United States District Court, D. Maryland
DEBORAH K. CHASANOW, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Plaintiff Vander Davis filed a motion to alter or amend
judgment which seeks to vacate the order dismissing this case
and to obtain leave to amend his complaint. ECF No. 42. The
medical and state defendants filed separate responses
opposing the motion for reconsideration. ECF Nos. 43, 44. The
issues are briefed, and the court now rules, no hearing being
deemed necessary. Local Rule 105.6. For the following
reasons, the motion for relief from judgment will be denied.
court granted the medical defendants' motion to dismiss,
the state defendants' motion to dismiss, or in the
alternative for summary judgment, dismissed Plaintiff's
§ 1983 claims with prejudice, dismissed Plaintiff's
state law claims without prejudice, granted the State
Defendants' motion to strike plaintiff's surreply,
and closed this case on August 29, 2018. ECF No. 41.
Plaintiff filed this motion to alter or amend judgment
pursuant to Fed R. Civ. P. 59(e) on September 17, 2018.
who is presently an inmate at Roxbury Correctional
Institution, initiated this case on November
27, 2017, by filing a complaint that presented claims arising
from the time he was incarcerated at the Maryland
Correctional Institution-Jessup (MCI-J). The complaint
alleged MCI-J had defective plumbing, inadequate toilets, and
polluted drinking water “toxic to human health, ”
and Plaintiff was exposed to flooding and human waste. Compl.
ECF No. 1 at 11. The court dismissed Plaintiff's claims
arising before November 27, 2014, as time-barred. The claims
against DPSCS, MCI-J, and the individual state defendants in
their official capacities were dismissed for failure to state
a claim on which relief could be granted, ECF No. 40, at 11,
13. Further, the court found that Plaintiff failed to state a
claim because he failed to allege any personal participation
by Defendant Parrish. Plaintiff likewise failed to state a
claim against Defendant Vivian Bailey as the sole reference
in the complaint to her was that she contacted medical staff
after Plaintiff complained to her on November 1, 2012, about
his ongoing ear discharge. Moreover, even if Plaintiff had
raised a plausible claim against Bailey, the allegation was
time barred. ECF No. 40, at 14-15.
complaint faulted the medical defendants for “failure
to inquire into facts necessary to make a professional
judgment, failure to carry out medical orders, judgment so
egregiously bad that it really isn't medical, ” for
environmental health and safety conditions which caused his
ear infection, and for failing to treat his ear infection.
ECF No. 1 at 10-11. The court dismissed Plaintiff's
claims against the medical defendants as time-barred. ECF No.
40 at 11.
Motion for Reconsideration
Standard of Review
motion filed pursuant to Fed. Rule of Civ. Proc. 59(e)
“need not be granted unless the district court finds
that there has been an intervening change of controlling law,
that new evidence has become available, or that there is a
need to correct a clear error or prevent manifest
injustice.” Robinson v. Wix Filtration Corp.
LLC, 599 F.3d 403, 411 (4th Cir. 2010). “Mere
disagreement does not support a Rule 59(e) motion.”
Hutchinson v. Staton, 994 F.2d 1076, 1082 (4th Cir.
1993). The rule enables a district court to correct its own
errors, “sparing the parties and the appellate courts
the burden of unnecessary appellate proceedings.”
Russell v. Delco Remy Div. of Gen. Motors Corp., 51
F.3d 746, 749 (7th Cir. 1995).
59(e) motion “may not be used to relitigate old
matters, or to raise arguments or present evidence that could
have been raised prior to the entry of judgment.”
Pacific. Ins. Co. v. Am. Nat'l Fire Ins. Co.,
148 F.3d 496, 403 (4th. Cir. 1998) (quoting 11 Wright, et
al., Federal Practice & Procedure § 2810.1, at
127-28 (2d ed. 1995)); see also Medlock v. Rumsfeld,
336 F.Supp.2d 452, 470 (D. Md. 2002), aff'd, 86
Fed.Appx. 665 (4th Cir. 2004) (citation omitted)
(“To the extent that Plaintiff is simply trying to
reargue the case, he is not permitted to do so. Where a
motion does not raise new arguments, but merely urges the
court to ‘change its mind,' relief is not
authorized.”). “In general,
‘reconsideration of a judgment after its entry is an
extraordinary remedy which should be used
sparingly.'” Pac. Ins. Co. 148 F.3d at 403
(quoting Wright, et al., supra, §
2810.1, at 124).
post-judgment motion to amend is evaluated under the same
legal standard as a similar motion filed before judgment was
entered.” Laber v. Harvey, 438 F.3d 404, 427
(4th. Cir. 2006); Matrix Capital Mgmt. Fund, LP v.
Bearingpoint, Inc., 576 F.3d 172 (4th Cir. 2009). When a
party moves for leave to amend a complaint, the court
“should freely give leave when justice so
requires.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 15(a)(2). A motion for leave to
amend should be denied only if one of the following has been
established: (1) the amendment would be prejudicial to the
opposing party; (2) there has been bad faith by the moving
party; or (3) the amendment would be futile. Mayfield v.
National Ass'n for Stock Car Auto Racing, Inc, 674
F.3d 369, 379 (4th Cir. 2012); Matrix Capital, 576
F.3d at 193.
motion for reconsideration asks for leave to file an amended
complaint to add J. Phillip Morgan, Warden of MCI-J and
Dayena Corcoran, Commissioner of Correction to
“overcome deficiency and add true party.” ECF No.
42 at 2, 6. He explains he originally named Carroll
Parrish as Warden of MCI-J, but has determined J. Phillip
Morgan is Warden at MCI-J. He alleges it is a “fact
that Dayena Corcoran is now the MD DPSCS Commissioner of
Corrections, who in fact has prejudiced herself on a lot of
issues concerning MCI-J- to wit its water and hearing
impaired inmates like myself.” ECF No. 42 at 6.
Plaintiff refers to exhibits he submitted previously with the
complaint and his opposition to the medical defendants'
dispositive motion and repeats allegations that the water at
MCI-J is unsafe and caused his ear infection. ECF No. 42 at
2-3, 5, 8. Plaintiff also takes issue with the decision to
strike his surreply and seems to attempt to reintroduce the
information it contained. ECF No. 42 at 9. He asserts he did
not intend to amend the complaint in his surreply. ECF No. 42
wholly fails to address the three limited grounds for
reconsideration under Rule 59(e). The motion for
reconsideration merely reiterates arguments previously
rejected by the court in its Memorandum Opinion without
identifying an intervening change of controlling law, new
evidence, or a need to correct clear error or ...