United States District Court, D. Maryland
Richard D. Bennett United States District Judge
is self-represented Petitioner James Calhoun-El's Motion
for Relief from Judgment pursuant to FRCP 60(b)(6). For
reasons set forth, the Motion is untimely, fails to
demonstrate an extraordinary circumstance within the
parameters of Rule 60(b)(6), and will be DENIED WITH
November 10, 1981, Calhoun-El was sentenced in the Circuit
Court for Montgomery County, Maryland to serve a life
sentence plus fifty years after he was convicted by a jury of
murder, use of a handgun in the commission of a violent
crime, armed robbery, and related offenses'
numerous previous filings, Calhoun-El filed this Motion on
March 14, 2019. He argues that he is entitled to relief of
this Court's decision dismissing his ineffective
assistance of trial and appellate counsel claims as
procedurally defaulted, based on the Supreme Court's
holding m Martinez v Ryan, 566 U.S. I (2012). Pet.
ECF No. I at I. Calhoun-El asks this Court for relief from
the "November 3, 1981 judgment," the date the
Montgomery County jury returned its guilty verdict. The
broader context of his allegations suggests his intent is to
challenge a decision denying him federal habeas relief.
Calhoun-E,, however does not specify the decision that is the
focus of this Motion. Over the last thirty years, Calhoun-El
has filed numerous petitions for habeas relief in this Court.
See Calhoun v. Campbel,, RDB-18-2173 (D. Md);
Calhoun v Smith, RDB-06-3185 (D, Md); Calhoun v.
Corcoran, Civil Action No. BEL-02-1114 (D. Md);
Calhoun-El v. Corcoran, etal, Civil Action No.
BEL-96-3476 (D. Md); Calhoun-El v. Smith, etal,
Civil Action No. FAK-91-2191 (D. Md); Calhoun-El v.
Smith, et ah, Civil Action No. FAK-91-1276(D. Md);
Calhoun-EI v. Lyles. Civil Action No. ESN-87-2486
(D. Md). On March 20, 2012, The Supreme Court held in
Martinez that inadequate assistance of counsel at
initial collateral review proceedings may establish cause for
a prisonerss procedural default claim of ineffective
assistance at trial. Id. at 9.
obtain relief under Rule 60(b), a petitioner must demonstrate
(I) timeliness, (2) a meritorious defense; (3) a lack of
unfair prejudice to the opposing party; and (4) exceptional
circumstance.. Werner v. Carbo, 731 F.2d 204, 206-07
(4th Cir. 1984). Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(6)
permits a court to grant relief for "any other reason
that justifies relief." Fed.R.Civ.P. 60(b)(6). Rule
60(b)(6) requires that the movant show "extraordinary
circumstance'' justifying the reopening ofa final
judgment." Gonzalez v. Crosby, 545 U.S. 524,
535 (2005). When a petitioner seeks Rule 60(b) relief from
the court's judgment denying his S 2254 petition, he must
demonstrate "some defect in the integrity of the federal
habeas proceeding"" to justify revisiting the
judgment denying his original habeas petition, such as an
erroneous finding of procedural default or a statute of
limitations bar. Gonzalez v. Crosby, 545 U.S. 524,
532 (2005). A petitioner may not use Rule 60 to evade the
successive petition bar contained in 28 U.S.C. S 2244(b) by
bringing new claims that challenge the underlying conviction
or sentence or that attack "the substance of the federal
court's resolution ofa [prior habeas] claim on the
merits." Id A motion that attempts such an attack
must be so construed and may be summarlly dismissed as a
successive S 2254 petitionl Id. at 531-32;
United Stales v. Winestock, 340 F.3d 200, 207 (4th
Cir. 2003). This Court may consider a successive S 2254
petition only upon specific certificaiion from the United
States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit. 28 U.S.C. S
60(b) motion "must be made within a reasonable
time." Fed. R. 60(c)(1.. Calhoun-El bears the burden of
showing timeliness. Moses v. Joymr, 815 F.3d 163,
166 (4th Cir. 2016) (noting the movant bears the burden to
show timeliness of the motion). Calhoun-El's 60(b)
motion, which is premised on a change in 2012 habeas
procedural law established in Mar/inez, was filed
more than six years after the Supreme Court announced
Mar/inez. In Moses v. Joymr 815 F.3d 163,
167 (4th. Cir. 2016), the United States Court of Appeals for
the Fourth Circuit affirmed dismissal of a two and one- half
years Martinez based Rule 60(b) motion, noting that
to rule otherwise would cause the "reasonable time"
limitation in Rule 60(c)()) to lose all meaning. ld.
at 167(citing dismissals of Rule 60(b)
Martinez-based motions involving shorter time
periods other cases).
subject Motion does not warrant Rule 60(b) relief because it
presents no extraordinary circumstance. "Intervening
developmenss in the law by themselves rarely constitute the
extraordinary circumstancss required for relief under Rule
60(b)(6)." Agosiini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203,
239 (1997). In Mrnes, the Fourth Circuit ruled a
"motion for relief invoking the change in procedural
default rules occasioned by Martinez falls well
short of 'extraordinary.'" Moses, 815
F.3d at 168 Calhoun-El's Motion will also be denied
because he has failed to show extraordinary circumstances
required for a successful FRCP 60(b)(6) motion.
these reasons, the Court will in a separate Order deny
Petitionerss Motion with prejudice.
(last visited April 1, 2019..
 To the extent Calhoun-El may intend to
challenge his underlying criminal convictions under 28 U.S.C.
~2254, he must obtain pre-f.ling permission from the United
States Court of Appeals for the district court to consider a