United States District Court, D. Maryland
MARYLAND RESTORATIVE JUSTICE INITIATIVE, et al. Plaintiffs,
v.
HOGAN, et al. Defendants.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
MARK
COULSON UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE.
This
case concerns a challenge to the constitutionality of
Maryland's parole system as applied to individuals who
received sentences of life imprisonment with parole for
homicide offenses committed as juveniles. The Maryland
Restorative Justice Initiative (“MRJI”) filed
suit on behalf of Calvin McNeill, Nathaniel Foster, and
Kenneth Tucker (collectively, “Plaintiffs”)
against four Maryland officials in their official capacities:
Governor Larry Hogan; David Blumberg, Chair of the Maryland
Parole Commission; Stephen Moyer, Secretary of the Maryland
Department of Public Safety and Correctional Services; and
Dayena M. Corcoran, Commissioner of the Maryland Division of
Correction, (collectively, the “State”).
This
case was referred to me for resolution of all discovery and
related scheduling matters pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636
and Local Rule 301. (ECF No. 85). Now pending before the
Court is Plaintiffs' Motion for Reconsideration of
September 27, 2017 Order Regarding Production of Risk
Assessments. (ECF No. 208-1). The issues are fully briefed,
(ECF Nos. 208-15 and 208-21), and no hearing is necessary.
See Loc. R. 105.6 (D. Md. 2018). For the reasons below,
Plaintiffs' motion will be DENIED.
I.
Background
On
September 27, 2017, this Court granted in part and denied in
part Plaintiffs' first motion to compel concerning a
number of discovery requests. (ECF No. 88). In doing so, the
Court declined to compel a full response to Request for
Production 4: “[a]ll documents relating to all risk
assessments conducted on any Lifer on or after January 1,
1995.” Despite the Plaintiffs' insistence that the
“Risk Assessments” are necessary for them to
fully understand the parole/commutation process in Maryland,
the Court declined to order the request in full. Along with
sharing the State's concerns over producing such highly
sensitive personal information, the Court acknowledged that
Plaintiffs' suit challenges the process as a whole, and
not as it was applied to any one individual. That is,
although the Court agreed that Plaintiffs should have an
understanding of the kinds of information being
collected on the Risk Assessment, the particular responses
for any given inmate were less relevant, intrusive, and
burdeonsome. Accordingly, the Court ordered that a sampling
of the Risk Assessment would impart what was germane while
minimizing exposure of highly sensitive information and the
accompanying burdens of production. Specifically, the Court
ordered the State to produce six sample Risk Assessments
(three from juvenile lifers and three from adult lifers) with
the personally-identifiable information redacted.
The six
assessments were produced in approximately May 2018. (ECF No.
208-3 at 4). In doing so the State provided the Risk
Assessments of a juvenile and adult lifer who had been
paroled following commutation by the Governor; the Risk
Assessments of a juvenile and adult lifer who had been
disapproved for commutation by the Governor; and the Risk
Assessments of a juvenile and adult lifer whom the Commission
had declined to recommend for parole or commutation. (ECF No.
208-15 at 4). Plaintiff now argues that circumstances
necessitate reconsideration and, ultimately, the production
of “at least 20% of the juvenile lifer assessments
responsive to MRJI's discovery requests, to be
selected by Plaintiffs.” (ECF No. 208-1 at 2)
(emphasis retained). This Court disagrees.
II.
Standard of Review
Under
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b), “any order or
other decision, however designated, that adjudicates fewer
than all the claims or the rights and liabilities of fewer
than all the parties” may be revisited by the court at
any time before an entry of final judgment. Fed.R.Civ.P.
54(b). While Rule 54 does not set forth the standard for
reconsideration of interlocutory orders, such as the
discovery ruling at issue here, the Fourth Circuit has held
that a motion for reconsideration under Rule 54 is not
subject to the same “strict standards” applicable
to motions for reconsideration of a final judgment. Am.
Canoe Ass'n v. Murphy Farms, Inc., 326 F.3d 505, 514
(4th Cir. 2003). Despite this relative leniency, “most
courts have adhered to a fairly narrow set of grounds on
which to reconsider their interlocutory orders and opinions,
” and will reconsider an interlocutory order only
where: “(1) there has been an intervening change in
controlling law; (2) there is additional evidence that was
not previously available; or (3) the prior decision was based
on clear error or would work manifest injustice.”
Cezair v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., No.
DKC-13-2928, 2014 WL 4955535, at *1 (D. Md. Sept. 30, 2014)
(citations omitted).[1]
III.
Discussion
Plaintiffs
argue that circumstances have changed to a point that
justifies reconsideration of this Court's September 27,
2017 decision as to the Risk Assessments. Specifically,
Plaintiffs assert that additional production is warranted
because circumstances now reveal just how central of a role
the assessments play in the process, and the past concerns
over confidentiality no longer exist because of the
protective order. Plaintiffs request that this Court alter
the ruling to instead order the production of “at least
20% of the juvenile lifer risk assessments responsive to
MRJI's discovery requests, to be selected by
Plaintiffs.” (ECF No. 208-1 at 2) (emphasis
retained).
The
State argues that the changing landscape of this case does
everything but justify more discovery. To the
contrary, the State points to the burdens of making such a
production and argues that it is patently disproportional
when compared to the recent appellate decisions concerning
the subject matter of this case, as well as that changing
statuses of the Plaintiff's themselves.[2] Lastly, the State
contends that the burdens of production are disproportional
to what is sought; if this case is about the process as a
whole, a massive sample size (such as “at least
20%”) to review particular data for specific
inmates' situations is not justified.
While
arguments of proportionality have some weight in any
discovery matter, the starting point for a motion for
reconsideration of an interlocutory order is whether
Plaintiffs have articulated any compelling reason for
reconsideration in light of the standard.
First,
Plaintiffs do not point to any intervening changes in the
controlling law. Second, Plaintiffs do not supply any new
evidence that would cause this Court to reconsider its
ruling. Simply put, Plaintiffs argue that the Risk
Assessments are far more significant than initially believed
such that many more should be produced. The Court does not
see these assertions as necessarily connected. The fact that
Risk Assessment as a tool in the parole process are more
prominent does not address why the sample assessments already
provided are insufficient.
Lastly,
this Court does not view Plaintiffs' expert's input,
the passage of the protective order, or allegations of
“gaming the system” as amounting to “clear
error ...