United States District Court, D. Maryland
Lipton Hollander United States District Judge
2, 2018, plaintiff Alexandra Deitmeyer filed suit under the
Fair Debt Collection Practices Act ("FDCPA"), 15
U.S.C § 1692 et seq., against defendants Steven
Ryback, Esq.; Jonathan W. Bierer, Esq.; Bierer Law Group, PA.
(collectively, "Attorney Defendants"); Transworld
Systems, Inc. ("Transworld"); and 10 unnamed
defendants. ECF 1. The Attorney Defendants filed a Motion to
Dismiss, or, in the alternative, Motion for Summary Judgment
on September 5, 2018. ECF 4 (the "Motion").
Transworld joined the Motion. ECF 6.
Memorandum Opinion (ECF 10) and Order docketed August 6, 2019
(ECF 11), I granted in part and denied in part
defendants' Motion. Of relevance here, I granted
defendants' Motion as to plaintiffs claim lodged under 15
U.S.C. § 1692i(b). ECF 11.
on September 4, 2019, plaintiff filed a motion titled
"Plaintiffs Motion To Set Aside Interlocutory Order
Pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 54(b) And For Other Relief" ECF
17 ("Motion to Reconsider"). Plaintiff appended two
exhibits to her motion. ECF 17-1; ECF 17-2.
Motion to Reconsider, plaintiff avers that the
"published text of the [FDCA] . . . contains a false
statement of 15 U.S.C. § 1692i(b) not enacted by
Congress." ECF 17 at 1. According to plaintiff, this
"defect. . . induced the Court to clearly misconstrue
§ 1692(c)(b)." Id. Thus, plaintiff asks
the Court to vacate its Order dismissing her claim under
§ 1692i(b), based on "newly discovered evidence
certified by the National Archives and Records
hearing is necessary to resolve the Motion to Reconsider.
See Local Rule 105.6. For the reasons that follow, I
will deny the motion.
for reconsideration of an interlocutory order are governed by
Fed.R.Civ.P. 54(b), under which "any order ... may be
revised at any time before the entry of a judgment
adjudicating all the claims and all the parties' rights
and liabilities." A district court retains the power to
reconsider and modify its interlocutory judgments at any time
before final judgment. U.S. Tobacco Coop., Inc. v. Big
South Wholesale of Va., LLC, 899 F.3d 236, 256 (4th Cir.
2018); Am. Canoe Ass'n v. Murphy Farms, Inc.,
326 F.3d 505, 514-15 (4th Cir. 2003). Accordingly, resolution
of a motion to reconsider an interlocutory order is
"committed to the discretion of the district
court," id. at 515, with "the goal ... to
reach the correct judgment under law." Netscape
Commc'n Corp. v. ValueClick, Inc., 704
F.Supp.2d 544, 547 (E.D.Va. 2010) (internal citations
"most courts have adhered to a fairly narrow set of
grounds on which to reconsider their interlocutory orders and
opinions," and will reconsider an interlocutory order
only where "(1) there has been an intervening change in
controlling law; (2) there is additional evidence that was
not previously available; or (3) the prior decision was based
on clear error or would work manifest injustice."
Cezair v. JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A., No.
DKC-13-2928, 2014 WL 4955535, at *1 (D. Md. Sept. 30, 2014)
Rule 105.10 further limits the Court's ability to
entertain motions for reconsideration. With exceptions not
applicable here, Local Rule 105.10 provides that "any
motion to reconsider any order issued by the Court shall be
filed with the Clerk not later than fourteen (14) days after
entry of the order." See, e.g., Direct Benefits, LLC
v. TAC Fin., Inc., No. RDB-13-1185, 2019 WL 3804513, at
*4 (D. Md. Aug. 13, 2019) ("This Court has held that
untimeliness is sufficient to warrant denial of a motion for
reconsideration."); Humane Soc. of U.S. v.
Nat'l Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh,
No. DKC-13-1822, 2017 WL 1426007, *5 (D. Md. Apr, 21, 2017)
(denying motion for reconsideration where it was untimely
filed and the plaintiff "offer[ed] no persuasive
justification for suspending Local Rule 105.10"). And,
the Court ordinarily "will not grant reconsideration
based on omitted evidence" that could have been
presented to the Court before it made the interlocutory
ruling at issue, unless there are sound reasons to do so.
Paulone v. City of Frederick, Civ. No. WDQ-09-2007,
2010 WL 3000989, at *3 (D. Md. July 26, 2010).
Motion to Reconsider is untimely. The Order dismissing
plaintiffs claim premised on 5 U.S.C. § 1692i(b) was
docketed on August 6, 2019. ECF 11. Plaintiff did not file
her Motion until September 4, 2017. ECF 17. Therefore, her
filing is well outside the fourteen-day window provide by
Local Rule 105.10. And, plaintiff "offers no persuasive
justification for suspending Local Rule 105.10." See
Humane Soc. of U.S., 2017 WL 1426007, *5.
even if the Motion to Reconsider were timely, it would still
fail. Plaintiff is correct that there is a slight discrepancy
between the text of the FDCA as published in the Public Laws
and the United States Code. Section 811 (b) of Title III of
Public Law 95-109 provides: "Nothing in this
title shall be construed to authorize the brining of
legal actions by debt collectors." Pub. L. No. 95-109,
91 Stat. 874, 880 (1977) (emphasis added). Codified at 15
U.S.C. § 1692i(b), that same provision in the United
States Code reads: "Nothing in this subchapter
shall be construed to authorize the bringing of legal actions
by debt collectors." 15 U.S.C. § 1692i(b) (2019)
this discrepancy is of no legal significance. Under either
reading, § 1692i(b) "does not affirmatively
prohibit debt collectors from bringing legal actions, but
merely declines to extend the circumstances under which they
may do so[.]" ECF 10 at 24 (quoting Middlebrooks v.
Sacor Fin., Inc., No. 1:17-CV-0679-SCJ-JSA, 2018 WL
4850122, at *20 (N.D.Ga. July 25, 2018)). Accordingly, I am
satisfied that the arguments advanced by plaintiff do not
provide grounds for relief.