United States District Court, D. Maryland
Xinis United States District Judge
this Court granted Petitioner Thomas Bailey leave to
supplement the Eighth Amendment claim raised in his original
Complaint. Bailey has filed three supplemental pleadings (ECF
Nos. 5, 8 and 9) and a Motion to Proceed in Forma Pauperis.
ECF No. 6. Because Bailey appears to be indigent, the in
forma pauperis motion shall be granted.
Petition, as supplemented, now seems to be challenging the
validity of sentences that he received in State and Federal
court, rather than the Eighth Amendment claim referenced in
his original pleading. ECF No. 5 at p. 7. However, reading
the pleadings most favorably to Bailey, the Court cannot
discern any actionable claims. ECF No. 5. Bailey references
generally the “supremacy clause federal/state
legislation conflict of interest double punishment
& Grand or Petit Jury verdict cannot render guilty
conjecture no facts nor evidence shown
proof of career off. Enhancement book test. Civil and
criminal contempt (federal) split (state) sentences
not found!” ECF No. 5. As relief, Bailey seeks
“correction of commitment or conviction and
sentence” to enable him to transfer to a mental health
treatment facility for evaluation before his release.
Id. at p. 8.
second supplement to the Petition seems to assert that he
should have been found not criminally responsible for
first-degree rape and related offenses tried in the state.
ECF No. 8 at pp. 4-5. Bailey describes a host of other
purported irregularities related to his criminal case,
including that the sexual act was consensual, his defense
counsel entered a guilty plea without his consent, and his
co-defendant was improperly joined in the case. Id.
at pp. 5-6. Bailey also references the Uniform Commercial
Code in his attempt to argue the impropriety of a prison
transfer. Id. at pp. 7-8.
third supplemental pleading, styled as a letter to the Court,
Bailey states he does not know what this Court wants or how
he can prove an injury without access to his medical records,
and references his need for treatment. ECF No. 9 at p. 1.
Bailey also discusses parole revocation hearings, anti-trust
provisions as they relate to insurance, and requirements for
imposition of an order of restitution. Id. at pp.
2-3. Bailey contends that in an unspecified state civil
proceeding, the court erred by revoking bond; and mentions
sex offender registration. Id. at p. 3. Similar to
Bailey's other pleadings, this supplement is largely
inscrutable regarding his intended claims.
Court can discern, however, that Bailey was tried criminally
in 1995 and believes he should be permitted to obtain
treatment at a mental health facility rather than remain
imprisoned, and that he should not serve both state and
federal terms of confinement. Although this Court directed
Bailey to supplement his Eighth Amendment claim, he appears
to have abandoned that claim and now presses claims related
to the validity of his current incarceration. For the
following reasons, the claims must be dismissed.
13, 2005, Bailey filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 in this Court. See
Bailey v. Galley, et al., Civil Action WDQ-05-1742 (D.
Md. 2005) (“Bailey I”). In that case,
the Court summarized Bailey's State court conviction and
subsequent proceedings as follows:
Bailey was sentenced in the Circuit Court for Harford County
to two concurrent prison sentences of life with all but 40
years suspended after a jury convicted him of first degree
rape and related offenses. In an unreported opinion filed on
December 10, 1996, the Court of Special Appeals of Maryland
affirmed the convictions. The mandate issued January 9, 1997.
Bailey did not seek certiorari review before the Court of
Appeals of Maryland, and his convictions became final on
January 24, 1997. See Md. Rule 8-302 (requiring that
a petition for writ of certiorari be filed not later than
fifteen days after the mandate is issued by the Court of
Special Appeals). Bailey commenced state post conviction
proceedings in the Circuit Court for Harford County on
October 12, 1999. He withdrew his post conviction petition,
without prejudice, on November 17, 2000. He filed a second
post conviction petition on October 24, 2001. The post
conviction court held a hearing on the petition on July 19,
2002. By order dated August 9, 2002, the post conviction
court denied the petition.
The record does not indicate that Bailey filed for leave to
appeal, but it does show that on February 10, 2005, an order
was filed by the Court of Special Appeals of Maryland
dismissing as untimely his application for leave to appeal.
The order of the Court of Special Appeals dismissing the
application is dated February 4, 2005, and indicates that
Bailey did not file for leave to appeal until January 21,
2005. Under these facts, because Bailey failed to file a
timely application for leave to appeal his state post
conviction proceedings, the state post conviction process
became final on September 11, 2002. See Md. Rules
4-408 & 8-204 (providing that an application for leave to
appeal shall be filed within 30 days after entry of judgment
Bailey I at ECF No. 23, pp. 2-3 (Memorandum Opinion)
(record citations omitted).
Court dismissed Bailey's petition as time-barred because
“the limitations period began to run on January 25,
1997 [the day after Bailey's conviction became final] and
expired on January 25, 1998.” Id. at p. 4.
Thus, the 2005 Petition was filed well beyond the applicable
limitations period and no record evidence supported equitably
tolling limitations, especially because “when Bailey
initiated state post conviction proceedings on October 12,
1999” the limitations period had already expired.
Id. at pp. 3, 4.
case, Bailey appears to be challenging this same state court
judgment. Accordingly, this Petition, construed as seeking a
relief pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, is time-barred for
the same reasons discussed in the 2005 opinion.
extent Bailey takes issue with the state procedures for
parole consideration or release for psychiatric treatment, he
has not set out a cognizable federal claim. The United States
Constitution does not create a protected liberty interest in
the expectation of early release on parole. Greenholtz v.
Inmates of Nebraska Penal & Corr'al Complex, 442
U.S. 1, 7 (1979); see also Jago v. Van Curen, 454
U.S. 14, 20 (1981) (mutually explicit understanding that
inmate would be paroled does not create liberty interest).
“There is no constitutional or inherent right of a
convicted person to be conditionally released before the
expiration of a valid sentence.” Greenholtz,
442 U.S. at 7. “It is therefore axiomatic that because
. . . prisoners have no protected liberty interest in parole
they cannot mount a challenge against a state parole review
procedure on procedural (or substantive) Due Process
grounds.” Johnson v. Rodriguez, 110 F.3d 299,
308 (5th Cir. 1997). Thus, putting to the side the wisdom of
Bailey's request for release to obtain psychiatric care,
he has simply not pleaded a federal claim.
extent that Bailey objects to serving his state and federal
sentences consecutively, the claim is also without merit.
When “an inmate has sentences imposed by federal and
state authorities, the sovereign that arrested him first
acquires and maintains primary jurisdiction over him until
the sentence imposed by that sovereign has been
satisfied.” Dickens v. Stewart, No. DKC
13-0795, 2014 WL 858977, at *2 (D. Md. Mar. 4, 2014) (citing
United States v. Evans,159 F.3d 908, 912 (4th Cir.
1998)). Thus, when, as here, “a state maintains primary
jurisdiction over a defendant, federal custody under a
federal criminal sentence ‘commences only when the
state authorities relinquish the prisoner on satisfaction of
the state obligation.'” Id. (quoting
Evans, 159 F.3d at 912). This is because “[a]
federal sentence does not commence until the Attorney General
receives the defendant into her ‘custody' for
service of that sentence, ” unless “the Attorney
General or the Bureau of Prisons agrees to designate the
state facility for service of the federal ...