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International Refugee Assistance Project v. Trump

United States District Court, D. Maryland

May 2, 2019

INTERNATIONAL REFUGEE ASSISTANCE PROJECT, et al, Plaintiffs,
v.
DONALD J. TRUMP, et al, Defendants. IRANIAN ALLIANCES ACROSS BS, UNIVERSITY OF MARYLAND COLLEGE PARK CHAPTER, et al, Plaintiffs,
v.
DONALD J. TRUMP, et al, Defendants. EBLAL ZAKZOK, et al, Plaintiffs,
v.
DONALD J. TRUMP, et al, Defendants.

          MEMORANDUM OPINION

          THEODORE D. CHUANG, JUDGE

         In 2017, President Donald J. Trump issued two Executive Orders temporarily banning the entry into the United States, with some exceptions, of nationals of multiple predominantly Muslim nations. These orders were followed by a Presidential Proclamation which extended the ban indefinitely as to immigrants and certain categories of nonimmigrants from a substantially similar set of Muslim-majority countries. Plaintiffs in these three consolidated cases, International Refugee Assistance Project ("IRAP"), HIAS, Inc., Middle East Studies Association ("MESA"), Arab-American Association of New York, Yemeni-American Merchants Association ("YAMA"), Doe Plaintiffs 1-5, Muhammed Meteab, Mohamad Mashta, Grannaz Amirjamshidi, Fakhri Ziaolhagh, Shapour Shirani, and Afsaneh Khazaeli (collectively, "the IRAP Plaintiffs"); Iranian Alliances Across Borders ("IAAB"), Doe Plaintiffs 1, 3, 5 and 6, and Iranian Students' Foundation (collectively, "the IAAB Plaintiffs"); and Eblal Zakzok, Fahed Muqbil, and Doe Plaintiffs 1 and 2 (collectively, "the Zakzok Plaintiffs"), challenge the Proclamation on the grounds that it violates several provisions of the United States Constitution and that the agencies implementing it have not complied with the Administrative Procedure Act ("APA"), 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-559, 701-706 (2012). After the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed a preliminary injunction entered by this Court to prevent the implementation of the Proclamation on the grounds that it violated the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment, the United States Supreme Court reversed a similar preliminary injunction that had been entered in a parallel case, held that the plaintiffs in that case were unlikely to succeed on the merits of their claims, including under the Establishment Clause, and remanded.

         The consolidated cases have now been remanded to this Court following the Supreme Court's decision. Presently before the Court is the Motion to Dismiss all three pending amended complaints ("the Complaints") filed by Defendants (the "Government"). On February 12, 2019, the Court heard oral argument on the Motion. For the reasons set forth below, the Motion will be granted in part and denied in part.

         BACKGROUND

         Relevant factual and procedural background is set forth in the Court's March 15, 2017 and October 17, 2017 Memorandum Opinions. Int'l Refugee Assistance Project v. Trump, 241 F.Supp.3d. 539, 543-48 (D. Md.), aff'd in part and vacated in part, 857 F.3d 554 (4th Cir.), judgment vacated, 138 S.Ct. 353 (2017); Int'l Refugee Assistance Project v. Trump ("IRAP F), 265 F.Supp.3d 570, 583-93 (D. Md. 2017), aff'd, 883 F.3d 233 (4th Cir. 2018), judgment vacated, 138 S.Ct. 2710 (2018). Limited additional facts and procedural history specific to the Motion are provided below.

         I. The Proclamation

         On September 24, 2017, President Donald J. Trump issued Proclamation No. 9645, "Enhancing Vetting Capabilities and Processes for Detecting Attempted Entry into the United States by Terrorists or Other Public-Safety Threats" (the "Proclamation"), 82 Fed. Reg. 45161 (Sept. 27, 2017). The Proclamation was the third iteration of the President's efforts to ban the entry of nationals from certain predominantly Muslim countries into the United States. See Exec. Order 13, 769, "Protecting the Nation from Foreign Terrorist Entry into the United States" ("EO-1"), 82 Fed. Reg. 8977 (Jan. 27, 2017); Exec. Order 13, 780, "Protecting the Nation from Foreign Terrorist Entry into the United States" ("EO-2"), 82 Fed. Reg. 13209 (Mar. 9, 2017).

