United States District Court, D. Maryland
L. RUSSELL, III UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
MATTER is before the Court on Petitioner Andrew Joseph
Dicks' Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 2254. (ECF No. 1). The Petition is ripe, and no
hearing is necessary. See Local Rule 105.6 (D.Md.
2018). Having reviewed the Petition and the Respondents'
responses thereto, the Court also finds no need for an
evidentiary hearing. See R. Govern. § 2254
Cases U.S. Dist. Ct. 8(a); 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(2)
(2018). For the reasons set forth below, the Court will
dismiss the Petition as time-barred and decline to issue a
Certificate of Appealability.
10, 2006, Dicks pleaded guilty in the Circuit Court for Anne
Arundel County to one count of robbery and one count of
armed robbery. (Pet. Writ Habeas Corpus
[“Pet.”] Ex. J at 1, ECF No. 1-10). On August 31,
2006, Dicks was sentenced to thirty years of incarceration.
(Id.). Dicks did not file an application for leave
to appeal the judgment, which became final on October 2,
2006. See Md. Rule 8-204(b)(2)(A) (requiring
application for leave to appeal to be filed within thirty
days of judgment from which appeal is sought). Dicks filed a
motion for reconsideration of sentence, (State Court Dockets
at 7, 31), that was held in abeyance until it expired by
operation of law on September 4, 2011.See Md.
Rule 4-345(e) (sentence may not be revised more than five
years after the date the sentence was imposed).
April 28, 2014, Dicks filed a state petition for
post-conviction relief in the Circuit Court for Anne Arundel
County. (State Court Dockets at 10, 34). After holding a
hearing on October 7, 2014, the Circuit Court denied
post-conviction relief in an order filed on January 20, 2015.
(Pet. Ex. J). Dicks did not file his application for leave to
appeal the denial of post-conviction relief within thirty
days. (State Court Dockets at 12). See Md. Rule
8-204(b)(2). He filed several other court papers in the
months thereafter, culminating in the Court of Appeals'
denial of Dicks' motion to reconsider dismissal of his
petition for writ of certiorari on December 15,
filed his undated Petition in this Court on March 22, 2017.
In the Petition, Dicks asserts that (1) he recently
discovered evidence that the police tampered with his
Miranda forms; (2) his confession was involuntary;
(3) plea counsel was ineffective for failing to (a) prepare
for trial and (b) prepare mitigation evidence for sentencing;
(4) post-conviction counsel was ineffective for failing to
adequately question plea counsel; and (5) his guilty plea was
involuntary. (Pet. 5-9).
their Limited Answer, Respondents assert that the Petition
should be dismissed as untimely pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §
2244(d) and that Dicks has provided no basis for applying the
doctrine of equitable tolling. In his Reply, Dicks notes that
he sought state post-conviction relief within Maryland's
ten-year limitations period. (Reply at 3, ECF No. 7). Dicks
also argues that any delay in seeking state post-conviction
relief cannot be imputed against him based on a claim that
could not have been discovered earlier, citing Brady v.
Maryland. He further argues that his state
post-conviction proceedings lasted until December 15, 2016
and therefore that his March 22, 2017 Petition was filed
timely filed under 2244(d)(2). (ECF No. 7 at 9).
2, 2018, the Court directed Respondents to answer the merits
of Dicks' claims and address the Brady claim
with regard to timeliness. (May 2, 2018 Order at 1, ECF No.
16). Respondents' Supplemental Response reiterated their
argument that the Petition is untimely and made additional
arguments, including that Dicks failed to exhaust state
remedies. (Suppl. Resp., ECF No. 20).
contend that Dicks' Petition is time-barred. The Court
prisoner seeking a writ of habeas corpus from a federal court
must comply with a one-year period of limitation.
See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1); Wall v.
Kholi, 562 U.S. 545, 549 (2011). When the limitation
period begins depends on the grounds for the prisoner's
petition. Specifically, the limitation period begins from the
(A) the date on which the judgment became final by the
conclusion of direct review or the expiration of the time for
seeking such review;
(B) the date on which the impediment to filing an application
created by State action in violation of the Constitution or
laws of the United States is removed, if the applicant was