Page 425
Circuit Court for Baltimore City, Case Nos. 18120316;
18120317, Christopher L. Panos, Judge.
Argued
by: Benjamin Rosenberg (Charles N. Curlett, Jr., Sarah F.
Lacey, Rosenberg, Martin, Greenberg, LLP, on the brief),
Baltimore, MD, for Appellant.
Argued
by: Jer Walter (Brian E. Frosh, Atty. Gen., on the brief),
Baltimore, MD, for Appellee.
Panel:
Wright, Beachley, Alan M. Wilner (Senior Judge, Specially
Assigned), JJ.
OPINION
Beachley,
J.
[242
Md.App. 434] On October 25, 2016, appellant Wendell Griffin
filed a Petition for Writ of Error Coram Nobis and Request
for Hearing in the Circuit Court for Baltimore City, seeking
to vacate his 1982 convictions for first-degree murder and
openly carrying a deadly weapon. The circuit court held a
hearing on appellants petition on November 15, 2017. In an
opinion and order dated April 3, 2018, the circuit court
denied appellants petition. Appellant timely appealed, and
presents two issues for our review,[1] which we have rephrased
as follows:
1. Does the inability to file a civil claim in federal court
constitute a significant collateral consequence for purposes
of coram nobis relief?
2. Did appellant waive his right to seek coram nobis
relief?
Page 426
We
hold that appellants inability to file a civil rights claim
does not satisfy the "significant collateral
consequences" element required for coram nobis
relief. In the alternative, we hold that appellant waived the
grounds underlying his coram nobis petition.
Accordingly, we affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
On
March 8, 1982, a jury convicted appellant of the first-degree
murder of James Wise, III, and of openly carrying a deadly
weapon with intent to injure. Appellant received a life
sentence for first-degree murder, and a consecutive sentence
of three years for the weapon conviction. A panel of this
Court [242 Md.App. 435] affirmed appellants convictions in
an unreported opinion, and the Court of Appeals denied
appellants petition for certiorari. Several years later, in
the 1990s, appellant unsuccessfully sought both Maryland
state post-conviction relief in the Circuit Court for
Baltimore City and federal habeas corpus relief in the United
States District Court for the District of
Maryland.[2]
On June
10, 2010, appellant filed a pro se petition seeking
post-conviction DNA testing pursuant to Md. Code (2001, 2008
Repl. Vol.), § 8-201 of the Criminal Procedure Article
("CP").[3] Pursuant to that filing, appellant,
through counsel, requested documents from the Baltimore
Police Department ("BPD") regarding its
investigation of appellant for the murder of Mr. Wise. As a
result of that document request, in 2011 appellant learned
that the BPD had withheld exculpatory evidence consisting of
photo arrays, witness statements, and chain of custody
documents. On February 2, 2012, appellant filed a motion for
leave to reopen his post-conviction case, seeking
post-conviction relief based on the newly discovered
evidence. Four days later, he filed a petition for writ of
actual innocence pursuant to CP § 8-301.[4] Both petitions
alleged that the State had committed numerous Brady
[5]
violations.
The
parties appeared in the circuit court before Judge Gale E.
Rasin on May 23, 2012, for a hearing on the two petitions.
Prior to the court ruling on the merits of the Brady
violations, [242 Md.App. 436] however, the parties reached an
agreement whereby appellant would withdraw his claims in
consideration for a time-served sentence. The State told the
court,
[T]he State is not convinced that there were, in fact, any
Brady violations. And if the State were convinced
the State ethically would be bound to concede to the granting
of a new trial. The State does recognize that the
Brady allegations are plausible enough that ...
after discussing the matters with both [appellant] through
his attorney, the State and [appellant] have agreed to a --
the State will concede to a resentencing on this matter.