         Preceding EO-1, EO-2, and the Proclamation, President Trump, as a presidential candidate, president-elect, and President, repeatedly made public statements describing his intention to ban entry of Muslims to the United States and otherwise evincing fear of and prejudice against Muslims. See IRAP I, 265 F.Supp.3d at 585-86, 589-90. For example, on December 7, 2015, then-presidential candidate Trump posted a statement on his campaign website in which he "call[ed] for a total and complete shutdown of Muslims entering the United States until our representatives can figure out what is going on." IRAP 2d Am. Compl. ¶ 55, ECF No. 203, No. TDC-17-0361; IAAB 2d Am. Compl. ¶ 28, ECF No. 78, No. TDC-17-2921; Zakzok Am. Compl. ¶ 20, ECF No. 62, No. TDC-17-2969. On March 9, 2016 during a televised interview, he stated: "I think Islam hates us" and "We can't allow people coming into this country who have this hatred of the United States ... and [of] people that are not Muslim." IRAP 2d Am. Compl. ¶ 60; IAAB 2d Am. Compl. ¶ 32; Zakzok Am. Compl. ¶ 20. On July 25, 2016, President Trump clarified that he would accomplish his Muslim ban by barring entry from certain "territories" because "people don't want me to say Muslim." IRAP 2d Am. Compl. ¶ 76; IAAB 2d Am. Compl. ¶ 34-35; Zakzok Am. Compl. ¶ 27. Shortly after President Trump signed EO-1 on January 27, 2017, Rudolph Giuliani, an advisor to President Trump, stated that it was the product of an effort directed by President Trump to put the "Muslim ban" into effect "legally" by using territory as a proxy for religion. IRAP 2d Am. Compl. ¶ 65; IAAB 2d Am. Compl. ¶ 39; Zakzok Am. Compl. ¶ 27.

         After EO-1 was rescinded and EO-2 went into effect, President Trump called EO-2 a "watered down" version of EO-1. IRAP 2d Am. Compl. ¶¶ 186, 190; IAAB 2d Am. Compl. ¶ 54; Zakzok Am. Compl. ¶ 33. Even after EO-2 was enjoined by courts, President Trump expressed his intent to issue a third travel ban for the same purpose by stating on June 5, 2017 that the Justice Department "should have stayed with the original Travel Ban, not the watered down, politically correct version" and that there should be a "much tougher version." IRAP 2d Am. Compl. ¶ 190. On September 24, 2017, President Trump issued the Proclamation.

         The Proclamation states that "absent the measures set forth in this proclamation, the immigrant and nonimmigrant entry into the United States" of nationals from Chad, Iran, Libya, North Korea, Somalia, Syria, Venezuela, and Yemen (the "Designated Countries") "would be detrimental to the interests of the United States." Procl. pmbl. Specifically, the Proclamation suspends the entry of all immigrants from seven of the eight Designated Countries, excepting only Venezuela. The ban on entry by nonimmigrants is "more tailored," with a narrower ban imposed on countries with mitigating circumstances such as a willingness to play a substantial role in combating terrorism. Id. § l(h)(iii).

         As justification for the ban, the Proclamation references a July 9, 2017 report by the Acting Secretary of Homeland Security, issued pursuant to the requirements of EO-2, describing a "worldwide review" conducted in consultation with the Secretary of State and the Director of National Intelligence. In that review, these officials selected baseline criteria for assessing the sufficiency of the information provided by foreign governments to permit the United States to confirm the identities of individuals seeking to enter the country and make a security assessment about them. Id. § 1(c); see IRAP I, 265 F.Supp.3d at 590-91.

         According to the Proclamation, pursuant to the process set forth in EO-2, nearly 200 countries were evaluated based on the criteria. Of those, 16 nations were found to be "inadequate" and 31 were found to be at risk of becoming so. In accordance with Section 2(d) of EO-2, those nations were given 50 days to bring their information-sharing practices into compliance with the United States's expectations. At the end of that 50-day period, eight countries were determined to have continued inadequate information-sharing practices: Chad, Iran, Iraq, Libya, North Korea, Syria, Venezuela, and Yemen. In a September 15, 2017 report to the President ("the DHS Report"), the Acting Secretary of Homeland Security recommended that entry restrictions be imposed on all of those countries with the exception of Iraq. Although Somalia's information-sharing practices were found to be adequate, the Acting Secretary of Homeland Security recommended that Somalia also be subjected to entry restrictions. Venezuela is the only designated country for which entry of immigrants is not suspended. Limitations on the entry of Venezuelan nationals are confined to barring entry of specific government officials and their immediate family members, who are suspended from traveling to the United States on B-l, B-2, and B-1/B-2 visas.

