United States District Court, D. Maryland, Southern Division
J. HAZEL, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE.
Wendy Miller brings this pro se action against
Defendants Delores C. Butler, Ed Haraway, Alex Echeandia,
Jeremy Marshall, Fifth Third Bank Mortgage, Franklin American
Mortgage Company, and Penny Mac in connection with the
circumstances surrounding her purchase of the real property
at 13047 Marquette Lane, Bowie, Maryland 20715 (the
Property).ECF No. 1 at 7. Pending before the Court
are Defendants' Motions to Dismiss. ECF Nos. 11, 13, 17,
28, 34, 38, & 47. No. hearing is necessary. See
Loc. R. 105.6 (D. Md. 2016). Because the Complaint is
insufficient and does not comply with federal pleading
requirements, Defendants' Motions to Dismiss for failure
to state a claim, ECF Nos. 11, 13, 17, 28, 34, & 38, will
be granted. Further, because Defendant Jeremy Marshall was
never served, Defendants' Motion to Dismiss for Failure
to Serve, ECF No. 47, will be granted.
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8, a Complaint shall contain
“a short and plain statement of the claim showing that
the pleader is entitled to relief, ” and “each
allegation must be simple, concise, and direct.”
Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a); Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(d)(1). Further, to state a
claim that survives a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, a complaint,
relying on only well-pled factual allegations, must state at
least a “plausible claim for relief.”
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009). The
“mere recital of elements of a cause of action,
supported only by conclusory statements, is not sufficient to
survive a motion made pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6).”
Walters v. McMahen, 684 F.3d 435, 439 (4th Cir.
2012). To determine whether a claim has crossed “the
line from conceivable to plausible, ” the Court must
employ a “context-specific inquiry, ” drawing on
the court's “experience and common sense.”
Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679-80. When performing this
inquiry, the Court accepts “all well-pled facts as true
and construes these facts in the light most favorable to the
plaintiff in weighing the legal sufficiency of the
complaint.” Nemet Chevrolet, Ltd. v.
Consumeraffairs.com, Inc., 591 F.3d 250, 255 (4th Cir.
2009). The Court need not, however, accept unsupported legal
allegations, Revene v. Charles Cnty. Comm'rs,
882 F.2d 870, 873 (4th Cir. 1989), nor must it agree with
legal conclusions couched as factual allegations,
Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678, or conclusory factual
allegations devoid of any reference to actual events,
United Black Firefighters v. Hirst, 604 F.2d 844,
847 (4th Cir. 1979); see also Francis v. Giacomelli,
588 F.3d 186, 193 (4th Cir. 2009). “[U]nadorned, the
defendant-unlawfully-harmed me accusation[s]” or
“naked assertions devoid of further factual
enhancement” do not suffice. Iqbal, 556 U.S.
at 678. Although the Court must accept well-pleaded factual
allegations in the Complaint as true, the Court is “not
bound to accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a
factual allegation, ” and “[t]hreadbare recitals
of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere
conclusory statements, do not suffice” and “are
not entitled to the assumption of truth.” Id.
se complaints must be construed liberally and must be
“held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings
drafted by lawyers.” Erickson v. Pardus, 551
U.S. 89, 94 (2007). However, “[p]rinciples requiring
generous construction of pro se complaints are not .
. . without limits.” Beauciett v. City of
Hampton, 775 F.2d 1274, 1278 (4th Cir. 1985). Courts are
not required to “conjure up questions never squarely
presented to them” nor “construct full blown
claims from sentence fragments.” Id.
of a concise statement of facts as to the underlying causes
of action, Plaintiff's allegations are difficult to
understand, contained in various documents attached to the
Complaint, and replete with legal statements and conclusions.
ECF No. 1; ECF No. 1-3. For example, Plaintiff asserts that
she “suffered Intentional and Emotional distress”
but does not allege facts to show that she is entitled to
relief for an intentional infliction of emotional distress
claim. ECF No. 1 at 7. To state a claim for intentional
infliction of emotional distress, plaintiffs must allege that
a defendant's conduct was intentional or reckless,
extreme and outrageous, and causally connected to the
suffered severe emotional distress. Baltimore-Clark v.
Kinko's Inc., 270 F.Supp.2d 695, 701 (2003) (citing
Harris v. Jones, 281 Md. 560, 566, 380 A.2d 611, 614
(1977). Here, however, Plaintiff does not allege any facts
showing that Defendant's conduct was intentional or met
the “intentional or reckless” and “extreme
and outrageous” thresholds. See ECF No. 1.
Similarly, she does not allege facts demonstrating how her
emotional distress manifested itself or that it was severe.
See Id. Instead, she offers only the naked assertion
that she suffered intentional emotional distress. ECF No. 1
Plaintiff refers to the Truth in Lending Act (TILA), 15
U.S.C. § 1631, et seq., without alleging facts
that support that she has been aggrieved under this statute
within the relevant statute of limitations period. Claims
brought pursuant to TILA must be brought within one year of
the date of the occurrence of the violation. 15 U.S.C. §
1640(e). But Plaintiff's Complaint, filed in 2018, only
refers to facts dating back to 2009. ECF No. 1 at 7.
also makes reference to a “fraudulent mortgage
contract.” However, Plaintiff's allegations related
to a fraudulent contract amount only to “unadorned, the
defendant-unlawfully-harmed me accusations” that are
“devoid of further factual enhancement.”
Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. Moreover, to sufficiently
allege any claim for fraud, the circumstances constituting
fraud must “be stated with particularity.”
Adams v. NVR Homes, Inc., 193 F.R.D. 243, 250 (D.
Md. 2000). Plaintiff's Complaint fails to meet this
Plaintiff has failed to provide a short and plain statement
of his claims showing that he is entitled to relief,
Defendants' Motions to Dismiss for failure to state a
claim are granted.
have also moved to dismiss Defendant Jeremy Marshall because
he has not been served. Rule 4(m) provides “If a
defendant is not served within 90 days after the complaint is
filed, the court-on motion or on its own after notice to the
plaintiff-must dismiss the action without prejudice against
that defendant or order that service be made within a
specified time.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 4(m). Plaintiff filed her
Complaint on October 9, 2018. ECF No. 1. Defendant Jeremy
Marshall has not been served. As a result, Defendants'
Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Service is granted.
separate Order shall issue.
 The Court notes that Orlando Antonio
Acosta has purported to file documents on Plaintiff's
behalf in this action. ECF No. 23; ECF No. 30. Acosta is not
licensed to practice law in Maryland or any state. ECF No.
33-2 ¶¶ 3-4. A non-attorney may not appear as
counsel in this Court even if granted power-of-attorney
authority by an unrepresented party. See Local Rule
10 1.1.a. The Court cautions Acosta that ...