United States District Court, D. Maryland
L. Hollander United States District Judge.
employment discrimination case, plaintiff Patricia Van Story,
D.D.S. sued her former employer, the Washington County Health
Department (“WCHD”), as well as the Maryland
Department of Health & Mental Hygiene (the
“MDH” or the “Department”),
Maryland Governor Larry Hogan. ECF 1. In an Amended Complaint
(ECF 15), plaintiff asserts a single count of retaliation,
“pursuant to 42 U.S.C. Section 1981 via 42 U.S.C.
Section 1983.” Id. at 1.
to the caption of the Amended Complaint, plaintiff sued WCHD,
MDH, and the Governor. Although the text of the suit
identifies MDH and WCHD as defendants, the retaliation claim
appears to be directed only at WCHD. And, the suit contains
no allegations as to Governor Hogan.
and Governor Hogan have moved to dismiss the Amended
Complaint, pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6).
ECF 18; ECF 18-1. It is supported by a memorandum of law (ECF
18-1) (collectively, the “Motion to Dismiss”) and
an exhibit. ECF 18-2. Curiously, MDH did not join in the
Motion. Van Story opposes the Motion to Dismiss (ECF 24), and
WCHD and Governor Hogan have replied. ECF 26.
January 18, 2019, Van Story filed a “Motion for Leave
to File a Second Amended Complaint.” ECF 21 (the
“Motion for Leave”). It is supported by five
exhibits. See ECF 21-2 to ECF 21-6. In the Motion
for Leave, plaintiff expressly withdraws all claims against
defendants Hogan and MDH (identified in the Motion for Leave
as the “State”). ECF 21 at 1. In light of
plaintiff's withdrawal of all claims against Hogan and
MDH, WCHD is the only remaining defendant. However, in the
Motion for Leave plaintiff seeks to add two defendants: her
former supervisors, Rod MacRae and Susan Parks, in their
individual and official capacities. See ECF 21-1 at
1, 2, ¶¶ 4-5. WCHD, Hogan, and MDH oppose the
Motion for Leave. See ECF 25. Plaintiff did not
reply, and the time to do so has expired. See Local
hearing is necessary to resolve the motions. See
Local Rule 105.6. For the reasons set forth below, I shall
deny the Motion for Leave and grant the Motion to Dismiss.
Factual and Procedural Background
alleges that WCHD “is an agency of and is governed
by” the Department. ECF 15, ¶ 3. Further, she
alleges that the Department “is the managing agency of
the State of Maryland's health care delivery system . . .
.” Id. ¶ 4.
Story, a licensed African American dentist, was employed by
WCHD from December 7, 2007 to April 2016. ECF 15,
¶¶ 2, 6 n.1. During the relevant time
period, she served as the “Dental Director/Program
Manager.” Id. ¶ 5.
one of twenty-four statutorily created county health
departments in Maryland. Md. Code (2015 Repl. Vol., 2017
Supp.), § 3-301(a) of the Health-General Article
(“H.G.”). Each county has a county health officer,
who appoints the staff of the county's health department.
H.G. § 3-306(b)(2).
November 2012, Van Story filed a complaint against her
supervisor, Rod MacRae, who was the Director of Health
Services. Id. ¶ 9. Thereafter, Susan Parks
replaced MacRae as Van Story's supervisor. Id.
Van Story alleges that after she filed “her complaint
against Mr. [MacRae], WCHD retaliated against her by any of
[sic] continued harassment and discrimination.”
Id. ¶ 10. On March 31, 2014, Parks reportedly
“disciplined” Van Story. Id. Van Story
appealed the discipline. Id.
Story complains that her “name and title were omitted
from the Department's staff directory while the
Department's Medical Director, her white counterpart, Dr.
Mark Jameson was included.” Id. ¶ 12. On
September 4, 2014, Van Story learned that “[e]ven
though [she] was the Dental Director, . . . WCHD had
previously applied for a dental grant without her knowledge
or input.” Id. ¶ 11. Instead, Parks, her
supervisor, prepared the application with a local entity.
Id. Van Story complained about the grant.
Id. ¶ 13.