         In addition to providing exceptions for lawful permanent residents, dual nationals if traveling on a passport issued by a non-designated country, and foreign nationals who have been granted asylum status or who have been already admitted to the United States as refugees, the Proclamation provides for waivers, to be granted on a case-by-case basis by either a State Department consular officer or an official of United States Customs and Border Protection ("CBP"), based on criteria to be developed by the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Homeland Security. The Proclamation expressly provides that waivers may be granted only upon a showing that (1) denying entry would cause the foreign national undue hardship; (2) allowing entry would not pose a national security or public safety threat; and (3) entry would be in the national interest.

         The Proclamation went into effect when it was published as to foreign nationals then barred by EO-2. For all other covered foreign nationals, it became effective on October 18, 2017. On April 10, 2018, Chad was removed from the list of Designated Countries.

         II. Procedural History

         In October 2017, the IRAP Plaintiffs, later joined by the IAAB and Zakzok Plaintiffs, moved for preliminary injunctive relief from the Proclamation. On October 17, 2017, the Court granted a preliminary injunction primarily on the grounds that Plaintiffs were likely to succeed on their claim that the Proclamation violates the Establishment Clause. IRAP I, 265 F.Supp. at 629. The preliminary injunction barred the enforcement of most provisions in Section 2 of the Proclamation, which directed the suspension of entry of nationals of the Designated Countries, except with respect to those individuals who lack a bona fide relationship with a person or entity in the United States. Id. at 633.

         On the same day, the United States District Court for the District of Hawaii also enjoined enforcement of the Proclamation in a separate case, on the grounds that Plaintiffs were likely to succeed on their claim that the Proclamation exceeded the scope of the President's statutory authority under the Immigration and Nationality Act ("INA"), specifically the authority contained in 8 U.S.C. §§ 1182(f) and 1185, and violated a separate provision of the INA, 8 U.S.C. § 1152(a)(1)(A), which bars discrimination on the basis of nationality in the issuance of immigrant visas. Hawaii v. Trump, 265 F.Supp.3d 1140, 1158-59, 1161 (D. Haw.), aff'd in part and vacated in part, 878 F.3d 662 (9th Cir. 2017), rev'd, 138 S.Ct. 2392 (2018). On December 4, 2017, the Supreme Court stayed the injunctions pending disposition of the cases by the United States Courts of Appeals for the Fourth and Ninth Circuits, as well as pending any review of the circuit court rulings by the Supreme Court. Trump v. Int'l Refugee Assistance Project, 138 S.Ct. 542 (2017); Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S.Ct. 542 (2017). On December 22, 2017, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the preliminary injunction entered by the District of Hawaii but stayed its ruling in light of the Supreme Court's December 4, 2017 stay order. Hawaii v. Trump (“Hawaii I"), 878 F.3d 662, 702 (9th Cir. 2017), rev'd, 138 S.Ct. 2392 (2018). The Supreme Court granted the Government's petition for a writ of certiorari in that case on January 19, 2018. Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S.Ct. 923 (2018). On February 15, 2018, the Fourth Circuit affirmed this Court's grant of a preliminary injunction in IRAPI but also stayed its decision in light of the Supreme Court's stay. Int'l Refugee Assistance Project v. Trump ("IRAP IF), 883 F.3d 233, 274 (4th Cir. 2018), judgment vacated, 138 S.Ct. 2710 (2018). On March 9, 2018, the Government filed a petition for a writ of certiorari in IRAP II. Pet. Writ Cert., Trump v. Int'l Refugee Assistance Project, No. 17-1270, 2018 WL 1419884 (U.S. Mar. 9, 2018).

         While the petition was pending, on June 26, 2018, the Supreme Court reversed the Ninth Circuit in Trump v. Hawaii ("Hawaii II”), 138 S.Ct. 2392, 2423 (2018). In Hawaii II, the Supreme Court held that the Proclamation did not exceed the President's statutory authority in 8 U.S.C. § 1182(f) and did not violate 8 U.S.C. § 1152(a)(1)(A). Id. at 2412, 2415. The Court also concluded that the plaintiffs had not demonstrated a likelihood of success on their claim that the Proclamation violated the Establishment Clause. Id. at 2415, 2423. On June 28, 2018, the Supreme Court granted the Government's petition for a writ of certiorari in IRAP II, vacated the judgment of the Fourth Circuit, and remanded these cases to the Fourth Circuit for further proceedings in light of Hawaii II. Int'l Refugee Assistance Project v. Trump, 138 S.Ct. 2710 (2018). On October 2, 2018, the Fourth Circuit, in turn, remanded the case to this Court for proceedings consistent with the Supreme Court's decision. Int'l Refugee Assistance Project v. Trump, 905 F.3d 287 (4th Cir. 2018).

