United States District Court, D. Maryland
LIPTON HOLLANDER UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE.
4, 2018, this Court entered a Memorandum (ECF 17) and Order
(ECF 18) (collectively, the "Dismissal Order"),
dismissing a bankruptcy appeal filed by appellant Joshua
Reynolds, who is self-represented. Reynolds asserts that, in
response, he sent a motion to vacate judgment to the
Clerk's Office on May 18, 2018. See ECF 20; ECF
26 at 1. The Court acknowledged that Reynolds' motion was
received on May 24, 2018, but returned the motion the next
day due to deficiencies in the submission. ECF 20.
Specifically, Reynolds did not attach a certificate of
service to the document, and the document did not contain an
original signature. Id.
on June 5, 2018, Reynolds filed a "Motion to Vacate
Judgment" pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 60. ECF 22
("Motion to Vacate"). It is dated May 18, 2018.
Id. at 2. Reynolds appears to have made the
corrections to his earlier submission. See ECF 20.
October 16, 2018, this Court issued a Memorandum (ECF 24) and
Order (ECF 25) (collectively, the "Order") denying
the Motion to Vacate. On November 19, 2018, Reynolds filed a
response to the Order. ECF 26. I shall construe ECF 26 as a
motion for rehearing under Fed.R.Bankr.P. 8022, and shall
refer to it as the "Motion."
Court is mindful of its obligation to construe liberally the
pleadings of a pro se litigant, which are "held to less
stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by
lawyers." Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94
(2007); see also White v. White, 886 F.2d 721,
722-23 (4th Cir. 1989). However, "[o]ral argument is not
permitted" on a motion for rehearing. Fed.R.Bankr.P.
reasons that follow, I shall deny the Motion.
explained in the Order of October 16, 2018 (ECF 24; ECF 25),
the exclusive avenue for post-judgment reconsideration of a
district court's decision in a bankruptcy appeal is
Fed.R.Bankr.P. 8022. Rule 8022, formerly known as Rule 8015,
governs motions for rehearing in this context. See In re
Minh Hoang, 484 B.R. 87, 94 (D. Md. 2012)
('"When the district court is acting as an appellate
court in a bankruptcy case, Rule  provides the sole
mechanism for filing a motion for rehearing.'")
(quoting In re Zegeye, DKC 2004-1387, 2005 WL
544763, at *1 (D. Md. Mar. 4, 2005). Rule 8022 provides:
"Unless the time is-shortened or extended by order or
local rule, any motion for rehearing by the district court or
[bankruptcy appellate panel] must be filed within 14 days
after entry of judgment on appeal." Fed.R.Bankr.P. 8022.
explained in the Order that Reynolds' motion of June 5,
2018, was properly considered under Rule 8022. And, under
that rule, it was untimely, as it was filed 32 days after
entry of the Dismissal Order on May 4, 2018. Moreover, even
if Reynolds had properly filed the Motion to Vacate on May
25, 2018, he still would have submitted it 7 days late.
I had no discretion to extend the filing period, sua
sponte. Fed. R. Bankr. P. 9006(b)(1) provides:
[W]hen an act is required or allowed to be done at or within
a specified period by these rules or by a notice given
thereunder or by order of court, the court for cause shown
may at any time in its discretion (1) with or without motion
or notice order the period enlarged if the request therefor
is made before the expiration of the period originally
prescribed or as extended by a previous order or (2) on
motion made after the expiration of the specified period
permit the act to be done where the failure to act was the
result of excusable neglect.
first basis for an extension was unavailable, as the period
for Reynolds to file his motion expired on May 18, 2018. The
second basis was also. unavailable, because "after the
expiration of the specified period," I may extend the
period only "on motion made" where the movant
failed to act because of "excusable neglect."
Appellant had not moved for an extension. Fed.R.Bankr.P.
9006(b)(1); see also Docket.