United States District Court, D. Maryland
Jaclyn D.
v.
Commissioner, Social Security Administration;
STEPHANIE A. GALLAGHER, UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Dear
Counsel:
On July
6, 2018, Plaintiff petitioned this Court to review the Social
Security Administration's (“SSA's”) final
decision to deny her claims for disability benefits. ECF 1. I
have considered the parties' cross-motions for summary
judgment, and Plaintiff's Reply. ECF 14, 17, 20. I find
that no hearing is necessary. See Loc. R. 105.6 (D.
Md. 2018). This Court must uphold the decision of the SSA if
it is supported by substantial evidence and if the SSA
employed proper legal standards. See 42 U.S.C.
§§ 405(g), 1383(c)(3); Craig v. Chater, 76
F.3d 585, 589 (4th Cir. 1996). Under that standard, I will
deny Plaintiff's motion, grant the SSA's motion, and
affirm the SSA's judgment pursuant to sentence four of 42
U.S.C. § 405(g). This letter explains my rationale.
Plaintiff
protectively filed her claims for disability benefits on
August 5, 2013, alleging a disability onset date of January
28, 2013. Tr. 321-28. Her claims were denied initially and on
reconsideration. Tr. 155-59, 162-65. A hearing was held on
September 14, 2016, before an Administrative Law Judge
(“ALJ”). Tr. 37-109. Following the hearing, the
ALJ determined that Plaintiff was not disabled within the
meaning of the Social Security Act during the relevant time
frame. Tr. 13-26. The Appeals Council (“AC”)
denied Plaintiff's request for review, Tr. 1-6, so the
ALJ's decision constitutes the final, reviewable decision
of the SSA.
The ALJ
found that, during the relevant time frame, Plaintiff
suffered from the severe impairments of:
depression; mood disorder; history of bipolar affective
disorder; post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD); cluster B
personality traits; borderline personality disorder by
history; narcissistic and histrionic traits;
claimant-perceived adrenal insufficiency of unknown etiology;
fibromyalgia by history; chronic fatigue syndrome by history;
claimant-perceived celiac disease; possible “leaky
gut” syndrome; history of gastritis and
gastroduodenitis; irritable bowel syndrome (IBS); possible
endocrine disorder; history of chronic candidiasis; and
thyroid disorder by history.
Tr. 15.
Despite these impairments, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff
retained the residual functional capacity (“RFC”)
to:
perform medium work as defined in 20 CFR 404.1567(c) and
416.967(c) except unskilled work; no more than occasional
interaction with co-workers, supervisors, and the general
public; no more than frequent exposure to atmospheric
irritants, such as dust, fumes, odors, and gases; no more
than frequent exposure to temperature extremes, wetness, high
humidity, exposed heights, and moving machinery.
Tr.
17-18. After considering the testimony of a vocational expert
(“VE”), the ALJ determined that, during the
relevant period, Plaintiff could not perform past relevant
work, but could perform other jobs existing in significant
numbers in the national economy. Tr. 24-26. Therefore, the
ALJ concluded that Plaintiff was not disabled. Tr. 26.
In
support of her appeal, Plaintiff advances several general
arguments with a great number of subparts: (1) that the ALJ
erred at step two by declining to find multiple impairments
to be severe, ECF 14-1 at 10-11; (2) that the ALJ erred in
evaluating the listings, ECF 14-1 at 11-17; (3) that the ALJ
erred in discounting Plaintiff's subjective assertions of
disabling symptoms, ECF 14-1 at 17-26; (4) that the ALJ
failed to conduct a function-by-function analysis, ECF 14-1
at 27-28; (5) that the ALJ erred in evaluating the medical
opinions and other evidence, ECF 14-1 at 28-31; and (6) that
the ALJ erred in evaluating the VE evidence, ECF 14-1 at
33-35. Each argument lacks merit for the reasons discussed
below.
First,
Plaintiff asserts that the ALJ should have found additional
impairments to be “severe.” ECF 14-1 at 10-11. An
impairment is considered “severe” if it
significantly limits the claimant's ability to do basic
work activities. See 20 C.F.R. §§
404.1522; 416.922. The claimant bears the burden of proving
that an impairment is severe. See Pass v. Chater, 65
F.3d 1200, 1203 (4th Cir. 1995). Here, the ALJ adequately
considered the relevant impairments at step two. Tr. 15-16.