         III. The Amended Complaints

         On remand, Plaintiffs continue to challenge the Proclamation, but have modified their claims. Following the Supreme Court's decision in Hawaii II, the IRAP Plaintiffs voluntarily dismissed their claims, brought under the INA and the APA, that the Proclamation violated 8 U.S.C. § 1182(f) and § 1152(a)(1)(A), as well as their claims that the Proclamation violated the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb (2012), and the Refugee Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1157 (2012). On November 2, 2018, this Court granted the IAAB Plaintiffs and the Zakzok Plaintiffs leave to amend their complaints. Across the three Complaints, Plaintiffs collectively have named the following Defendants: President Trump, the U.S. Department of State ("State Department"), the U.S. Department of Homeland Security ("DHS"), the Office of the Director of National Intelligence, the Secretary of State, the Attorney General, the Secretary of Homeland Security, the Director of National Intelligence, the Commissioner of CBP, and the Director of U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services.

         All Plaintiffs bring claims under the APA alleging that the Proclamation and the actions taken by the implementing agencies do not comply with the substantive and procedural requirements of the APA (the "APA Claims"). Specifically, Plaintiffs assert that the issuance and implementation of the Proclamation was arbitrary and capricious, or an abuse of discretion, in violation of 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A), and that it was issued "without observance of procedure required by law," including the following of rulemaking procedures, in violation of 5 U.S.C. §§ 706(2)(D) and 553.

         All Plaintiffs also continue to assert that the Proclamation violates the Establishment Clause. The IRAP and IAAB Plaintiffs further assert claims that the Proclamation violates the equal protection and procedural due process components of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. Finally, the IAAB Plaintiffs assert that the Proclamation also violates the First Amendment rights to freedom of speech and freedom of association. Together, these claims will be referred to as the "Constitutional Claims." All Plaintiffs seek declaratory and injunctive relief.

         In support of their claims, Plaintiffs describe in great detail President Trump's statements expressing his intent to institute a Muslim ban by barring entry of individuals from predominantly Muslim territories and his "explicitly bigoted statements about Muslims and Islam," including statements surrounding the implementation of EO-1, EO-2, and the Proclamation. Zakzok Am. Compl. ¶ 18; see IMP I, 265 F.Supp.3d at 585-86, 589-90. Plaintiffs allege that the Proclamation bears no rational relationship to the national security interests it purports to further and identify features of the Proclamation's design, its exceptions, its failure to justify itself, and the waiver process in support of their theory.

         First, Plaintiffs argue that the design of the Proclamation provides proof that it does not further its supposed national security purposes. The Zakzok Plaintiffs allege that a nationality-based ban will not reduce terrorism risks, because DHS has concluded that country of citizenship is not a reliable predictor of the risk of terrorist activity and no Americans have died from a terrorist attack in the last 40 years based on the actions of citizens of five of the eight Designated Countries. The IAAB Plaintiffs allege that the use of the INA's Visa Waiver Program, 8 U.S.C. § 1187, to evaluate which countries to include in the ban is an irrational baseline because the purposes of and concerns underlying the Visa Waiver Program and the Proclamation are divergent.

         According to the IAAB and Zakzok Plaintiffs, the Proclamation's departures from the purported results of the baseline test, by including or exempting certain countries from the list of Designated Countries even if they failed or passed the baseline test, evidence that the Proclamation furthers not national security interests, but other unidentified concerns. Similarly, Plaintiffs assert that the exceptions to the visa suspensions are not rationally related to any national security measure. The Zakzok Plaintiffs contend that because the Proclamation allows foreign nationals from the Designated Countries to enter the United States on some nonimmigrant visas, for which they receive less vetting, it does not actually accomplish increased information sharing between the Designated Countries and the United States. The TRAP and IAAB Plaintiffs allege that the Proclamation's exceptions for certain foreign nationals and certain countries react to "legal challenges and public condemnation" originating with EO-1 and EO-2 and thus are not founded in any national security policy. IRAP 2d Am. Compl. ¶ 210.

         Next, Plaintiffs assert that the Proclamation's duplication of other programs under the INA and its failure to explain why its measures are necessary demonstrate that it is not related to national security concerns. Plaintiffs emphasize that the Proclamation does not explain what specific "visa vetting failures" or other factors led DHS to recommend suspending immigration from the Designated Countries or suspending only certain types of visas from certain countries, when it admits that other, unidentified countries could have been included under the terms of DHS's review. Id. ¶ 213. The IAAB and Zakzok Plaintiffs add to this allegation that the Proclamation does not explain why the suspension of immigrants is required to supplement or supersede the INA's current method for processing visa applicants from countries with deficient information sharing.

