United States District Court, D. Maryland
ISAAC T. BOLDEN, JR., Plaintiff,
STEPHEN T. MOYER, et al, Defendants.
David Copperthite United States Magistrate Judge.
Court has before it Defendants' Motion to Dismiss or, in
the alternative, Motion for Summary Judgment (the
"Motion to Dismiss") (ECF No. 30). Defendants
allege that Plaintiff has failed to state a claim upon which
relief may be granted and alternatively, in the light most
favorable to the Plaintiff, there exists no dispute of
material fact, entitling Defendants to summary judgment.
Plaintiff has responded that there is a dispute of material
fact and Plaintiff is entitled to relief. After considering
the Motion to Dismiss and the responses thereto (ECF Nos. 33,
36), the Court finds that no hearing is necessary. See Loc.R.
105.6 (D.Md. 2018). For the reasons set forth below, the
Court GRANTS the Motion to Dismiss and, in the alternative,
Summary Judgment to Defendants on all Counts.
2, 2006, Plaintiff pled guilty to first-degree rape and
first-degree assault in the Circuit Court for Prince
George's County. ECF No. 29 at 6, ¶ 17; ECF No. 30-2
at 3-4. Plaintiff was sentenced to 25 years'
incarceration with all but 15 years suspended concurrent to
both counts of conviction. ECF No. 30-2 at 8. The Division of
Correction ("DOC") calculated Plaintiffs maximum
confinement date as November 26, 2020. ECF No. 30-3.
Plaintiff does not contest any of these facts.
Plaintiff does contest is that his release date of September
1, 2015 was incorrect and that August 30, 2015 was correct
and since it was a weekend, he should have been released on
August 28, 2015, four days prior to September 1. ECF No. 29
at 6, ¶¶ 16, 19. Plaintiff also alleges that he
should have been entitled to an additional 780 special
project diminution credits for his participation in the
"Youth Offenders Patuxent Program," which would
have resulted in release sometime in August 2013.
Id. at 5-6, ¶¶ 13-16. Plaintiff states
that if he was not entitled to the 780 additional credits,
then his release date should have been August 28, 2015, as
stated previously. See Id. at 6, ¶¶ 17-18.
complaint, Plaintiff alleges violations of the Fifth, Eighth,
Ninth, and Fourteenth Amendments against all Defendants in
Count I; violations of the Maryland Declaration of Rights,
Articles XXIV and XXVI in Count II; and violations of
Maryland state law in claims set forth in Count III.
Id. at 12-15, ¶¶ 52-65. The Court has
reviewed the allegations of violations of civil rights and
state law claims set forth in the Complaint. The Court finds
that it is not necessary to reach the constitutional merits
of the claim or liability of any Defendant since the
underlying basis of the lawsuit-the calculation of the
release date of Plaintiff-lacks any merit and the Motion to
Dismiss or, in the alternative, Motion for Summary Judgment
original Complaint was filed in the Circuit Court for
Baltimore City on August 27, 2018 and removed by Defendants
to this Court on October 16, 2018. ECF No. I. On January 7,
2019, Plaintiff amended the Complaint. ECF No. 29. On January
22, 2019, Defendants filed the Motion to Dismiss. ECF No. 30.
Plaintiff filed an opposition on February 22, 2019, ECF No.
33, and Defendants replied on March 15, 2019, ECF No. 36.
This matter is now fully briefed, and the Court has reviewed
Defendants' Motion to Dismiss, as well as the responses
thereto. For the following reasons, the Motion to Dismiss or,
in the alternative, Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED.
Standards of Review
Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim
purpose of a Rule 12(b)(6) motion is to test the sufficiency
of a complaint, not to "resolve contests surrounding the
facts, the merits of a claim, or the applicability of
defenses." King v. Rubemtein, 825 F.3d 206, 214
(4th Cir. 2016) (quoting Edwards v. City of
Goldsboro, 178 F.3d 231, 243-44 (4th Cir. 1999)). A
complaint must contain "sufficient factual matter,
accepted as true, to 'state a claim to relief that is
plausible on its face.'" Ashcroft v. Iqbal,
556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). Facial plausibility
exists "when the plaintiff pleads factual content that
allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the
defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged."
Id. An inference of a mere possibility of misconduct
is not sufficient to support a plausible claim. Id.
at 679. As stated in Twombly, "[f]actual
allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above
the speculative level." 550 U.S. at 555. "A
pleading that offers 'labels and conclusions' or
'a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of
action will not do.' Nor does a complaint suffice if it
tenders 'naked assertions' devoid of 'further
factual enhancement."' Iqbal, 556 U.S. at
678 (internal citations omitted). Although when considering a
motion to dismiss a court must accept as true all factual
allegations in the complaint, this principle does not apply
to legal conclusions couched as factual allegations.
Twombfy, 550 U.S. at 555.
Motion for Summary Judgment
to Rule 56, a movant is entitled to summary judgment where
the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and
admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any,
show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact.
Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a); see Celotex Corp. v. Catrett,477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986). The Supreme Court has clarified
that not every factual dispute will defeat a motion for
summary judgment but rather, there must be a genuine issue of
material fact. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477
U.S. 242, 247-48 (1986) ("[T]he mere existence of
some alleged factual dispute between the parties will
not defeat an otherwise properly supported motion for summary
judgment; the requirement is that there be no
genuine issue of material fact."
(emphases in original)). An issue of fact is material if,
under the substantive law of the case, resolution of the
factual dispute could affect the outcome. Id. at
248. There is a genuine issue as to material fact "if
the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a
verdict for the nonmoving party." Id.; see also
Dulaney v. Packaging Corp. of Am.,673 F.3d 323, 330
(4th Cir. 2012). On ...