United States District Court, D. Maryland
MEMORANDUM OPINION
TIMOTHY J. SULLIVAN UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Pending
before the Court is Plaintiff Victor Stanley, Inc.'s
(“VSI”) “Motion for Attorney Fees and
Expenses” (“Motion”) (ECF No. 838). Having
considered the submissions of the parties (ECF Nos. 838, 843
& 844), I find that a hearing is unnecessary.
See Loc. R. 105.6. For the following reasons, the
Motion will be granted. The Court awards VSI reasonable
attorney's fees and costs in the amount of $143, 087.62.
I.
Introduction
The
Court has previously summarized the lengthy procedural
history of this case. (ECF No. 747 at 1-7.) Of import here,
on April 20, 2016, the Court ordered Defendant-judgment
debtors Mark Pappas (“Pappas”) and Creative Pipe,
Inc.[1]
(collectively, “Defendants”) to pay a total of
$1, 281, 315.91 in monetary sanctions and costs to
Plaintiff-judgment creditor Victor Stanley, Inc. by May 23,
2016, and certify that such amount had been paid by May 31,
2016 (hereinafter, the “Sanctions Order”).
Defendants did not comply with the Sanctions Order. (ECF No.
747 at 17.) VSI now seeks an order directing Defendants to
reimburse it for the attorney's fees and costs that it
incurred in connection with its efforts to obtain
Defendants' compliance with the Sanctions Order.
II.
Reasonable Attorney's Fees and Expenses
The
Court is required to award certain reasonable attorney's
fees and expenses when a party fails to comply with a court
order. Fed.R.Civ.P. 37(b)(2)(C); see also U.S. Home Corp.
v. Settlers Crossing, LLC, DKC-08-1863, 2013 WL 3713671,
at *3 (D. Md. July 15, 2013). Specifically, the Court
“must order the disobedient party . . . to pay the
reasonable expenses, including attorney's fees, caused by
the failure, unless the failure was substantially justified
or other circumstances make an award of expenses
unjust.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 37(b)(2)(C).
“The
amount of attorneys' fees to be awarded in any case is
left to the discretion of the district court.”
Davis v. Uhh Wee, We Care Inc., No. ELH-17-494, 2019
WL 3457609, at *10 (D. Md. July 31, 2019) (citing McAfee
v. Boczar, 738 F.3d 81, 88 (4th Cir. 2013); Robinson
v. Equifax Info. Servs., LLC, 560 F.3d 235, 243 (4th
Cir. 2009)). In calculating an award of attorney's fees,
the Court must first determine the lodestar amount, defined
as a “reasonable hourly rate multiplied by hours
reasonably expended.” Grissom v. The Mills
Corp., 549 F.3d 313, 320-21 (4th Cir. 2008); see
also Perdue v. Kenny A., 559 U.S. 542, 551 (2010)
(noting that the lodestar figure is “the guiding light
of our fee-shifting jurisprudence”); Hensley v.
Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 433 (1983) (“The most
useful starting point for determining the amount of a
reasonable fee is the number of hours reasonably expended on
the litigation multiplied by a reasonable hourly
rate.”); Garcia v. Montgomery Cty., Maryland,
No. TDC-12-3592, 2018 WL 1441189, at *5 (D. Md. Mar. 22,
2018). In determining whether hours were “reasonably
expended, ” courts consider whether a case was
overstaffed, and the degree to which the skill and experience
of counsel may have effected the time spent on a task.
Id. at 434. Counsel for a party seeking
attorney's fees must engage in “billing judgment,
” which means that they must “make a good faith
effort to exclude from a fee request hours that are
excessive, redundant, or otherwise unnecessary.”
Id.
To
ascertain what is reasonable in terms of hours expended and
the rate charged, the Fourth Circuit has stated that the
Court's
discretion should be guided by the following twelve factors:
(1) the time and labor expended; (2) the novelty and
difficulty of the questions raised; (3) the skill required to
properly perform the legal services rendered; (4) the
attorney's opportunity costs in pressing the instant
litigation; (5) the customary fee for like work; (6) the
attorney's expectations at the outset of the litigation;
(7) the time limitations imposed by the client or
circumstances; (8) the amount in controversy and the results
obtained; (9) the experience, reputation and ability of the
attorney; (10) the undesirability of the case within the
legal community in which the suit arose; (11) the nature and
length of the professional relationship between attorney and
client; and (12) attorneys' fees awards in similar cases.
Robinson v. Equifax Info. Servs., LLC, 560 F.3d 235,
243 (4th Cir. 2009) (citing Johnson v. Ga. Highway
Express, Inc., 488 F.2d 714 (5th Cir. 1974)). “In
ruling on an award for a discovery dispute, the most relevant
Johnson factors may be the time and labor expended,
the novelty and difficulty of the questions raised, the skill
required to properly perform the legal services rendered, and
the experience, reputation and ability of the
attorneys.” Davis, 2019 WL 3457609, at *10
(internal quotation marks omitted).
Once
the Court determines a lodestar figure, it must
“subtract fees for hours spent on unsuccessful claims
unrelated to successful ones.” McAfee v.
Boczar, 738 F.3d 81, 88 (4th Cir. 2013), as amended
(Jan. 23, 2014). The Court then awards “some percentage
of the remaining amount, depending on the degree of success
enjoyed by the plaintiff.” Id.
“Reasonableness
is the touchstone of any award of attorneys' fees,
” regardless of whether the award is made because of a
fee-shifting statute or as a sanction. SunTrust Mortg.,
Inc. v. AIG United Guar. Corp., 933 F.Supp.2d 762, 769
(E.D. Va. 2013). In considering the reasonableness of
attorney's fees sought as a sanction for spoliation,
courts consider “the nature of the sanctionable
conduct, the nature and extent of the inquiry necessary to
ascertain and resolve issues respecting the sanctionable
conduct, and the nature of the sanction obtained.”
SunTrust, 933 F.Supp.2d at 774. Courts will reduce
fee awards where a party employs “too many
professionals and too many hours devoted to the
sanctions-related issues, ” or neglects to exercise
adequate billing judgment. Id. at 775. Similarly, if
“much of the work was unnecessary. . . considering what
was at stake and what was achieved, ” reasonableness
will require lowering the fee award. Id. In
addition, “[p]roper documentation is the key to
ascertaining the number of hours reasonably spent on legal
tasks.” Guidry v. Clare, 442 F.Supp.2d 282,
294 (E.D. Va. 2006). Inadequate documentation is a basis for
a finding that a party has not met its burden to prove the
reasonableness of its requested fee. Id.
(“Lumping and other types of inadequate documentation
are thus a proper basis for reducing a fee award because they
prevent an accurate determination of the reasonableness of
the time expended in a case.”)
Regarding
the determination of a reasonable hourly rate, the
Court's Local Rules provide some guidance. Appendix B to
the Local Rules (“Rules and Guidelines for Determining
Attorneys' Fees in Certain Cases”) provides the
following hourly rates as guidelines:
a. Lawyers admitted to the bar for less than five (5) years:
...