United States District Court, D. Maryland
RENEE L. MCCRAY, Plaintiff,
SAMUEL I. WHITE, P.C., et al, Defendants.
DAVID COPPERTHITE UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Samuel I. White, P.C., et al, move this Court for
summary judgment ("Defendants' Motion") (ECF
No. 174). Defendants seek summary judgment on the single
remaining claim alleging violation of the Fair Debt
Collection Practices Act (the "Act"), 15 U.S.C.
§ 1692g. Plaintiff, Renee L. McCray, filed an opposition
to Defendants' Motion (ECF No. 178) and a cross-motion
for summary judgment ("Plaintiffs Cross-Motion")
(ECF No. 176). In her response, Plaintiff alleges she has met
her burden as to the remaining count and in her summary
judgment motion has included arguments on previously
considering the motions and responses thereto (ECF Nos. 174,
176, 177, 178), the Court finds that no hearing is necessary.
See Loc.R. 105.6 (D.Md. 2018). In addition, having
reviewed the pleadings of record and all competent and
admissible evidence submitted by the parties, the Court finds
that there is no genuine issue of material fact as to the
single remaining claim asserted. Accordingly, the Court will
GRANT Defendants' Motion (ECF No. 174) and DENY
Plaintiffs Cross-Motion (ECF No. 176).
lawsuit arises out of a controversy surrounding the
foreclosure proceedings on Plaintiffs residence when
Plaintiff stopped paying her mortgage in 2011. Plaintiff
alleges Defendants violated the Act during the foreclosure
process on her mortgage. Plaintiff does not contest that she
failed to make her mortgage payments, but instead alleges the
foreclosure was illegal. Plaintiff unsuccessfully litigated
the foreclosure proceeding in the Circuit Court for Baltimore
City and was also unsuccessful on appeal to both the Court of
Special Appeals and the Court of Appeals of Maryland.
Plaintiff also unsuccessfully litigated her claims in the
United States Bankruptcy Court and filed three actions in
this Court as well as the Court of Appeals for the Fourth
alleges in this single remaining count that Defendants
initiated the foreclosure and then continued to foreclose on
the property without providing verified evidence that
Defendants had a legal right to do so in violation of 15
U.S.C. § 1692g.
case has an extensive history captured in the parties'
pleadings (ECF Nos. 174, 176) and the Court's Memorandum
Opinion (ECF No. 97). Since that opinion, Plaintiff has filed
a Fourth Amended Complaint (ECF No. 102), which was corrected
(ECF No. 105) and further amended (ECF No. 109), There has
been substantial discovery conducted and there remains
pending motions (ECF Nos. 163, 165) which will become moot
for the reasons stated in this Opinion. The parties have
traveled the many side roads of litigation, but at this time
there remains only one claim as to each Defendant to resolve.
Before this Court, the issue is whether Defendants violated
15 U.S.C. § 1692g(b) by failing to validate the admitted
debt owed by Plaintiff on her mortgage.
Standard of Review
to Rule 56, a movant is entitled to summary judgment where
the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and
admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any,
show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact.
Fed, R.Civ.P. 56(a); see Celotex Corp. v. Catrett,
477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986). The Supreme Court has clarified
that not every factual dispute will defeat a motion for
summary judgment but rather, there must be a genuine issue of
material fact. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477
U.S. 242, 247-48 (1986) ("[T]he mere existence of
some alleged factual dispute between the parties
will not defeat an otherwise properly supported motion for
summary judgment; the requirement is that there be no
genuine issue of material fact."
(emphases in original)). An issue of fact is material if,
under the substantive law of the case, resolution of the
factual dispute could affect the outcome. Id. at
248. There is a genuine issue as to material fact "if
the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a
verdict for the nonmoving party." Id; see also
Dulaney v. Packaging Corp. of Am., 673 F.3d 323, 330
(4th Cir. 2012). On the other hand, if after the court has
drawn all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving
party, "the evidence is merely colorable, or is not
significantly probative, summary judgment may be
granted." Anderson, 477 U.S.at 249-50 (internal
party seeking summary judgment bears the initial burden of
either establishing that no genuine issue of material fact
exists or that a material fact essential to the
non-movant's claim is absent. Celotex Corp., 477
U.S. at 322-24. Once the movant has met its burden,
the onus is on the non-movant to establish that there is a
genuine issue of material fact. Matsushita Elec. Indus.
Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., A15 U.S. 574, 586 (1986). In
order to meet this burden, the non-movant "may not rest
upon the mere allegations or denials of [its]
pleadings," but must instead "set forth specific
facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial."
Bouchat v. Bait. Ravens Football Club, Inc., 346
F.3d 514, 522 (4th Cir. 2003) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e)).
both parties moved for summary judgment. "When faced
with cross-motions for summary judgment, the court must
review each motion separately on its own merits to determine
whether either of the parties deserves judgment as a matter
of law," and in considering each motion "the court
must take care to resolve all factual disputes and any
competing, rational inferences in the light most favorable to
the party opposing that motion." Rossignol v.
Voorhaar, 316 F.3d 516, 523 (4th Cir. 2003) (citations
and internal quotation marks omitted); see also United
States v. Diebold, Inc., 369 U.S. 654, 655 (1962) (per
curiam) ("On summary judgment the inferences to be drawn
from the underlying facts contained in such materials must be
viewed in the light most favorable to the party opposing the
motion."). At the same time, the court also must abide
by the "affirmative obligation of the trial judge to
prevent factually unsupported claims and defenses from
proceeding to trial." Bouchat, 346 F.3d at 526
(quoting Drewitt v. Pratt, 999 F.2d 774, 778-79 (4th
Cir. 1993)). The fact that both sides moved for summary
judgment "neither establish[es] the propriety of
deciding a case on summary judgment nor establish[es] that
there is no issue of fact requiring that summary judgment be
granted to one side or another." Cont 'I
Airlines, Inc. v. United Airlines, Inc., 277 F.3d 499,
511 n.7 (4th Cir. 2002) (internal citations and quotation
marks omitted). "The court must deny both motions if it
finds there is a genuine dispute of material fact, 'but
if there is no genuine issue and one or the other party is
entitled to prevail as a matter of law, the court will render
judgment.'" Rashid v. Wash. Metro. Area Transit
Auth., No. DKC 17-0726, 2018 WL 1425978, at *4 (D.Md.
Mar. 22, 2018) (citation omitted).
motion for summary judgment, Plaintiff again alleges
violations of 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692c, 1692e, 1692f,
1692g, 16921, and 1692j. ECF No. 176-1. This Court has
previously dismissed all allegations except § 1692g(b)
and therefore will not address those allegations already
dismissed. ECF No. 97. The Court also notes that § 1692i
does not allege an actual violation; it merely determines
jurisdiction for filing an action authorized under the
statute. There is no allegation that jurisdiction in the
United States District Court for the District of Maryland is
not correct. Therefore, the only issue ...