United States District Court, D. Maryland
XINIS UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Carson Blake, an inmate incarcerated at the Federal
Correctional Institution in Cumberland, Maryland
(“Cumberland”), has filed a Petition for Writ of
Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. Blake
challenges the Federal Bureau of Prison's
(“BOP”) computation of his sentence and alleges
that his criminal defense attorney provided ineffective
assistance of counsel. ECF No. 1. As relief, Blake asks that
he be awarded 21 months and seven days prior custody credit.
Warden Timothy Stewart moves to dismiss the Petition, or
alternatively for summary judgment. ECF No. 9. Although this
Court advised Blake of his right to respond to Stewart's
motion (ECF No. 11), Blake has not done so. The Court now
rules pursuant to Local Rule 105.6 because a hearing is not
necessary. For the follow reasons, the motion is granted.
October 4, 2010, Blake was arrested and charged in Virginia
state court with assault and trespass in Waynesboro,
Virginia, as well as eluding police and possession with
intent to distribute marijuana in Staunton, Virginia. ECF No.
9-2, p. 3, ¶ 4 (Martin Decl.); ECF No. 9-2, pp. 12-22.
Blake also had an outstanding warrant for breaking and
entering, destruction of property, and grand larceny, in
Augusta County Virginia. Id. On November 5, 2010,
the Waynesboro General District Court sentenced Blake to 30
days of confinement for the assault and trespass charges. ECF
No. 9-2, p. 3, ¶ 5, p. 24. On March 23, 2011, Blake
received one and a half years of confinement for eluding
police and possessing with intent to distribute marijuana in
the Augusta County Circuit Court, with credit for time spent
in state custody from September 11, 2009 through February 26,
2010, and from October 4, 2010 through January 25, 2012. ECF
No. 9-2, p. 3, ¶ 6; ECF No. 9-2, p. 24.
Blake was released from the above prison sentences,
Blake's probation was revoked in the Staunton criminal
matter and he was sentenced to an additional six months of
confinement for the violation. ECF No. 9-2, ¶ 7; ECF No.
9-2, p. 24. Blake completed this state sentence on January
25, 2012. ECF No. 9-2, ¶ 8. On April 30, 2013, the
Augusta County Circuit Court next revoked his probation and
sentenced him to one year of confinement, with credit for
time spent in pretrial detention on this violation. ECF No.
9-2, p. 4, ¶ 9, p. 27. As directed, Blake reported to
the Middle River Regional Jail on May 7, 2013 to begin
serving the Augusta county sentence. Id.
¶¶ 9-10, p. 28. On July 10, 2013, the Augusta
County Circuit Court also revoked a separate probationary
sentence and imposed three months' confinement with
credit for time spent in detention pending his hearing.
Id. ¶ 11.
March 24, 2014, while Blake was in primary state custody, the
United States Marshals transported him to federal custody
pursuant to writ of habeas corpus ad prosequendum.
ECF No. 9-2, ¶ 12. On May 12, 2014, Blake was paroled
for his state sentences and thus, as of that date, was
released from state custody into primary federal custody
where he remained detained pending the resolution of his
federal case. ECF No. 9-2, ¶ 13; ECF No. 9-2, p. 36.
February 24, 2015, Blake was sentenced to 120 months custody
of the Bureau of Prisons in the federal case. ECF No. 9-2, p.
5 ¶ 14, pp. 38-43. The BOP computed Blake's 120-
month sentence to begin on February 24, 2015, the date his
federal sentence was imposed, with credit for the time
spending in primary federal detention from May 13, 2014 (the
day after he completed his state sentence) to February 23,
2015 (the day before his federal sentence commenced). ECF No.
9-2, p. 6, ¶¶ 16, 18. Blake did not receive any
other credit toward his federal sentence because the BOP
determined that all other time was otherwise credited toward
another state sentence. Id. ¶¶ 15, 17.
Further, because the federal court did not expressly state
that the federal sentence was to run concurrently with any
other previously imposed state sentence, the BOP construed
the federal sentence as one to be served consecutively to any
other sentence. Id., ¶ 15; ECF No. 9-2, pp.
38-43. BOP thus calculated Blake's release date to be
June 14, 2023, with credit for good conduct time. ECF No.
9-2, ¶ 18; ECF No. 9-2, pp. 49, 73, 74.
at Cumberland, Blake filed two administrative complaints
regarding BOP's calculation of his confinement term. ECF
No. 9-3, ¶ 7 (Williams Decl.); ECF No. 9-2, p. 52. Both
were denied. Blake appealed only one of the two complaints to
the Mid-Atlantic Regional Office on November 13, 2018.
Id., ¶ 8. The Mid-Atlantic Regional Office
denied the appeal on December 13, 2018. Id. Blake
took no further appeal. Id.
Standard of Review
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure apply to federal habeas
corpus proceedings to the extent the Rules do not conflict
with any statutory provisions or the rules governing habeas
corpus proceedings. See R. 12, Rules Governing
§ 2254 Cases. Dismissal of the Petition may be warranted
where it is clear from the face of the Petition and
attachments that Petitioner is not entitled to relief.
Id. at Rule 4.
if the Court considers evidence beyond the Petition, summary
judgment may may be granted when the moving party
demonstrates that “no genuine dispute as to any
material fact” exists. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a), (c)(1)(A);
see also Ricci v. DeStefano, 557 U.S. 557, 585-86
(2009); Baldwin v. City of Greensboro, 714 F.3d 828,
833 (4th Cir. 2013). A mere “scintilla of
evidence” suggesting a material dispute cannot defeat a
motion for summary judgment. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby,
Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 251-52 (1986). Rather, the record
evidence must demonstrate that a reasonable trier of fact
could find in favor of the nonmoving party. Matsushita
Elec Indus Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587
(1986). When reviewing a motion for summary judgment, the
Court must view all facts in the light most favorable to the
non-moving party. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); see
also In re Family Dollar FLSA Litig., 637 F.3d 508, 512
(4th Cir. 2011).
challenges the BOP's sentencing computation. However,
because Blake has failed to exhaust administrative remedies,
the Petition must be dismissed. It is well-established that a
petitioner seeking judicial review of agency actions must
first have exhausted available remedies within the agency
prior to filing suit. See McKart v. United States,
395 U.S. 185, 193-95 (1969). “The basic purpose of the
exhaustion doctrine is to allow an administrative agency to
perform functions within its special competence, ” that
is, “to make a factual record, to apply its expertise,
and to correct its own errors so as to moot judicial
controversies.” Parisi v. Davidson, 405 U.S.
34, 37 (1972). Petitioners seeking relief under § 2241
are subject to this exhaustion requirement. See Branden
v. 30 Judicial Cir. Ct., 410 U.S. 484, 489-92 (1973);
McClung v. Shearin, 90 Fed.Appx. 444, 445 (4th Cir.
2004) (Petitioner must ...