United States District Court, D. Maryland
L. Russell, III United States District Judge.
MATTER is before the Court on Defendants Peter Osborne
(“Peter”) and Timothy Osborne's
(“Timothy”) (collectively, “the
Osbornes”) Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (ECF No.
38), Plaintiffs Mario Castro (“Mario”) and Marvin
Castro's (“Marvin”) (collectively, “the
Castros”) Second Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF
No. 40), and Defendants Cordoba Enterprises, LLC
(“Cordoba”) and the Osbornes' Motion for
Leave to File a Surreply (ECF No. 46). The Motions are ripe
for disposition, and no hearing is necessary. See
Local Rule 105.6 (D.Md. 2018). For the reasons outlined
below, the Court will grant the Osbornes' Motion, grant
the Castros' Motion, and deny Defendants' Motion.
April 28, 2016, the Castros sued Cordoba Enterprises, LLC and
the Osbornes.(ECF No. 1). The three-count First Amended
Complaint alleges violations of the Fair Labor Standards Act
(the “FLSA”), 29 U.S.C. §§ 201 et
seq. (2018), Maryland's Wage and Hour Law (the
“MWHL”), Md. Code Ann., Lab. & Empl.
[“L&E”] §§ 3-401 et seq.
(West 2018), and Maryland's Wage Payment and Collection
Law (the “MWPCL”), L&E §§ 3-501
et seq. (West 2018). (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 32-43,
ECF No. 7). The Castros seek unpaid overtime wages,
liquidated damages, and attorney's fees and costs.
(Id. at 7).
March 30, 2018, the Court granted in part and denied in part
Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment. (Mar. 30, 2018
Mem. at 5, ECF No. 32). The Court also denied without
prejudice the Castros' Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment.
(Id.). As a result of the Court's ruling, only
the Castros' claims under the FLSA and MWHL for the time
period from December 2014 to September 2015 (the
“Operative Time Period”) remain. (Id.).
8, 2018, the Osbornes filed a Motion for Partial Summary
Judgment. (ECF No. 38). The Castros filed an Opposition on
June 22, 2018. (ECF No. 42). On July 20, 2018, the Osbornes
filed a Reply. (ECF No. 44).
June 8, 2018, the Castros filed a Second Cross-Motion for
Summary Judgment. (ECF No. 40). Defendants filed an
Opposition on June 29, 2018. (ECF No. 43). On July 20, 2018,
the Castros filed a Reply. (ECF No. 45). Defendants filed a
Motion for Leave to File a Surreply on August 3, 2018. (ECF
No. 46). To date, the Court has no record that the Castros
filed an Opposition.
Standard of Review
reviewing a motion for summary judgment, the Court views the
facts in a light most favorable to the nonmovant, drawing all
justifiable inferences in that party's favor. Ricci
v. DeStefano, 557 U.S. 557, 586 (2009); Anderson v.
Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986) (citing
Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144,
158-59 (1970)). Summary judgment is proper when the movant
demonstrates, through “particular parts of materials in
the record, including depositions, documents, electronically
stored information, affidavits or declarations, stipulations
. . . admissions, interrogatory answers, or other materials,
” that “there is no genuine dispute as to any
material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a
matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a), (c)(1)(A).
Significantly, a party must be able to present the materials
it cites in “a form that would be admissible in
evidence, ” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c)(2), and supporting
affidavits and declarations “must be made on personal
knowledge” and “set out facts that would be
admissible in evidence, ” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c)(4).
motion for summary judgment is properly made and supported,
the burden shifts to the nonmovant to identify evidence
showing there is genuine dispute of material fact. See
Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475
U.S. 574, 586-87 (1986). Likewise, if the movant
“demonstrates that there is no evidence to support the
nonmoving party's case, the burden shifts to the
nonmoving party to identify evidence that shows that a
genuine dispute exists as to material facts.” Hall
v. Washington Metro. Area Transit Auth., 33 F.Supp.3d
630, 632 (D.Md. 2014). The nonmovant cannot create a genuine
dispute of material fact “through mere speculation or
the building of one inference upon another.”
Othentec Ltd. v. Phelan, 526 F.3d 135, 141 (4th Cir.
2008) (quoting Beale v. Hardy, 769 F.2d 213, 214
(4th Cir. 1985)).
“material fact” is one that might affect the
outcome of a party's case. Anderson, 477 U.S. at
248; see also JKC Holding Co. v. Wash. Sports Ventures,
Inc., 264 F.3d 459, 465 (4th Cir. 2001) (citing
Hooven-Lewis v. Caldera, 249 F.3d 259, 265 (4th Cir.
2001)). Whether a fact is considered to be
“material” is determined by the substantive law,
and “[o]nly disputes over facts that might affect the
outcome of the suit under the governing law will properly
preclude the entry of summary judgment.”
Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248; accord
Hooven-Lewis, 249 F.3d at 265. A “genuine”
dispute concerning a “material” fact arises when
the evidence is sufficient to allow a reasonable jury to
return a verdict in the nonmoving party's favor.
Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248. If the nonmovant has
failed to make a sufficient showing on an essential element
of her case where she has the burden of proof, “there
can be ‘no genuine [dispute] as to any material
fact,' since a complete failure of proof concerning an
essential element of the nonmoving party's case
necessarily renders all other facts immaterial.”
Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23
Cross-Motions for Summary Judgment
the parties have filed cross-motions for summary judgment,
the court must “review each motion separately on its
own merits to ‘determine whether either of the parties
deserves judgment as a matter of law.'”
Rossignol v. Voorhaar, 316 F.3d 516, 523 (4th Cir.
2003) (quoting Philip Morris Inc. v. Harshbarger,
122 F.3d 58, 62 n.4 (1st Cir. 1997)). Moreover, “[w]hen
considering each individual motion, the court must take care
to ‘resolve all factual disputes and any competing,
rational inferences in the light most favorable' to the
party opposing that motion.” Id. (quoting
Wightman v. Springfield Terminal Ry. Co., 100 F.3d
228, 230 (1st Cir. 1996)). This Court, however, must also
abide by its affirmative obligation to prevent factually
unsupported claims and defenses from going to trial.
Drewitt v. Pratt, 999 F.2d 774, 778-79 (4th Cir.
1993). If the evidence presented by the nonmovant is merely
colorable, or is not significantly probative, summary
judgment must be granted. Anderson, 477 U.S. at
Osbornes' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment
Osbornes maintain that the Castros have not produced any
evidence that either of them is an “employer”
under the FLSA or the MWHL,  and that they are therefore
entitled to summary judgment on this issue. In response, the
Castros point to deposition testimony from their former
manager, Ken Kazanijian,  as evidence that each of the Osbornes
is an “employer” under these statutes. The
Osbornes counter that the Court should not consider
Kazanijian's deposition testimony because it is not part
of the record in this case and his deposition was taken after