         Finally, Plaintiffs assert that other features of the Proclamation demonstrate its discriminatory purpose. Plaintiffs claim that North Korea and Venezuela, two non-Muslim-majority countries, were included among the list of affected countries for the first time to cover up the discrimination against Muslims, because the Proclamation has a negligible practical effect on foreign nationals from those countries. The IAAB and Zakzok Plaintiffs allege in detail that the waiver process, which would exempt individuals from the terms of the Proclamation on a case-by-case basis, masks the Proclamation's discrimination against Muslims. They note that the waiver criteria, "if applied in good faith," would allow the entry of those foreign nationals who do not trigger the national security concerns referenced in the Proclamation. Zakzok Am. Compl. ¶ 38. However, the waiver criteria are either "wholly unrelated to national security" or were considered in the visa vetting process that was in place before the Proclamation was issued. Id. ¶ 45. They assert that the State Department and DHS have established no process to apply for waivers, informed applicants that legal services can play no role in facilitating the waiver process, and published no guidance implementing the waiver proceedings, as required by the Proclamation. They further state that as of April 30, 2018, only two percent of applicants had been cleared for waivers, many applicants who met the requirements set out in the Proclamation have been denied waivers, and the State Department has not made information available showing how many waivers have actually been granted. They allege that consular officials have been instructed to find applicants ineligible for waivers, and if they are considering a waiver, that they must refer the application to other officials in Washington, D.C. who will decide if a waiver should issue. These allegations, they argue, establish that the waiver process is a "sham" and simply acts to "paper over" the discriminatory animus against Muslims in, and the lack of national security justification for, the Proclamation. IAAB 2d Am. Compl. ¶ 86; see Zakzok Am. Compl. ¶52.

         DISCUSSION

         In its Motion, the Government asserts multiple arguments for dismissal of Plaintiffs' claims. As threshold matters, the Government, while conceding that at least one of the IAAB Plaintiffs has constitutional standing to pursue the asserted claims, takes the position that the IRAP and Zakzok Plaintiffs lack standing. The Government also broadly argues that any statutory claims are not subject to judicial review under the doctrine of consular nonreviewability and related principles.

         As to the APA Claims, the Government argues that the Proclamation is not subject to APA review because (1) presidential action is not reviewable under the APA; (2) Plaintiffs have not identified a "final" agency action to be reviewed, 5 U.S.C. § 704; (3) the action here was "committed to agency discretion by law," id. § 701(a)(2); and (4) Plaintiffs do not meet statutory standing requirements, see Id. § 702. The Government further argues that the APA claim that the Proclamation was "arbitrary and capricious" is foreclosed by the Supreme Court's finding in Hawaii II that the Proclamation satisfies constitutional rational basis review, and that the separate APA claim that the Proclamation and its implementation violated the procedural requirements of the APA fails because the foreign affairs exception to notice-and-comment rulemaking applies, see Id. § 553(a)(1). As to the Constitutional Claims, the Government argues that all claims must be dismissed in light of Hawaii II, which held that the Proclamation satisfies rational basis review, that Plaintiffs do not have a cognizable liberty or property interest upon which to base their due process claim, and that Plaintiffs have not alleged a violation of their own rights for the purposes of their Establishment Clause and equal protection claims.

         I. Legal Standard

         To defeat a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), the complaint must allege enough facts to state a plausible claim for relief. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). A claim is plausible when the facts pleaded allow "the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Id. Legal conclusions or conclusory statements do not suffice. Id. The Court must examine the complaint as a whole, consider the factual allegations in the complaint as true, and construe the factual allegations in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 268 (1994); Lambeth v. Bd of Comm 'rs of Davidson Cty., 407 F.3d 266, 268 (4th Cir. 2005).

         Courts are permitted, however, to consider documents attached to a motion to dismiss "when the document is integral to and explicitly relied on in the complaint, and when the plaintiffs do not challenge the document's authenticity." Zak v. Chelsea Therapeutics Int'l, Ltd.,780 F.3d 597, 606-07 (4th Cir. 2015) (quoting Am. Chiropractic Ass'n v. Trigon Healthcare, Inc.,367 F.3d 212, 234 (4th Cir. 2004)). Although the Proclamation itself is not attached to the Complaints, all Plaintiffs refer to and explicitly rely ...


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