October 16, 2014, WCHD “informed [Van Story] that an
employee complaint had been filed against her, and that she
was required to appear at a hearing regarding that
complaint” later that same day. Id. The
following day, plaintiff filed a charge of discrimination
with both the Maryland Commission on Civil Rights and the
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”).
Id. ¶ 14; see ECF 21-3; ECF 21-5.
six months later, on April 9, 2015, “Van Story was
terminated from her position at WCHD.” ECF 15,
¶ 16. The EEOC concluded its investigation on
June 12, 2015. Id. ¶ 17; see also ECF
1, ¶ 17. However, plaintiff did not file suit until
Motion to Dismiss
Standards of Review
noted, defendants have moved to dismiss under Fed.R.Civ.P.
12(b)(1) for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, asserting
that plaintiff's claims are barred by sovereign immunity.
Under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(1), plaintiff bears the burden of
proving, by a preponderance of evidence, the existence of
subject matter jurisdiction. See Demetres v. East West
Const., Inc., 776 F.3d 271, 272 (4th Cir. 2015); see
also The Piney Run Preservation Ass'n v. Cty. Comm'rs
of Carroll Cty., 523 F.3d 453, 459 (4th Cir. 2008);
Evans v. B.F. Perkins Co., 166 F.3d 642, 647 (4th
challenge to subject matter jurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(1)
may proceed “in one of two ways”: either a facial
challenge, asserting that the allegations pleaded in the
complaint are insufficient to establish subject matter
jurisdiction, or a factual challenge, asserting
“‘that the jurisdictional allegations of the
complaint [are] not true.'” Kerns v. United
States, 585 F.3d 187, 192 (4th Cir. 2009) (citation
omitted); accord Durden v. United States, 736 F.3d
296, 300 (4th Cir. 2013). In a facial challenge, “the
facts alleged in the complaint are taken as true, and the
motion must be denied if the complaint alleges sufficient
facts to invoke subject matter jurisdiction.”
Kerns, 585 F.3d at 192. On the other hand, in a
factual challenge, “the district court is entitled to
decide disputed issues of fact with respect to subject matter
jurisdiction.” Id. In that circumstance, the
court “may regard the pleadings as mere evidence on the
issue and may consider evidence outside the pleadings without
converting the proceeding to one for summary judgment.”
Velasco v. Gov't of Indonesia, 370 F.3d 392, 398
(4th Cir. 2004); see also United States ex rel. Vuyyuru
v. Jadhav, 555 F.3d 337, 347-48 (4th Cir. 2009);
Evans, 166 F.3d at 647.
raise a facial challenge to the Court's subject matter
jurisdiction. As indicated, this challenge is based on the
four corners of the Amended Complaint.
Fourth Circuit recently reiterated that the defense of
sovereign immunity is a jurisdictional bar, stating that
“‘sovereign immunity deprives federal courts of
jurisdiction to hear claims, and a court finding that a party
is entitled to sovereign immunity must dismiss the action for
lack of subject-matter jurisdiction.'”
Cunningham v. Gen. Dynamics Info. Tech., Inc., 888
F.3d 640, 649 (4th Cir. 2018) (quoting Ackerson v. Bean
Dredging LLC, 589 F.3d 196, 207 (5th Cir. 2009)). But, a
defendant “bears the burden of demonstrating”
sovereign immunity, because it is “akin to an
affirmative defense.” Hutto v. S.C. Ret. Sys.,
773 F.3d 536, 543 (4th Cir. 2014).
defendant may test the legal sufficiency of a complaint by
way of a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6). In re
Birmingham, 846 F.3d 88, 92 (4th Cir. 2017); Goines
v. Valley Cmty. Servs. Bd., 822 F.3d 159, 165-66 (4th
Cir. 2016); McBurney v. Cuccinelli, 616 F.3d 393,
408 (4th Cir. 2010), aff'd sub nom.,
McBurney v. Young, 569 U.S. 221 (2013); Edwards
v. City of Goldsboro, 178 F.3d 231, 243 (4th Cir. 1999).
