United States District Court, D. Maryland
Melissa M.
v.
Andrew M. Saul, Commissioner of Social Security[1]
Dear
Counsel:
On
October 2, 2018, Plaintiff Melissa M.[2] petitioned this Court to
review the Social Security Administration's final
decision to deny her claim for Supplemental Security Income
(“SSI”) and disability insurance benefits
(“DIB”). (ECF No. 1.) The parties have filed
cross-motions for summary judgment. (ECF Nos. 12 & 13.)
These motions have been referred to the undersigned with the
parties' consent pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636 and
Local Rule 301.[3] Having considered the submissions of
the parties, I find that no hearing is necessary. See Loc. R.
105.6. This Court must uphold the decision of the agency if
it is supported by substantial evidence and if the agency
employed the proper legal standards. 42 U.S.C. §§
405(g), 1383(c)(3); Mascio v. Colvin, 780 F.3d 632,
634 (4th Cir. 2015). Following its review, this Court may
affirm, modify, or reverse the Commissioner, with or without
a remand. See 42 U.S.C. § 405(g); Melkonyan v.
Sullivan, 501 U.S. 89 (1991). Under that standard, I
will grant the Commissioner's motion and deny the
Plaintiff's motion. This letter explains my rationale.
In her
applications for SSI and DIB, Melissa M. alleged a disability
onset date of March 1, 2014. (Tr. 28.) Her applications were
denied initially and on reconsideration. (Id.) A
hearing was held before an Administrative Law Judge
(“ALJ”) on February 28, 2017 (Tr. 46-61), and the
ALJ found that Melissa M. was not disabled under the Social
Security Act (Tr. 28-41). The Appeals Council denied Melissa
M.'s request for review (Tr. 1-4), making the ALJ's
decision the final, reviewable decision of the agency.
The ALJ
evaluated Melissa M.'s claim for benefits using the
five-step sequential evaluation process set forth in 20
C.F.R. §§ 404.1520, 416.920. At step one, the ALJ
found that Melissa M. had not engaged in substantial gainful
activity since March 1, 2014, the alleged onset date. (Tr.
30.) At step two, the ALJ found that Melissa M. suffered from
the following severe impairments: degenerative disc disease,
obstructive sleep apnea, and obesity. (Id.) At step
three, the ALJ found Melissa M.'s impairments, separately
and in combination, failed to meet or equal in severity any
listed impairment as set forth in 20 C.F.R., Chapter III, Pt.
404, Subpart P, App. 1 (“Listings”). (Tr. 34.)
The ALJ determined that Melissa M. retained the residual
functional capacity (“RFC”) to perform the full
range of light work as defined in 20 C.F.R. §§
404.1567(b) and 416.967(b). (Tr. 34.)
At step
four, the ALJ determined that Melissa M. can perform past
relevant work as a data entry clerk. (Tr. 39.) Because the
ALJ found that Melissa M. could perform past relevant work,
he concluded that she was not disabled. (Id.)
Alternatively, at step five, the ALJ found that there are
jobs that exist in significant numbers in the national
economy that she can also perform. (Tr. 40-41.) Therefore,
the ALJ found that Melissa M. was not disabled under the
Social Security Act. (Tr. 41.)
Melissa
M. raises three arguments in this appeal. First, she argues
that the ALJ did not properly evaluate her RFC because he did
not perform a “function-by-function assessment of the
Plaintiff's abilities to [] perform work-related
activities.” (ECF No. 12-1 at 5.) Second, she argues
that the ALJ “improperly substituted his opinion for
those of competent medical professionals.”
(Id.) Third, she argues that the ALJ improperly
relied on the Medical Vocational Guidelines in determining
that she was not disabled. (Id. at 8.) None of these
arguments have merit.
Melissa
M. argues that the ALJ's RFC assessment is deficient
because he failed to perform a function-by-function
assessment of her abilities to perform work-related
activities. She argues that the ALJ expressed the RFC
“in terms of exertional levels, without first assessing
her work-related abilities on a function-by-function
basis.” (ECF No. 12-1 at 5.) An ALJ must consider all
of a claimant's “physical and mental impairments,
severe and otherwise, and determine, on a
function-by-function basis, how they affect [the
claimant's] ability to work.” Thomas v.
Berryhill, 916 F.3d 307, 311 (4th Cir. 2019), as amended
(Feb. 22, 2019) (internal quotation marks and citation
omitted). In doing so, the ALJ must provide “a
narrative discussion describing how the evidence supports
each conclusion . . . .” SSR 96-8P, 1996 WL 374184 at
*7 (July 2, 1996). Once the ALJ has completed this
function-by-function analysis, the ALJ can make a finding as
to the claimant's RFC. Id.
