United States District Court, D. Maryland
Mary S.
v.
Andrew M. Saul, Acting Commissioner of Social Security[1]
LETTER
TO COUNSEL:
TIMOTHY J. SULLIVAN, UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Dear
Counsel:
On May
21, 2018, Plaintiff Mary S.[2] petitioned this Court to review
the Social Security Administration's final decision to
deny her claim for disability insurance benefits
(“DIB”). (ECF No. 1.) The parties have filed
cross-motions for summary judgment. (ECF Nos. 18 & 21.)
These motions have been referred to the undersigned with the
parties' consent pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636 and
Local Rule 301.[3] Having considered the submissions of the
parties, I find that no hearing is necessary. See
Loc. R. 105.6. This Court must uphold the decision of the
agency if it is supported by substantial evidence and if the
agency employed the proper legal standards. 42 U.S.C.
§§ 405(g), 1383(c)(3); Mascio v. Colvin,
780 F.3d 632, 634 (4th Cir. 2015). Following its review, this
Court may affirm, modify, or reverse the Commissioner, with
or without a remand. See 42 U.S.C. § 405(g);
Melkonyan v. Sullivan, 501 U.S. 89 (1991). Under
that standard, I will grant the Commissioner's motion and
deny the Plaintiff's motion. This letter explains my
rationale.
In her
application for DIB, Mary S. alleged a disability onset date
of September 8, 2009. (Tr. 203-06.) Her application was
denied initially and on reconsideration. (Tr. 126-28,
130-38.) A hearing was held before an Administrative Law
Judge (“ALJ”) on February 1, 2017 (Tr. 33-61),
and the ALJ found that Mary S. was not disabled under the
Social Security Act (Tr. 8-26). The Appeals Council denied
Mary S.'s request for review (Tr. 1-3), making the
ALJ's decision the final, reviewable decision of the
agency.
The ALJ
evaluated Mary S.'s claim for benefits using the
five-step sequential evaluation process set forth in 20
C.F.R. § 404.1520. At step one, the ALJ found that Mary
S. engaged in substantial gainful activity in 2009 and
between 2013 and February 2016. (Tr. 13.) Otherwise, the ALJ
concluded that Mary S. had not engaged in substantial gainful
activity since her alleged onset date. At step two, the ALJ
found that Mary S. suffered from the following severe
impairments during the periods when she was not engaged in
substantial gainful activity: degenerative disc disease,
peripheral vascular disease, and osteoporosis. (Tr. 14.) At
step three, the ALJ found Mary S.'s impairments,
separately and in combination, failed to meet or equal in
severity any listed impairment as set forth in 20 C.F.R.,
Chapter III, Pt. 404, Subpart P, App. 1
(“Listings”). (Tr. 14-15.) The ALJ determined
that Mary S. retained the residual functional capacity
(“RFC”) to perform work, but that the RFC was
different for the two periods during which Mary S. was not
engaged in substantial gainful activity. The ALJ explained:
[F]rom the claimant's alleged onset date to the start of
her substantial gainful activity period (2013 to February
2016) the claimant had the residual functional capacity to
perform light work as defined in 20 CFR 414.1567(b) except no
climbing of ladders, ropes, or scaffolds; occasional climbing
of stairs, or ramps; occasional stooping, crouching,
crawling, or kneeling. From the completion of her substantial
gainful activity in February 2016, the claimant has the
residual functional capacity to perform sedentary work as
defined in 20 CFR 404.1567(a) except no climbing of ladders,
ropes, or scaffolds; occasional climbing of stairs or ramps;
occasional stooping, crouching, crawling, or kneeling.
(Tr. 15.)
At step
four, relying on the testimony of a vocational expert, the
ALJ determined that Mary S. was capable of performing past
relevant work from the alleged onset date to 2013. (Tr. 23.)
