Searching over 5,500,000 cases.


searching
Buy This Entire Record For $7.95

Download the entire decision to receive the complete text, official citation,
docket number, dissents and concurrences, and footnotes for this case.

Learn more about what you receive with purchase of this case.

Castro v. Cordoba Enterprises, LLC

United States District Court, D. Maryland

March 28, 2019

MARIO CASTRO, et al., Plaintiffs,
v.
CORDOBA ENTERPRISES, LLC, et al., Defendants.

          MEMORANDUM OPINION

          George L. Russell, III United States District Judge.

         THIS MATTER is before the Court on Defendants Peter Osborne (“Peter”) and Timothy Osborne's (“Timothy”) (collectively, “the Osbornes”) Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (ECF No. 38), Plaintiffs Mario Castro (“Mario”) and Marvin Castro's (“Marvin”) (collectively, “the Castros”) Second Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 40), and Defendants Cordoba Enterprises, LLC (“Cordoba”) and the Osbornes' Motion for Leave to File a Surreply (ECF No. 46). The Motions are ripe for disposition, and no hearing is necessary. See Local Rule 105.6 (D.Md. 2018). For the reasons outlined below, the Court will grant the Osbornes' Motion, grant the Castros' Motion, and deny Defendants' Motion.

         I. BACKGROUND[1]

         On April 28, 2016, the Castros sued Cordoba Enterprises, LLC and the Osbornes.[2](ECF No. 1). The three-count First Amended Complaint alleges violations of the Fair Labor Standards Act (the “FLSA”), 29 U.S.C. §§ 201 et seq. (2018), Maryland's Wage and Hour Law (the “MWHL”), Md. Code Ann., Lab. & Empl. [“L&E”] §§ 3-401 et seq. (West 2018), and Maryland's Wage Payment and Collection Law (the “MWPCL”), L&E §§ 3-501 et seq. (West 2018). (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 32-43, ECF No. 7). The Castros seek unpaid overtime wages, liquidated damages, and attorney's fees and costs. (Id. at 7).

         On March 30, 2018, the Court granted in part and denied in part Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment. (Mar. 30, 2018 Mem. at 5, ECF No. 32). The Court also denied without prejudice the Castros' Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment. (Id.). As a result of the Court's ruling, only the Castros' claims under the FLSA and MWHL for the time period from December 2014 to September 2015 (the “Operative Time Period”) remain. (Id.).

         On June 8, 2018, the Osbornes filed a Motion for Partial Summary Judgment. (ECF No. 38). The Castros filed an Opposition on June 22, 2018. (ECF No. 42). On July 20, 2018, the Osbornes filed a Reply. (ECF No. 44).

         Also on June 8, 2018, the Castros filed a Second Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment. (ECF No. 40). Defendants filed an Opposition on June 29, 2018. (ECF No. 43). On July 20, 2018, the Castros filed a Reply. (ECF No. 45). Defendants filed a Motion for Leave to File a Surreply on August 3, 2018. (ECF No. 46). To date, the Court has no record that the Castros filed an Opposition.

         II. DISCUSSION

         A. Standard of Review

         In reviewing a motion for summary judgment, the Court views the facts in a light most favorable to the nonmovant, drawing all justifiable inferences in that party's favor. Ricci v. DeStefano, 557 U.S. 557, 586 (2009); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986) (citing Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 158-59 (1970)). Summary judgment is proper when the movant demonstrates, through “particular parts of materials in the record, including depositions, documents, electronically stored information, affidavits or declarations, stipulations . . . admissions, interrogatory answers, or other materials, ” that “there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a), (c)(1)(A). Significantly, a party must be able to present the materials it cites in “a form that would be admissible in evidence, ” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c)(2), and supporting affidavits and declarations “must be made on personal knowledge” and “set out facts that would be admissible in evidence, ” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c)(4).

         Once a motion for summary judgment is properly made and supported, the burden shifts to the nonmovant to identify evidence showing there is genuine dispute of material fact. See Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586-87 (1986). Likewise, if the movant “demonstrates that there is no evidence to support the nonmoving party's case, the burden shifts to the nonmoving party to identify evidence that shows that a genuine dispute exists as to material facts.” Hall v. Washington Metro. Area Transit Auth., 33 F.Supp.3d 630, 632 (D.Md. 2014). The nonmovant cannot create a genuine dispute of material fact “through mere speculation or the building of one inference upon another.” Othentec Ltd. v. Phelan, 526 F.3d 135, 141 (4th Cir. 2008) (quoting Beale v. Hardy, 769 F.2d 213, 214 (4th Cir. 1985)).

         A “material fact” is one that might affect the outcome of a party's case. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248; see also JKC Holding Co. v. Wash. Sports Ventures, Inc., 264 F.3d 459, 465 (4th Cir. 2001) (citing Hooven-Lewis v. Caldera, 249 F.3d 259, 265 (4th Cir. 2001)). Whether a fact is considered to be “material” is determined by the substantive law, and “[o]nly disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law will properly preclude the entry of summary judgment.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248; accord Hooven-Lewis, 249 F.3d at 265. A “genuine” dispute concerning a “material” fact arises when the evidence is sufficient to allow a reasonable jury to return a verdict in the nonmoving party's favor. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248. If the nonmovant has failed to make a sufficient showing on an essential element of her case where she has the burden of proof, “there can be ‘no genuine [dispute] as to any material fact,' since a complete failure of proof concerning an essential element of the nonmoving party's case necessarily renders all other facts immaterial.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986).

         B. Cross-Motions for Summary Judgment

         When the parties have filed cross-motions for summary judgment, the court must “review each motion separately on its own merits to ‘determine whether either of the parties deserves judgment as a matter of law.'” Rossignol v. Voorhaar, 316 F.3d 516, 523 (4th Cir. 2003) (quoting Philip Morris Inc. v. Harshbarger, 122 F.3d 58, 62 n.4 (1st Cir. 1997)). Moreover, “[w]hen considering each individual motion, the court must take care to ‘resolve all factual disputes and any competing, rational inferences in the light most favorable' to the party opposing that motion.” Id. (quoting Wightman v. Springfield Terminal Ry. Co., 100 F.3d 228, 230 (1st Cir. 1996)). This Court, however, must also abide by its affirmative obligation to prevent factually unsupported claims and defenses from going to trial. Drewitt v. Pratt, 999 F.2d 774, 778-79 (4th Cir. 1993). If the evidence presented by the nonmovant is merely colorable, or is not significantly probative, summary judgment must be granted. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249-50.

         C. Analysis

         1.The Osbornes' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment

         The Osbornes maintain that the Castros have not produced any evidence that either of them is an “employer” under the FLSA or the MWHL, [3] and that they are therefore entitled to summary judgment on this issue. In response, the Castros point to deposition testimony from their former manager, Ken Kazanijian, [4] as evidence that each of the Osbornes is an “employer” under these statutes. The Osbornes counter that the Court should not consider Kazanijian's deposition testimony because it is not part of the record in this case and his deposition was taken after ...


Buy This Entire Record For $7.95

Download the entire decision to receive the complete text, official citation,
docket number, dissents and concurrences, and footnotes for this case.

Learn more about what you receive with purchase of this case.