A Rule 12(b)(6) motion constitutes an assertion by a
defendant that, even if the facts alleged by a plaintiff are
true, the complaint fails as a matter of law “to state
a claim upon which relief can be granted.”
a complaint states a claim for relief is assessed by
reference to the pleading requirements of Fed.R.Civ.P.
8(a)(2). That rule provides that a complaint must contain a
“short and plain statement of the claim showing that
the pleader is entitled to relief.” The purpose of the
rule is to provide the defendants with “fair
notice” of the claims and the “grounds” for
entitlement to relief. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly,
550 U.S. 544, 555-56 (2007).
survive a motion under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6), a complaint
must contain facts sufficient to “state a claim to
relief that is plausible on its face.”
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570; see Ashcroft v.
Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 684 (2009) (citation omitted)
(“Our decision in Twombly expounded the
pleading standard for ‘all civil actions' . . .
.”); see also Paradise Wire & Cable Defined
Benefit Pension Plan v. Weil, 918 F.3d 312, 317 (4th
Cir. 2019); Willner v. Dimon, 849 F.3d 93, 112 (4th
Cir. 2017). To be sure, a plaintiff need not include
“detailed factual allegations” in order to
satisfy Rule 8(a)(2). Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555.
Moreover, federal pleading rules “do not countenance
dismissal of a complaint for imperfect statement of the legal
theory supporting the claim asserted.” Johnson v.
City of Shelby, Miss., 574 U.S. 10,, 135 S.Ct. 346, 346
(2014) (per curiam). But, mere “‘naked
assertions' of wrongdoing” are generally
insufficient to state a claim for relief. Francis v.
Giacomelli, 588 F.3d 186, 193 (4th Cir. 2009) (citation
other words, the rule demands more than bald accusations or
mere speculation. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555; see
Painter's Mill Grille, LLC v. Brown, 716 F.3d 342,
350 (4th Cir. 2013). If a complaint provides no more than
“labels and conclusions” or “a formulaic
recitation of the elements of a cause of action, ” it
is insufficient. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555.
“[A]n unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me
accusation” does not state a plausible claim of relief.
Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. Rather, to satisfy the
minimal requirements of Rule 8(a)(2), the complaint must set
forth “enough factual matter (taken as true) to
suggest” a cognizable cause of action, “even if .
. . [the] actual proof of those facts is improbable and . . .
recovery is very remote and unlikely.”
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556 (internal quotation marks
reviewing a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, a court “must accept
as true all of the factual allegations contained in the
complaint” and must “draw all reasonable
inferences [from those facts] in favor of the
plaintiff.” E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v.
Kolon Indus., Inc., 637 F.3d 435, 440 (4th Cir. 2011)
(citations omitted); see Semenova v. MTA, 845 F.3d
564, 567 (4th Cir. 2017); Houck v. Substitute Tr. Servs.,
Inc., 791 F.3d 473, 484 (4th Cir. 2015); Kendall v.
Balcerzak, 650 F.3d 515, 522 (4th Cir. 2011), cert.
denied, 565 U.S. 943 (2011). But, a court is not
required to accept legal conclusions drawn from the facts.
See Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286 (1986);
Glassman v. Arlington Cty., 628 F.3d 140, 146 (4th
Cir. 2010). “A court decides whether [the pleading]
standard is met by separating the legal conclusions from the
factual allegations, assuming the truth of only the factual
allegations, and then determining whether those allegations
allow the court to reasonably infer” that the plaintiff
is entitled to the legal remedy sought. A Society Without
a Name v. Virginia, 655 F.3d 342, 346 (4th. Cir. 2011),
cert. denied, 566 U.S. 937 (2012).
ordinarily do not “‘resolve contests surrounding
the facts, the merits of a claim, or the applicability of
defenses'” through a Rule 12(b)(6) motion.
Edwards, 178 F.3d at 243 (quoting Republican
Party v. Martin, 980 F.2d 943, 952 (4th Cir. 1992)).
However, “in the relatively rare circumstances where
facts sufficient to rule on an affirmative defense are
alleged in the complaint, the defense may be reached by a
motion to dismiss filed under Rule 12(b)(6).”
