United States District Court, D. Maryland, Southern Division
J. HAZEL UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Amended Complaint, Plaintiff Maurice Ragins alleges that he
was physically assaulted by several correctional officers at
the Baltimore City Booking and Intake Center (BCBIC) in
violation of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States
Constitution. ECF No. 48. Pending before the Court is
Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment. ECF No. 64. No.
hearing is necessary. See Loc. R. 105.6 (D. Md.
2016). For the following reasons, Defendants' Motion for
Summary Judgment will be denied.
Maurice Ragins is incarcerated at the Maryland Correctional
Institute in Hagerstown, Maryland (MCI-H). ECF No. 64-6.
According to Plaintiff, on May 14, 2014, while he was being
held at BCBIC to be rebooked on a 2012 charge, Defendants
physically assaulted him including by stomping, kicking,
elbowing, and punching him. ECF No. 63-3 at 2; ECF No. 64-4
at 1; ECF No. 64-7 at 1.
a.m., Plaintiff was sitting on a table in 4 North B-Dorm
while other inmates were locked in their cells. See
ECF No. 65, ENC 17 at 7:33:37. A female officer approached
Plaintiff as he was sitting on the table. Id., ENC
17 at 7:36:43. They spoke for a short period of time and then
she walked away. Id., ENC 17 at 7:37:43. Plaintiff
continued to sit on the table and then after getting up,
approached two female officers. Id., ENC 17 at
7:38:30. After a short conversation, Plaintiff returned to
the table where he had been previously sitting. Id.,
ENC 17 at 7:38:40. A short time later, three officers arrived
and approached the table where Plaintiff was sitting.
Id., ENC 17 at 7:40. After a brief conversation, the
three officers left the area. Id., ENC 17 at
7:40:36. Plaintiff walked towards the officers' desk and
waited at the vestibule door. Id., ENC 17 and ENC 08
at 7:46:47. Multiple officers then escorted Plaintiff to his
cell. Id., ENC 17 and ENC 08 at 7:48:29. After
Plaintiff entered his cell, the officers started walking away
but then returned. Id., ENC 17 at 7:48:49. The cell
door opened and Plaintiff's cellmate exited the cell.
Id., ENC 17 at 7:50:59. An officer appears to be
motioning for Plaintiff to exit the cell. Id.
Officers then entered the cell. Id.
is no footage of the approximately two minutes that officers
spent in Plaintiff's cell. Plaintiff says that Defendants
assaulted him during this time. ECF No. 64-4 at 1; ECF No.
64-7 at 1.
Plaintiff exited the cell in handcuffs and was led away by an
officer. ECF No. 65, ENC 17 at 7:52:53. He was taken
immediately to the medical unit. Id., ENC 10 at
7:55:38. He had an abrasion to his left ear. ECF No. 64-4.
Plaintiff's “wound” was “cleaned and
bacitracin [was] applied.” Id.
next day, Plaintiff returned to MCI-H where he was again
provided medical attention for his ear laceration and for
other injuries. ECF No. 64-7 (“abrasions noted on
bilateral elbow, no drainage noted; 1 laceration noted on
inner left ear lobe, no drainage; 1 abrasion noted on left
lobe; hematoma around left ear; 1 abrasion noted on left 
front head above left eyebrow; left suborbital hematoma
noted; patient denied discomfort at this time”).
received a Notice of Infraction for the May 8, 2014 BCBIC
incident, which claimed Plaintiff had “threatened to
assault his cell buddy.” ECF No. 64-8 at 4. A hearing
was held on May 13, 2014. Id. at 3. The hearing
officer found that the infraction notice lacked factual
details, was conclusory, and not credible. Id. at 4.
Thus, the hearing officer found Plaintiff not guilty.
STANDARDS OF REVIEW
style their motion as a Motion to Dismiss or, in the
Alternative, Motion for Summary Judgment. When deciding a
motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
12(b)(6), the Court considers only the facts in the complaint
or “integral to the complaint.” Sec'y of
State for Defense v. Trimble Navigation Ltd., 484 F.3d
700, 705 (4th Cir. 2007). However, Rule 12(d) requires courts
to treat a motion to dismiss as a motion for summary judgment
when the court considers matter outside the pleadings.
Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(d). Before converting a motion to dismiss to
one for summary judgment, courts must give the nonmoving
party “a reasonable opportunity to present all the
material that is pertinent to the motion.” Id.
Consistent with this rule, the nonmoving party must have some
indication that the court will treat the motion to dismiss as
a motion for summary judgment and “must be afforded a
reasonable opportunity for discovery” if it is
essential to the nonmoving party's ability to oppose the
motion. Gay v. Wall, 761 F.2d 175, 177 (4th Cir.
1985) (citation omitted).
obvious that when the moving party styles its motion as a
“Motion to Dismiss or, in the Alternative, Motion for
Summary Judgment, ” and the nonmoving party attaches
exhibits to its opposition, the nonmoving party is aware that
materials outside the pleadings are before the Court, and the
Court can treat the motion as one for summary judgment.
See Laughlin v. Metropolitan Wash. Airports Auth.,
149 F.2d 253, 260-61 (4th Cir.1998). That is the situation
here. Defendants' style their motion as a Motion to
Dismiss or Motion for Summary Judgment and in opposing
Defendants' Motion, Plaintiff relies on evidence outside
the pleadings and treats Defendants' motion as one for
summary judgment. Under these circumstances, the Court will
construe Defendants' motion as a Motion for Summary
to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56, summary judgment is
appropriate if the moving party demonstrates that there is no
genuine issue as to any material fact, and that the moving
party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477
U.S. 317, 322 (1986). In assessing the Motion, the Court
views the facts in the light most favorable to the nonmoving
party, with all justifiable inferences drawn in its favor.
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255
(1986). The Court may rely only on facts supported in the
record, not simply assertions in the pleadings. Bouchat
v. Balt. Ravens Football Club, Inc., 346 F.3d 514, 522
(4th Cir. 2003). The nonmoving party bears the burden of
demonstrating that a genuine dispute of material fact exists.
Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp.,
475 U.S. 574, 586-87 (1986). A fact is “material”
if it “might affect the outcome of the suit under the
governing law.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248. A
dispute of material fact is only “genuine” if
sufficient evidence favoring the nonmoving party exists for
the trier of fact to return a verdict for that party.
Id. at 248-49.