United States District Court, D. Maryland
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
DEBORAH K. CHASANOW UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE.
judgment entered May 2, 2016, Petitioner Colbert Juan Jones,
Jr. was convicted, upon his guilty plea, of conspiracy to
distribute and possess with intent to distribute 500 grams or
more of cocaine (count 1) and felon in possession of a
firearm (count 2). Consistent with the terms of his
Fed.R.Civ.P. 11(c)(1)(C) plea agreement, he was sentenced to
concurrent terms of one hundred and twenty (120) months
incarceration followed by four years of supervised release.
(ECF No. 162). Mr. Jones noted an appeal on May 16, 2016.
(ECF No. 127 at 5; ECF No. 164). The United States Court of
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed this court's
judgment on April 27, 2017 (ECF No. 212) and issued a mandate
on May 19, 2017 (ECF No. 213).
Jones filed the instant motion on May 20, 2019, pursuant to
“Rule 3582(c)” requesting a reduction of his sentence
so that he realizes the sentence reduction benefit of the
Residential Drug Abuse Program (“RDAP” or
“the program”). (ECF No. 224). For qualifying
participants who complete RDAP, their sentence “may be
reduced by the Bureau of Prisons, but such reduction may not
be more than one year from the term the prisoner must
otherwise serve.” 18 U.S.C. § 3621(e)(2)(B).
Although a prisoner may still participate in the program, he
does not qualify for the sentencing benefit if, among other
restrictions, his offense of conviction “involved the
carrying, possession, or use of a firearm.” 28 C.F.R.
§ 550.55(b)(5)(ii). Mr. Jones, who may be in the process
of completing RDAP (see ECF No. 224 at 5 (“. . .
pending the Petitioner's graduation from the BOP's
RDAP program.”), appears to recognize that he does not
qualify for RDAP's sentencing benefit because of his
firearm conviction, but nonetheless requests that the court
grant him an equivalent reduction to his sentence based on
reductions in his Sentencing Guidelines calculation to which
he believes he is entitled.
to 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c),  a “court may not modify a
term of imprisonment once it has been imposed” unless
(1) a motion is filed by the Director of the Bureau of
Prisons on certain grounds; (2) the “sentencing
range” for the crime of conviction “has
subsequently been lowered”; or (3) modification is
permitted “by statute or by Rule 35 of the Federal
Rules of Criminal Procedure[.]” As the Director of the
Bureau of Prisons has not petitioned the court for
modification and the sentencing range applicable to
Defendant's crime of conviction has not been subsequently
lowered, the only provision that could potentially apply is
Rule 35. That rule permits a defendant to petition the court,
within fourteen days after sentencing, to “correct a
sentence that resulted from arithmetical, technical, or other
clear error.” Fed.R.Crim.P. 35(a). Here, Petitioner
does not allege any error in his sentence. The other grounds
for relief under Rule 35 apply only where the government
petitions the court for a sentence reduction, which has not
occurred here. Thus, Petitioner is ineligible for relief
under 18 U.S.C. §3582(c).
this court is without authority to grant the relief requested
it is this 30th day of May, 2019, by the United
States District Court for the District of Maryland, ORDERED
Petitioner's motion for a reduction of sentence pursuant
to Rule 3582(c) (ECF No. 224) BE, and the same hereby IS,
clerk is directed to transmit copies of this Memorandum
Opinion and Order to Petitioner and counsel for the
 See 18 U.S.C. §
 Petitioner cites to United States
v. Clay, 627 F.3d 959 (4th Cir. 2010) in support of his
argument. However, Clay is inapplicable here, among other
reasons, because it was a challenge on direct appeal rather
brought pursuant to under the very limited circumstances
permitted by § 3582.
 In any event, Mr. Jones' arguments
are without merit. Under the terms of his Rule 11(c)(1)(C)
agreement, he specifically agreed to a sentence of 120
months' imprisonment. (ECF No. 127 at 5). Moreover, even
if Mr. Jones had not agreed to the specific term of
imprisonment, he also agreed that his base offense level for
the firearm offense was driven by Sentencing Guidelines
§ 2K2.1(a)(2); the reduction to offense level six that
Mr. Jones seeks under § 2K2.1(b)(2) for possessing the
firearm for sporting purposes is expressly inapplicable where
the base offense level is determined under § 2K2.1(a)(2)
See U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(b)(2)(“If the defendant,
other than a defendant subject to ...