Goodman v. Praxair, Inc., 494 F.3d 458, 464 (4th
Cir. 2007) (en banc); accord Pressley v. Tupperware Long
Term Disability Plan, 553 F.3d 334, 336 (4th Cir. 2009).
Because Rule 12(b)(6) “is intended [only] to test the
legal adequacy of the complaint, ” Richmond,
Fredericksburg & Potomac R.R. Co. v. Forst, 4 F.3d
244, 250 (4th Cir. 1993), “[t]his principle only
applies . . . if all facts necessary to the affirmative
defense ‘clearly appear[ ] on the face of the
complaint.'” Goodman, 494 F.3d at 464 (quoting
Forst, 4 F.3d at 250) (emphasis added in
when a defendant moves to dismiss a complaint under Rule
12(b)(6), courts are limited to considering the sufficiency
of allegations set forth in the complaint and the
‘documents attached or incorporated into the
complaint.'” Zak v. Chelsea Therapeutics
Int'l, Ltd., 780 F.3d 597, 606 (4th Cir. 2015)
(quoting E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 637 F.3d
at 448). The court “may not consider any documents that
are outside of the complaint, or not expressly incorporated
therein . . . .” Clatterbuck v. City of
Charlottesville, 08 F.3d 549, 557 (4th Cir. 2013);
see Bosiger v. U.S. Airways, Inc., 510 F.3d 442, 450
(4th Cir. 2007).
under limited circumstances, when resolving a Rule 12(b)(6)
motion, a court may consider documents beyond the complaint
without converting the motion to dismiss to one for summary
judgment. Goldfarb v. Mayor & City Council of
Baltimore, 791 F.3d 500, 508 (4th Cir. 2015). In
particular, a court may properly consider documents that are
“explicitly incorporated into the complaint by
reference and those attached to the complaint as
exhibits.” Goines, 822 F.3d at 166 (citation
omitted); see also Six v. Generations Fed. Credit
Union, 891 F.3d 508, 512 (4th Cir. 2018); Anand v.
Ocwen Loan Servicing, LLC, 754 F.3d 195, 198 (4th Cir.
2014); U.S. ex rel. Oberg v. Pa. Higher Educ. Assistance
Agency, 745 F.3d 131, 136 (4th Cir. 2014); Am.
Chiropractic Ass'n v. Trigon Healthcare, Inc., 367
F.3d 212, 234 (4th Cir. 2004), cert. denied, 543
U.S. 979 (2004); Phillips v. LCI Int'l Inc., 190
F.3d 609, 618 (4th Cir. 1999).
“before treating the contents of an attached or
incorporated document as true, the district court should
consider the nature of the document and why the plaintiff
attached it.” Goines, 822 F.3d at 167 (citing
N. Ind. Gun & Outdoor Shows, Inc. v. City of S.
Bend, 163 F.3d 449, 455 (7th Cir. 1998)). And,
“[w]hen the plaintiff attaches or incorporates a
document upon which his claim is based, or when the complaint
otherwise shows that the plaintiff has adopted the contents
of the document, crediting the document over conflicting
allegations in the complaint is proper.”
Goines, 822 F.3d at 167. Conversely, “where
the plaintiff attaches or incorporates a document for
purposes other than the truthfulness of the document, it is
inappropriate to treat the contents of that document as
may also “consider a document submitted by the movant
that [is] not attached to or expressly incorporated in a
complaint, so long as the document was integral to the
complaint and there is no dispute about the document's
authenticity.” Goines, 822 F.3d at 166
(citations omitted); see also Woods v. City of
Greensboro, 855 F.3d 639, 642 (4th Cir. 2017), cert.
Denied, ___ U.S.___, 138 S.Ct. 558 (2017);
Oberg, 745 F.3d at 136; Kensington Volunteer
Fire Dep't. v. Montgomery Cty., 684 F.3d 462, 467
(4th Cir. 2012). To be “integral, ” a document
must be one “that by its ‘very existence, and
not the mere information it contains, gives rise to the
legal rights asserted.'” Chesapeake Bay Found.,
Inc. v. Severstal Sparrows Point, LLC, 794 F.Supp.2d
602, 611 (D. Md. 2011) (citation omitted) (emphasis in
original). See also Fed. R. Civ. P. 10(c) (“A
copy of a written instrument that is an exhibit to a pleading
is a part of the pleading for all purposes.”).
addition, without converting a motion to dismiss into a
motion for summary judgment, “a court may properly take
judicial notice of ‘matters of public record' and
other information that, under Federal Rule of Evidence 201,
constitute ‘adjudicative facts.'”