Here,
the ALJ's analysis of the medical evidence is detailed,
clear, and well-supported by citations to the record. In his
opinion, the ALJ discussed evidence related to Melissa
M.'s allegations of pain and trouble sleeping, spinal
abnormalities, obesity, and issues with gait. (Tr. 34-39.)
The ALJ then discussed at length why he found that Melissa M.
could perform the exertional and postural activities
associated with light work. Because the ALJ adequately
explained his RFC finding such that this Court can
meaningfully review the finding, this argument is without
merit. Melissa M. may disagree with the ALJ's
conclusions, but it is not the function of this Court to
reweigh the evidence. See, e.g., Pearson v. Colvin,
810 F.3d 204, 207 (4th Cir. 2015).
Next,
Melissa M. argues that the ALJ substituted his own opinion
for the opinion of qualified medical professionals. (ECF No.
12-1 at 5.) At step two, the ALJ discussed Melissa M.'s
mental impairments and concluded that they “do not
cause more than minimal limitation in the claimant's
ability to perform basic mental work activities and are
therefore non-severe.” (Tr. 31.) In making this
finding, the ALJ considered the four broad areas of mental
functioning known as the “paragraph B” criteria.
The ALJ
found that Melissa M. had mild limitation in understanding,
remembering, and applying information. (Id.) In
making this finding, the ALJ considered the observations of
Dr. Foster, a psychological consultative examiner, but
concluded that some of his opinions did “not appear
representative of the claimant's longitudinal
functioning.” (Id.) Citing to records produced
by Melissa M.'s treating psychiatrist, Dr. Singh, the ALJ
noted that “the claimant [was] described as oriented
across all visits from September 2015 to March 2017.”
(Id.) In addition, across all visits Dr. Singh
observed “relevant, coherent, and goal directed thought
processes, ” which the ALJ took to indicate that
Melissa M. had no difficulties with understanding or applying
information. The ALJ also noted that Dr. Singh “did not
record objective evidence of memory deficits or corresponding
subjective complaints.” (Id.)
The ALJ
found that Melissa M. had mild limitation in the functional
area of interacting with others. (Id.) The ALJ
acknowledged Dr. Foster's observation that Melissa
M.'s “emotions ranged from flat to tearful, ”
but found that “this single observation is not
consistent” with her presentation over time because she
appeared emotional at only one primary care visit between
March 2014 and January 2017. (Id.) The ALJ also
discussed Dr. Singh's observations regarding Melissa
M.'s behavior and moods. He concluded that they indicated
interactional stability. Finally, the ALJ considered Melissa
M.'s own description of her daily activities and her
history of substantial gainful activity over time, which
support a finding that her ability to interact with others is
not more than minimally limited. (Tr. 32.)
Regarding
concentrating, persisting, or maintaining pace, the ALJ found
that Melissa M. had mild limitation. (Id.) While the
consultative exam indicated weakness in attention, Melissa
M.s' longitudinal treatment record with Dr. Singh did not
contain reference to “any specific deficits in
attention or concentration.” (Id.) The ALJ
acknowledged Melissa M.'s report of visual and auditory
hallucinations, but reasoned that because there was
“only one clinically confirmed instance of responding
to external stimuli, ” and because the hallucinations
occurred before she was prescribed Risperdal by Dr. Singh,
they did not more than minimally impact Melissa M.'s
functional abilities in the area of concentrating,
persisting, or maintaining pace. (Id.)
Regarding
the fourth functional area, the ALJ found that Melissa M. had
no limitation in adapting or managing herself. (Id.)
In
making these findings, the ALJ explained the weight given to
the various medical opinions in the record. The ALJ gave
little weight to the State agency consultants' mental
assessments. (Id.) The ALJ noted that the State
agency consultants “are non-treating, non-examining
sources, who did not have the opportunity to consider the
entire record.” (Id.) The ALJ found that one
of the consultants' remarks appeared to be “heavily
based on the claimant's subjective reports, ” which
were “not in alignment with the findings of Dr. Singh,
” her treating psychiatrist. (Id.) The ALJ
also noted that Melissa M.'s statement that her severe
mental impairments were lifelong was inconsistent with her
past work at substantial gainful activity levels and her lack
of any specialized mental health treatment until about 18
months after the alleged onset of her disability.
(Id.) The ALJ also noted ...