However, from February 2016 to the date of the ALJ's
decision, the ALJ concluded that Mary S. was unable to
perform any past relevant work. (Tr. 24.) At step five,
relying on the testimony of a vocational expert, the ALJ
determined that there are jobs that exist in significant
numbers in the national economy that Mary S. can perform.
(Tr. 24-25.) Therefore, the ALJ found that Mary S.
was not disabled under the Social Security Act. (Tr.
26.)
Mary S.
raises two arguments in this appeal. First, she argues that
the ALJ improperly concluded that her obesity was non-severe
and inadequately explained how her obesity and bilateral knee
limitations were considered in formulating her RFC. (ECF No.
18-1 at 9-16.) Second, she argues that the RFC is not
supported by substantial evidence because it conflicts with a
medical opinion that the ALJ afforded significant weight.
(Id. at 16-18.) I will discuss both of these
arguments below.
Mary S.
first argues that the ALJ should have found that her obesity
was a severe impairment. An impairment is considered
“severe” if it significantly limits the
claimant's ability to do basic work activities. See 20
C.F.R. §§ 404.1522, 416.922. The claimant bears the
burden of proving that an impairment is severe. See Pass
v. Chater, 65 F.3d 1200, 1203 (4th Cir. 1995).
“[M]ere diagnosis says nothing about the severity of
[a] condition.” Corcoran v. Astrue, No.
SKG-08-0913, 2009 WL 3100350, at *15 (D. Md. Sept. 22, 2009).
According to SSR 02-1p, “the combined effects of
obesity with other impairments can be greater than the
effects of each of the impairments considered
separately.” SSR 02-1p, 2002 WL 34686281, at *1 (Sept.
12, 2002).[4] No. specific weight or body mass index
(“BMI”) establishes obesity as a severe
impairment. Id. Similarly, the “descriptive
terms for levels of obesity (e.g. ‘severe,'
‘extreme,' or ‘morbid' obesity) [do not]
establish whether obesity is or is not a ‘severe'
impairment for disability program purposes.”
Id. ALJs are required to “do an individualized
assessment of the impact of obesity on an individuals'
functioning.” Id. Obesity is a severe
impairment when, alone or in combination with another
impairment, it significantly limits a person's ability to
do basic work activities. Id.
The ALJ
found that Mary S.'s obesity was not a severe impairment.
Although the ALJ did not specifically explain why she
concluded that Mary S.'s obesity was not a severe
impairment, she listed several reasons why some of her
impairments (including obesity, diabetes mellitus, and
hypertension) were not severe: “they did not exist for
a continuous period of 12 months, were responsive to
medication, did not require significant medical treatment, or
did not result in any continuous exertional or non-exertional
functional limitations.” (Tr. 14.) Because the Court is
unable to review the ALJ's reasons for not classifying
Mary S.'s obesity as a severe impairment, the Court will
assume that the ALJ made an error. However, any such error is
harmless. Because Mary S. made the threshold showing that her
other impairments were severe, the ALJ continued with the
sequential evaluation process and properly considered all
impairments, both severe and non-severe, that significantly
impacted Mary S.'s ability to work. The ALJ discussed
Mary S.'s height and weight throughout her decision. (Tr.
16-18.) It is apparent that the ALJ considered the effect of
Mary S.'s obesity on its own and in combination with her
other impairments (including her knee impairments) when
formulating the RFC. Any step two error, therefore, does not
necessitate remand.
Mary
S.'s second argument is that the ALJ's RFC
determination is not supported by substantial evidence
because it is inconsistent with a medical opinion that the
ALJ afforded significant weight. The ALJ partially recited
the opinion of Dr. Kurup, a consultative examiner:
The opinion of consultative examiner, Dr. Kurup, who opined
the claimant could lift 5-10 pounds with her bilateral upper
extremities, sit for extended periods of time, stand for
30-60 minutes, walk for about 30 minutes at a slow pace with
the use of a can, and never run, stoop or crawl, was
considered. He further opined the claimant did not have
difficulty ...