, the Circuit Court imposed a 3-year
sentence to run consecutively to the 12 year sentence for
assault and battery. Further, the Court imposed a probation
for five years upon Reed’s release. Reed’s term
of confinement had a maximum expiration date of November 15,
2007. ECF No. 11-1 at p. 2; ECF 11-2 at p. 7; see
also Maryland Judiciary Case Search website;
http://casesearch.courts.state.md.us (viewed on
September 18, 2019). Reed was released on mandatory
supervision on May 16, 2007. ECF No. 11-4 at 2.
In
2008, Reed was charged in the Circuit Court for Prince
George’s County with violating his probation, and on
November 13, 2008, the case was dismissed and he was directed
to “report to the District of
Columbia.”[1] ECF No. 11-2 at p. 27. In 2009, Reed was
charged in the Superior Court of the District of Columbia
with first degree child sex abuse, stalking, threat to injure
or kidnap a person, and obstructing justice. On May 21, 2010,
Reed was sentenced to serve concurrent terms totaling five
years for stalking, threat to kidnap or injure and
obstruction of justice. See United States v. Reed,
No. CF1 015815 (D.C. Superior Ct.).[2]
On
September 8, 2016, the Circuit Court for Prince
George’s County determined that Reed had violated his
probation and sentenced him to serve 10 years to begin on
June 1, 2010, accounting for six-years, 99 days of time spent
incarcerated prior to sentencing under Md. Code Ann., Crim.
Pro. Art. § 6-128. ECF No. 11-5; ECF No. 11-8 at p. 2.
Reed’s 10-year term of confinement expires on June 1,
2020. ECF No. 11-8.
Reed
alleges his sentence was incorrectly calculated because he is
“under the old 1/3 law” and his mandatory release
date was August 31, 2016. ECF No. 1 at p. 8. Reed, however,
does not explain or cite authority to identify this law, nor
does he provide facts to substantiate his purported release
date. Reed also claims that he “can only do 6 years and
4 months on 10 years.” Id.
DISCUSSION
I.
Exhaustion
Before
seeking federal habeas corpus relief, Petitioner must exhaust
each claim presented by pursuing remedies available in state
court. See Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 521 (1982).
Each claim must be fairly presented to the state courts; this
means presenting both the operative facts and controlling
legal principles. See Baker v. Corcoran, 220 F.3d
276, 289 (4th Cir. 2000) (citations omitted). Exhaustion
includes appellate review in the Court of Special Appeals of
Maryland and, where appropriate, the Court of Appeals of
Maryland. See Granberry v. Greer, 481 U.S. 129,
134-35 (1987). The state courts must be afforded the first
opportunity to review federal constitutional challenges to
state convictions in order to preserve the role of the state
courts in protecting federally guaranteed rights. See
Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 491 (1973).
A
petitioner may challenge the calculation of his term of
confinement by pursuing both administrative and judicial
remedies. He may file a grievance with the Inmate Grievance
Office. See generally Adamson v. Corr. Med. Servs.,
Inc., 753 A.2d 501 (Md. 2000); Md. Code Ann., Corr.
Servs. § 10-206(a). If the grievance is not found wholly
lacking in merit on its face, it is referred to the Office of
Administrative Hearings (“OAH”) for a hearing
before an administrative law judge. Id. at §
10-207(c). An order of the OAH finding that an inmate’s
complaint is lacking in merit constitutes the final decision
of the Secretary of Public Safety and Correctional Services
(“Secretary”) for purposes of judicial review.
Id. at § 10-209(b)(1)(ii). If the OAH finds
that the grievance is meritorious, an order is forwarded to
the Secretary. The Secretary may affirm, reverse, or modify
the order of the OAH. Id. at § 10-209(c).
An
appeal of the Secretary’s decision lies with the
“circuit court of the county in which the complainant
is confined.” Id. at § 10-210(b)(2).
Petitioner may thereafter seek review in the Court of Special
Appeals of Maryland by application for leave to appeal,
id. at § 10-210(c)(2), and, if the Court of
Special Appeals of Maryland grants the application for leave
to appeal but denies relief on the merits, he may then seek
review in the Court of Appeals of Maryland by petition for
writ of certiorari. See Williams v. State, 438 A.2d
1301 (Md. 1981); Md. Code Ann., Cts. & Jud. Proc. §
12-202.
A
prisoner who “alleges entitlement to immediate release
and makes a colorable claim that he or she has served the
entire sentence less any mandatory [diminution]
credits” may seek relief directly from Maryland courts
by petition for a writ of habeas corpus. See Maryland
House of Corr. v. Fields, 703 A.2d 167, 175 (Md. 1997)
(abrogated on other grounds by Moats v. Scott, 751
A.2d 462 (Md. 2000)). The inmate may appeal a circuit
court’s decision denying habeas corpus relief to the
Court of Special Appeals of Maryland and may thereafter seek
certiorari in the Court of Appeals of Maryland.
See generally Stouffer v. Pearson, 887 A.2d 623 (Md.
2005); Stouffer v. Staton, 833 A.2d 33 (Md. 2003);
Jones v. Filbert, 843 A.2d 908 (Md.App. 2004).
When
Reed filed this Petition on October 17, 2016, he provided no
evidence that he had exhausted his claims administratively or
before the state courts. ECF No. 1 at pp. 3-5, 7; ECF No.
11-2 at pp. 2, 16. Reed states in his Reply that on November
2, 2016, he sent a petition to the state court, which was
“forwarded to the U.S. federal Court.” ECF No. 12
at p. 12. He does not address the issue of exhaustion or
explain the ...