Page 427
The
State went on to explain that the matter had "been
discussed" with "all levels of the States
Attorneys Office," and that this particular course of
action would "ensure that [appellant] for the rest
of his life will remain convicted for the murder of James
Wise ." (Emphasis added). Appellants counsel
responded that appellant "maintain[ed] his actual
innocence of these convictions but [had] agreed to this
resolution in the interest of moving forward and obtaining
his freedom ." (Emphasis added). As we shall
explain below, these expressed considerations— the
States intent that appellant remain convicted of James
Wises murder for the rest of his life, and appellants
decision to accept a commuted sentence rather than challenge
the underlying convictions for Brady
violations— play an important role in resolving this
appeal.
On
November 13, 2013, nearly eighteen months after he was
released from prison, appellant filed a civil action in the
United States District Court for the District of Maryland
pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § § 1983 and 1988(b) against the BPD
and three BPD detectives.[6] The district court dismissed
appellants complaint, ruling that it was barred pursuant to
Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 114 S.Ct. 2364, 129
L.Ed.2d 383 (1994). In Heck, the Supreme Court held
that,
[242 Md.App. 437] in order to recover damages for allegedly
unconstitutional conviction or imprisonment, or for other
harm caused by actions whose unlawfulness would render a
conviction or sentence invalid, a § 1983 plaintiff must prove
that the conviction or sentence has been reversed on direct
appeal, expunged by executive order, declared invalid by a
state tribunal authorized to make such determination, or
called into question by a federal courts issuance of a writ
of habeas corpus, 28 U.S.C. § 2254. A claim for damages
bearing that relationship to a conviction or sentence that
has not been so invalidated is not cognizable under
§ 1983.
Id. at 486-87, 114 S.Ct. 2364 (footnote omitted). As
relevant here, Heck required appellant to have his
convictions "declared invalid by a [Maryland] state
tribunal" before proceeding with his § 1983 action.
Appellant
appealed the district courts decision to the Fourth Circuit.
In Griffin v. Balt. Police Dept., 804 F.3d 692, 699
(4th Cir. 2015), the Fourth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of
appellants claim. The Fourth Circuit noted that Maryland
provides "many avenues of post-conviction
relief[,]" listing as examples petitions for writ of
error coram nobis and for writ of actual innocence,
procedures which are in addition to direct appeals and
collateral review. Id. at 698. Nevertheless, the
Fourth Circuit cautioned that "[appellant] may or may
not qualify for any or all of [those] remedies; that is for
Maryland to decide." Id.
Apparently heeding the Fourth Circuits suggestion, on
October 25, 2016, appellant filed his petition for writ of
error coram nobis, which is the subject of this
current appeal. In the petition, appellant sought to vacate
his convictions based on the same Brady violations
he alleged in his 2012 petitions for post-conviction relief
and for writ of actual innocence. As previously noted, the
circuit court held a hearing on November 15, 2017. In its
memorandum opinion, the circuit court denied appellants
petition, finding that he failed to establish that he was
suffering significant collateral consequences, and that
pursuant to the
Page 428
doctrine of res judicata, he waived his right to seek
coram nobis relief. As stated above, appellant [242
Md.App. 438] timely appealed. We shall provide additional
facts as necessary.
DISCUSSION
The
Court of Appeals has noted that "[t]he essential nature
of the writ of coram nobis is that it is an extraordinary
remedy justified only under circumstances compelling
such action to achieve justice . " Hyman v.
State, 463 Md. 656, 671, 208 A.3d 807 (2019) (internal
quotation marks omitted) (quoting State v. Smith,
443 Md. 572, 597, 117 A.3d 1093 (2015)). Explaining its
purpose, the Court has stated that the writ of coram
nobis
is "available to raise fundamental errors in attempting
to show that a criminal conviction was invalid under
circumstances where no other remedy is presently available
and where there were sound reasons for the failure to seek
relief earlier." Often, coram nobis relief is sought
"years after the fact":
Very often in a criminal case, because of a relatively light
sanction imposed or for some other reason, a defendant is
willing to forego [sic] an appeal even if errors of a
constitutional or fundamental nature may have occurred. Then,
when the defendant later learns of a substantial collateral
consequence of the conviction, it may be too late to appeal,
and, if the defendant is not incarcerated or on parole or
probation, he or she will not be able to challenge ...