The ALJ found roughly a dozen impairments to be nonsevere,
because they were “stable with medication or do not
require ongoing treatment.” Tr. 16. Plaintiff disagrees
with the ALJ's finding that her allergic rhinitis,
sinusitis, and fecal incontinence were nonsevere. The records
that Plaintiff cites do little to nothing to support her
position. The only substantive mention of fecal incontinence
in the records that Plaintiff cites to is a single notation
that she reported “alternating constipation and
diarrhea with an episode of nocturnal fecal
incontinence.” Tr. 997. While Plaintiff's rhinitis
and sinusitis are mentioned more than a single time, the
Court has not found anything in the records that allow
Plaintiff to meet her burden that those impairments caused a
significant limitation in her ability to perform work
activities. Plaintiff cites to her testimony that she had to
move out of an apartment, because it smelled of smoke and
would “ignite all my candida symptoms.” Tr.
68-69. Plaintiff has not offered evidence that her rhinitis
and sinusitis were involved in this incident. Furthermore,
because Plaintiff made the threshold showing that her other
impairments were severe, the ALJ continued with the
sequential evaluation process and properly considered all
impairments, both severe and nonsevere, that significantly
impacted Plaintiff's ability to work. See 20
C.F.R. §§ 404.1523, 416.923. Plaintiff has not
offered evidence demonstrating that she required greater
restrictions than the limitations the ALJ included in the
RFC. Accordingly, even if the ALJ's failure to find her
rhinitis, sinusitis, or fecal incontinence severe was error
at all, it would be harmless.
Second,
Plaintiff asserts that the ALJ should have found her to meet
the criteria of multiple listings, including 5.08, 14.10,
12.04 and 12.06. ECF 14-1 at 11-17. The ALJ explained that
Plaintiff did not meet Listing 5.08's requirement of
documentation of body mass index (“BMI”)
measurements of less than 17.50 calculated on at least two
evaluations at least 60 days apart within a consecutive
6-month period. Tr. 16; see 20 C.F.R. Pt. 404,
Subpt. P, App. 1 § 5.08. The records that Plaintiff
cites to refute that finding are from an October 11, 2013
examination, with attached laboratory results, Tr. 949-954,
and a January 4, 2015 record of a phone appointment, Tr.
1087-1088. EFC 14-1 at 11. Those dates are not within a
consecutive 6-month period. Plaintiff does not provide any
legal authority for her apparent contention that a
“denial must be vacated and awarded as a matter of
law” when an ALJ cites to only some, but not all,
exhibits identified in a representative's pre-hearing and
post-hearing briefs. Id. (emphasis removed).
Next,
Plaintiff contends that the ALJ erred by finding that
Plaintiff did not meet Listing 14.10, for
Sjoegren's/Sjogren's syndrome, [1] because
“she has not been diagnosed with Sjogren's
syndrome.” Tr. 16. Plaintiff contends the ALJ should
have found Plaintiff's impairments to medically equal the
listing.[2] Under the regulations, the SSA may
determine medical equivalence to a listing under three
scenarios: (1) if a claimant has an impairment described in a
listing but does not have all of the required findings or
required severity of the findings; (2) if a claimant has an
impairment not described in the listings, the SSA compares
the findings with those for closely analogous listed
impairments; or (3) if a claimant has a combination of
impairments, no one of which meets a listing, the SSA will
compare the findings with those for closely analogous listed
impairments. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1526(b), 416.926(b).
Plaintiff has not argued that she has Sjoegren's
syndrome, that she has an impairment not described in the
listings that is closely analogous to Sjoegren's
syndrome, or that Sjoegren's syndrome is a closely
analogous impairment to the combination of impairments she
does have. Accordingly, there is no basis for remand on this
issue.
Plaintiff's
final listing argument is that the ALJ erred in his
assessment of the paragraph B criteria for Listings 12.04 and
12.06. The ALJ found that Plaintiff had no limitation in the
functional area of understanding, remembering, or applying
information, and moderate limitation in each of the three
other functional areas. Tr. 17. Plaintiff argues the ALJ
reached his findings “without even making specific
references to any substantial evidence in the record, ”
but then acknowledges that the ALJ cited notes from a
consultative psychological examination, a function report by
Plaintiff, and Plaintiff's testimony. ECF 14-1 at 14; Tr.
17. Plaintiff claims that the ALJ cited
“inaccurate” records showing intact memory,
without clearly explaining how they were inaccurate. ECF 14
at 15 (emphasis removed). Further, Plaintiff represents that
she has had “various hospitalizations for suicidal
ideations.”[3] ECF 20 at 5. The records that Plaintiff
cites do not provide any direct support for that contention.
The only hospital records included in the records Plaintiff
cites are for an overdose of heroin in 2011, and 2013
hospitalization for dizziness and headaches. Tr. 528, 613.
The ALJ's analysis of the ...