United States District Court, D. Maryland
ALYSSA V. HOPE, a/k/a Michael Jones, a/k/a Rosalyn Alyssa Rodriguez, #420-162Plaintiff
PRESIDENT DONALD J. TRUMP, UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Defendants
RICHARD D. BENNETT UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE.
Plaintiff Alyssa V. Hope, who is incarcerated at North Branch
Correction Institution (NBCI) in Cumberland, Maryland, filed
this Complaint, with the full civil filing fee, seeking
declaratory and injunctive relief and damages.
alleges that President Donald Trump violated her rights under
the First, Fifth, Ninth, and Fifteenth Amendments to the
United States Constitution as well as the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights. (ECF No. 1 at 1). For reasons
set forth in this Memorandum Opinion, the Complaint will be
twenty-one page handwritten complaint expresses her general
disagreement with actions and policies she attributes to
President Trump. Plaintiff alleges: the "American
prison-industrial complex is built on Nazi and white
suprem[ac]ist ideologies" which have "worsened
since President Trump took office; President Trump has
promoted hatred toward the LGBTTQIA community which has led to
"literally, and massacre of 100's of members of the
community,  "attack[ed] immigrants," placed
them in detention centers and separated them from their
children; engaged in "illegal and corrupt
activities" before he was elected President; and
President Trump and his administration are "well
aware" that the American prison system refuses to
provide meaningful gender dysphoria evaluations to
incarcerated transgender persons. (Id. at 9, 10, 13,
14). Additionally, Plaintiff states that she is a communist,
adheres to the principles of the Black Panther Party, and due
to her political beliefs, she has been held in solitary
confinement for 10 years, spending the last 4 years in
disciplinary segregation. She alleges that she is a
"political prisoner" who has "even been
subjected to waterboard[ing] by the prison totalitarian
[system]." (Id. at 10).
relief, Plaintiff, who is suing President Trump in his
official and individual capacities, seeks: a declaration that
her constitutional rights have been violated; an injunction
ordering: President Trump's to acknowledgment that
political prisoners exist in the United States and
implementation of a policy protecting them from abuse
including long term disciplinary segregation; enactment of a
law identifying transgender as a third gender; promulgation
of a law that requires only outside transgender specialists
to evaluate prisoners for gender dysphoria; implementation of
a law that allows transgender inmates to choose their place
of incarceration; and transfer of plaintiff to a women's
prison. She also seeks compensatory and punitive damages, and
a jury trial. (Id. at 15-17).
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2), a complaint must
contain a "short and plain statement of the claim
showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." The
Supreme Court has explained that "[t]hreadbare recitals
of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere
conclusory statements, do not suffice" to plead a claim.
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). The
plausibility standard requires that the pleader show more
than a sheer possibility of success, although it does not
impose a "probability requirement." Bell Ail.
Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 556 (2007). Instead,
"[a] claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff
pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the
reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the
misconduct alleged." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.
Thus, a court must "draw on its judicial experience and
common sense" to determine whether the pleader has
stated a plausible claim for relief. Id.
this Court is required by statute to review and dismiss any
civil action in which a prisoner seeks redress from an
officer or employee of a governmental entity if the complaint
is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which
relief may be granted or seeks monetary relief from a
defendant who is immune from suit. 28 U.S.C. §1915A.
Additionally, under the provisions of 28 U.S.C. §
1915(e)(2) a case shall be dismissed at any time if the court
determines that (A) the allegation of poverty is untrue; or
(B) the action or appeal (i) is frivolous or malicious; (ii)
fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted; or
(iii) seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune
from such relief.
Complaint must be dismissed because Plaintiff lacks standing
to raise the generalized claims asserted making the issues
she presents nonjusticiable. Because a finding of
nonjusticiability deprives a court of subject matter
jurisdiction, Taylor v. Kellogg Brown & Root Servs.,
Inc., 658 F.3d 402, 412 (4th Cir. 2011), the complaint
will also be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. See
Bulldog Trucking, 147 F.3d 347, 352 (4th. Cir. 1998) (a
federal court is required, sua sponte, to determine
if a valid basis for its jurisdiction exists, "and to
dismiss the action if no such ground appears."); see
also Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(h)(3) ("Whenever it appears .
.. that the court lacks jurisdiction of the subject matter,
the court shall dismiss the action.").
III of the Federal Constitution limits judicial power to
"actual, ongoing cases or controversies." Lewis
v. Cont'l Bank Corp., 494 U.S. 472, 477 (1990)
(citations omitted); see Clapper v. Amnesty Int'l
USA, 568 U.S. 398, 488, (2013). One element of this
case-or-controversy requirement" is that a plaintiff
must have standing to sue. Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S.
811, 818 (1997); see Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 578
U.S.__, 136 S.Ct. 1540, 1547 (2016) ("Standing to sue is
a doctrine rooted in the traditional understanding of a case
or controversy."). Article III standing "is built
on separation-of-powers principles" and "serves to
prevent the judicial process from being used to usurp the
powers of the political branches." Clapper v.
Amnesty International USA, 568 U.S. 398, 408 (1990).
"The standing inquiry asks whether a plaintiff had the
requisite stake in the outcome of a case ...." Deal
v. Mercer Cty. Bd. of Educ, 911 F.3d 183, 187 (4th Cir.
2018) (citing Friends of the Earth. Inc. v. Laidlaw
Envtl. Servs. (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 180).
Article III, "a party invoking the jurisdiction of a
federal court [must] seek relief for a particularized
injury," which is a requirement that "serves vital
interests going to the role of the judiciary in our system of
separated powers." Hollings worth v. Perry, 570
U.S. 693, 696 (2013). "[A] plaintiff generally must
assert his own legal rights and interests, and cannot rest
his claim to relief on the legal rights or interests of third
parties." Worth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 499
(1975). This serves to "preclude a court from deciding
'questions of broad social import in cases in which no
individual rights will be vindicated'" and to ensure
that '"access to the federal courts [is] limited to
those litigants best suited to assert the claims.'"
Buchanan v. Consolidated Stores Corp., 125 F.Supp.2d
730, 738 (D. Md. 2001) (quoting Mackey v. Nationwide Ins.
Co., 724 F.2d 419, 422 (4th Cir. 1984)).
establish Article III standing a plaintiff must satisfy three
First, the plaintiff must have suffered an injury in fact-an
invasion of a legally protected interest which is (a)
concrete and particularized, and (b) actual or imminent, not
conjectural or hypothetical. Second, there must be a causal
connection between the injury and the conduct complained
of-the injury has to be fairly traceable to the challenged
action of the defendant, and not the result of the
independent action of some third party not before the court.
Third, it must be likely, as opposed to merely speculative,
that the injury will be redressed by a favorable decision.
Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560: see also Susan B.
Anthony List v. Driehaus,573 U.S. 149, 168 (2014);
Sierra Club v. U.S. Dep't of the Interior, 899