Goldfarb, 791 F.3d at 508; see also Tellabs,
Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308,
322 (2007); Katyle v. Penn Nat'l Gaming, Inc.,
637 F.3d 462, 466 (4th Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 565
U.S. 825 (2011); Philips v. Pitt Cty. Mem. Hosp.,
572 F.3d 176, 180 (4th Cir. 2009). This includes
“docket entries, pleadings and papers in other cases .
. . .” Brown v. Ocwen Loan Servicing, LLC,
PJM-14-3454, 2015 WL 5008763, at *1 n. 3 (D. Md. Aug. 20,
2015), aff'd, 639 Fed.Appx. 200 (4th Cir. May 6,
2016); cf. Anderson v. Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp., 918
F.2d 1139, 1141 n. 1 (4th Cir. 1990) (concluding that a
district court may “properly take judicial notice of
its own records”). However, “these facts [must
be] construed in the light most favorable” to the
non-movant. Clatterbuck v. City of Charlottesville,
708 F.3d 549, 557 (4th Cir. 2013) (abrogated on other
grounds by Reed v. Town of Gilbert, Ariz., 576
U.S.___, 135 S.Ct. 2218 (2015), as recognized in Cahaly
v. Larosa, 796 F.3d 399 (4th Cir. 2015)). But, under
Fed.R.Evid. 201, a court may take judicial notice of
adjudicative facts only if they are “not subject to
reasonable dispute, ” in that they are “(1)
generally known within the territorial jurisdiction of the
trial court or (2) capable of accurate and ready
determination by resort to sources whose accuracy cannot
reasonably be questioned.”
submitted the affidavit of Beth Reid, Deputy Director of the
Office of Human Resources for the MDH. ECF 18-2. I need not
consider this exhibit to resolve the Motion.
42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1983
to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, plaintiff alleges a violation of
rights guaranteed in 42 U.S.C. § 1981. Section 1983
establishes a cause of action against any
“person” who, acting under color of state law,
“subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of
the United States or other person within the jurisdiction
thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or
immunities secured by the Constitution and laws” of the
United States. It “‘is not itself a source of
substantive rights,' but merely provides ‘a method
for vindicating federal rights elsewhere
conferred.'” Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S.
266, 271 (1994) (quoting Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S.
137, 144 n.3 (1979)).
plaintiff invokes § 1983 as a vehicle for the contention
that defendants discriminated against her on the basis of
race, in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1981. Section 1981
prohibits, inter alia, “discrimination in
employment on the basis of race.” Yashenko v.
Harrah's NC Casino Co., LLC, 446 F.3d 541, 551-52
(4th Cir. 2006); see Johnson v. Ry. Express Agency,
Inc., 421 U.S. 454, 459-60 (1975) (“§ 1981
affords a federal remedy against discrimination in private
employment on the basis of race.”); Nnadozie v.
Genesis Healthcare Corp., 730 Fed. App'x 151, 156
(4th Cir. 2018).
1981(a) provides, in part: “All persons within the
Jurisdiction of the United States shall have the same right .
. . to make and enforce contracts, to sue, be parties, give
evidence, and to the full and equal benefit of all laws . . .
as is enjoyed by white citizens.” Section 1981(b)
states: “For purposes of this section, the term
‘make and enforce contracts' includes the making,
performance, modification, and termination of contracts, and
the enjoyment of all benefits, privileges, terms, and
conditions of the contractual relationship.”
Id. Section 1981(b), enacted as part of the Civil
Rights Act of 1991, ensures that § 1981 applies not
“only to the formation of a contract” but also to
“‘conduct by the employer after the contract
relation has been established, including breach of the
terms of the contract or imposition of discriminatory working
conditions.'” CBOCS West, Inc. v.
