United States District Court, D. Maryland, Southern Division
RICHARD W. FULLEN and MICHELLE FULLEN, Plaintiffs,
3M COMPANY, et al., Defendants.
J. HAZEL United States District Judge.
before the Court in this asbestos liability action are
Defendant Velan Valve Corporation's (“Velan”)
Motion to Dismiss the cross claim of Parker-Hannifin
Corporation (“Parker-Hannifin”), ECF No. 221,
Defendant Parkin-Hannifin's Motion for Summary Judgment
as to all claims, ECF No. 258, and Defendant Schneider
Electric USA, Inc.'s (“Schneider”) Motion for
Summary Judgment as to all crossclaims and third-party
claims, ECF No. 256. All three motions are unopposed. No.
hearing is necessary. See Loc. R. 105.6. For the
following reasons, the Motions shall be granted.
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, crossclaims
are evaluated under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). See, e.g.,
EEOC v. Phase 2 Investments, Inc., 333 F.Supp.3d 505,
513 (D. Md. 2018). Under this standard, the Court “must
accept the factual allegations of the complaint as true and
construe them in the light most favorable to the nonmoving
party.” Rockville Cars, LLC v. City of Rockville,
Md., 891 F.3d 141, 145 (4th Cir. 2018). To overcome a
12(b)(6) motion, the “complaint must contain sufficient
factual matter, accepted as true, ‘to state a claim to
relief that is plausible on its face.'”
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting
Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570
(2007). Plaintiffs must “provide sufficient
detail” to show “a more-than-conceivable chance
of success on the merits.” Upstate Forever v.
Kinder Morgan Energy Partners, 887 F.3d 637, 645 (4th
Cir. 2018) (citing Owens v. Balt. City State's
Attorneys Ofice, 767 F.3d 379, 396 (4th Cir. 2014)). The
mere recitation of “elements of a cause of action,
supported only by conclusory statements, is not sufficient to
survive a motion made pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6).”
Walters v. McMahen, 684 F.3d 435, 439 (4th Cir.
2012). Nor must the Court accept unsupported legal
allegations. Revene v. Charles Cnty. Commis., 882
F.2d 870, 873 (4th Cir. 1989). A plausibility determination
is a “context-specific inquiry” that relies on
the court's “experience and common sense.”
Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679-80.
Fed.R.Civ.P. 56, summary judgment is when the pleadings and
evidence demonstrate that “there is no genuine dispute
as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law.” See Celotex Corp. v.
Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-24 (1986). The burden is on
the moving party to demonstrate that there exists no genuine
dispute of material fact. See Pulliam Inv. Co. v. Cameo
Props., 810 F.2d 1282, 1286 (4th Cir. 1987). To defeat
the motion, the nonmoving party must submit evidence showing
facts sufficient for a fair-minded jury to reasonably return
a verdict for that party. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby,
Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 252 (1986).
March 12, 2018, Parker-Hannifin filed a crossclaim against
all of the other defendants in this action. ECF No. 200. In
that crossclaim, Parker-Hannifin alleged that if any of the
plaintiffs “are adjudicated to have sustained any
damages as averred in their Complaints, such damages have
been caused solely by or contributed by the mistake,
intentional acts, omissions, or primary, active negligence of
the Cross-Defendants.” Id. ¶ 2. But the
three-paragraph crossclaim offers no further detail or
factual support for these allegations. Because the crossclaim
contains only a “naked assertion devoid of further
factual enhancement, ” it is dismissed. See
Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.
survive a motion for summary judgment in an asbestos
liability case, a plaintiff must “introduce evidence
which allows the jury to reasonably conclude that it is more
likely than not that the conduct of the defendant was a
substantial factor in bringing about the result.”
Lohrmann v. Pittsburgh Corning Corp., 782 F.2d 1156,
1162 (4th Cir. 1986). To establish this reasonable inference,
the plaintiff must offer some “evidence of exposure to
a specific product on a regular basis over some extended
period of time in proximity to where the Plaintiff actually
worked.” Id. at 1162-63. Both Parker-Hannifin
and Schneider aver that discovery has produced no evidence
linking any of their products to Mr. Fullen's injury in
this case. Because no party has responded to the contrary,
Parker-Hannifin and Schneider's Motions for Summary
Judgment will be granted.
Motion to Dismiss, ECF No. 221, is granted. Parker-Hannifin
and Schneider's Motions for Summary Judgment, ECF Nos.
256, 258, are granted. A separate Order shall issue.
 The facts relied on herein are
undisputed. For the purposes of the Motion to Dismiss, ECF
No. 221, all facts and reasonable inferences are viewed in
the light most favorable to the Parker-Hannifin. For the
purposes of the Motions for Summary Judgment, ECF Nos. 256,
258, all facts and inferences are viewed in the ...