Humphries, 553 U.S. 442, 449 (2008) (emphasis in
original) (quoting Patterson v. McLean Credit Union,
491 U.S. 164, 177 (1989)) (discussing post-Patterson
enactment of § 1981(b)).
framework for proof of a claim of retaliation under §
1981 is the same as the framework applicable to a claim under
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §
2000e et seq. (“Title VII”). See
Guessous v. Fairview Prop. Invs., LLC, 828 F.3d
208, 216 (4th Cir. 2016); Boyer-Liberto v. Fontainebleau
Corp., 786 F.3d 264, 281 (4th Cir. 2015) (en banc);
Hawkins v. PepsiCo, Inc., 203 F.3d 274, 281 n. 1
(4th Cir. 2000). To state a claim for retaliation, plaintiff
must aver that: (1) she engaged in protected activity; (2)
the employer took a materially adverse action against her;
and (3) the protected activity and the adverse action were
causally connected. See Guessous, 828 F.3d at 217;
Boyer-Liberto, 786 F.3d at 281.
contends that it is protected from plaintiff's suit in
federal court based on sovereign immunity under the Eleventh
Amendment. ECF 18-1 at 5-8. The Eleventh Amendment provides:
“The Judicial power of the United States shall not be
construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced
or prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of
another state, or by Citizens or subjects of any Foreign
the Eleventh Amendment, states generally enjoy immunity from
suits brought in federal court by their own citizens. See
Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 3 (1890); see also
Bd. of Trustees of Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S.
356, 363 (2001) (“The ultimate guarantee of the
Eleventh Amendment is that nonconsenting states may not be
sued by private individuals in federal court.”).
Therefore, absent consent or a valid congressional abrogation
of sovereign immunity, the Eleventh Amendment bars a private
individual from bringing suit against a state in federal
court to recover damages, unless there is an exception to
sovereign immunity. See Coleman v. Court of Appeals of
Md., 556 U.S. 30, 35 (2012) (“A foundational
premise of the federal system is that States, as sovereigns,
are immune from suits for damages, save as they elect to
waive that defense.”); Va. Office for Prot. &
Advocacy v. Stewart, 563 U.S. 247 (2011); see also
Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 54-55
(1996) (“For over a century we have reaffirmed that
federal jurisdiction over suits against unconsenting States
was not contemplated by the Constitution when establishing
the judicial power of the United States.”) (internal
quotation marks and citation omitted); Edelman v.
Jordan, 415 U.S. 651 (1974).
Eleventh Amendment did not create sovereign immunity,
however. Rather, it preserved the sovereign immunity that the
states enjoyed prior to the formation of the Union. See
Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 724 (1999); see also
Sossamon v. Texas, 563 U.S. 277, 284 (2011). State
sovereign immunity “accord[s] states the dignity that
is consistent with their status as sovereign
entities[.]” Fed. Mar. Comm'n v. S.C. State
Ports Auth., 535 U.S. 743, 760 (2002).
import here, sovereign immunity also bars suit against an
instrumentality of a state, sometimes referred to as an
“arm of the state, ” including state agencies.
See Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman,
465 U.S. 89, 101-02 (1984) (“It is clear, of course,
that in the absence of consent a suit in which the State or
one of its agencies or departments is named as the defendant
is proscribed by the Eleventh Amendment.”); see
also Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Doe, 519 U.S. 425, 429
(1997); Pense v. Maryland Dep't of Pub. Safety &
Corr. Servs., 926 F.3d 97, 100 (4th Cir. 2019)
McCray v. Md. Dep't of Transp., Md. Transit
Admin., 741 F.3d 480, 483 (4th Cir. 2014); Bland v.
Roberts, 730 F.3d 368, 389 (4th Cir. 2013);
Constantine v. Rectors and Visitors of George Mason
Univ., 411 F.3d 474, 479 (4th Cir. 2005). The question
here, addressed infra, is whether WCHD is an arm of
Fourth Circuit has noted three exceptions to the Eleventh
Amendment's prohibition of suits against a state or an
arm of the state. In Lee-Thomas v. Prince George's
Cnty. Pub. Sch., 666 F.3d 244 (4th Cir. ...