United States District Court, D. Maryland
Stephanie A. Gallagher United States Magistrate Judge
case has been referred to me, by consent of the parties, for
all proceedings and the entry of judgment, in accordance with
28 U.S.C. § 636(c). ECF 60. I have reviewed Plaintiff
Class Produce Group, LLC's (“CPG”) Motion for
Reconsideration of this Court's November 5, 2018
Memorandum and Order, Defendant Harleysville Worcester
Insurance Company's (“Harleysville”)
Opposition, and CPG's Reply. ECF 104, 105, 107. I find
that no hearing is necessary. See Loc. R. 105.6 (D. Md.
2018). For the reasons set forth below, CPG's Motion for
Reconsideration will be DENIED.
background, CPG filed a Motion for Leave to File a Second
Amended Complaint on September 25, 2018, seeking to
“clarify its position with regard to CPG's
obligations under the Lease to remediate, repair, and clean
up any damage caused by its operations in it leased
space.” ECF 89-1 at 4. Harleysville opposed the Motion.
ECF 92. On November 5, 2018, this Court issued an Order
denying CPG's Motion (“the Order”), finding
that, given the posture of the case and the nature of the
proposed amendments, granting CPG leave to file a Second
Amended Complaint would be prejudicial to Harleysville. ECF
100. On November 30, 2018, CPG filed its Motion for
Reconsideration of the Order. ECF 104. Harleysville opposed
CPG's motion, arguing that it was untimely. ECF 105. CPG
filed a Reply, arguing that the motion was timely because it
was filed pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 59 and
argues that its motion is properly considered under Rules 59
and 60 because “the Court's Order could be
construed as denying CPG's ability to continue the case
under its claim for breach of contract by precluding the
argument that the lease functions as Business Personal
Property under the insurance policy.” ECF 107 at 4.
However, the Order was not a final judgment. The Order did
not adjudicate any of the claims asserted by CPG in its First
Amended Complaint, and thus was not ripe for appeal. See ECF
100. Therefore, CPG's motion is improperly styled as a
motion to alter or amend under Rules 59 and 60. See
Alston v. Branch Banking & Trust Co., No.
GJH-15-3100, 2017 WL 4124231, at * 3 (D. Md. Sept. 15, 2017)
(explaining the inapplicability of Rules 59 and 60 to an
order dismissing in part a plaintiff's claim because it
was not a final judgment); Letren v. Experian Info
Solutions, Inc., No. 8:14-cv-03957-TDC, 2016 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 189768, at *4 (D. Md. Aug. 1, 2016) (“Under the
plain language of Rule 54, then, an order that resolves some
but not all claims in a case . . . cannot be a
‘judgment' because such an order is expressly one
that the issuing court may revise ‘at any time'
before the entry of judgment on all the claims in the
case.”) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1291). Instead,
CPG's motion is a motion to reconsider, which, under
Local Rule 105.10, “shall be filed with the Clerk not
later than fourteen (14) days after entry of the
order.” Loc. R. 105.10 (D. Md. 2018).
local rule, CPG had fourteen days from November 5, 2018 to
seek reconsideration of the Order, but failed to do so until
November 30, 2018. ECF 104; Loc. R. 105.10; see Smith v
McGraw, Civil Action No. 10-cv-02310-AW, 2012 WL 603238,
at *4 (D. Md. Feb. 23, 2012) (finding untimely
Plaintiff's Motion for Reconsideration of the court's
order denying Plaintiff's Motion for Leave to File a
Third Amended Complaint because it was filed later than
fourteen days after the entry of the order). CPG has provided
no explanation for its late filing. Accordingly, CPG's
motion must be denied as untimely.
CPG's motion were timely, CPG has not established grounds
for this Court to reconsider its Order. Under Local Rule
105.10, similar to the standard for relief under Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 59(e), “[a] motion for
reconsideration is appropriate  to ‘correct manifest
errors of law or fact or  to present newly discovered
evidence,' or  where there has been an intervening
change in controlling law.” Potter v. Potter,
199 F.R.D. 550, 552 n.1 (D. Md. 2001) (citing Harsco
Corp. v. Zlotnicki, 779 F.2d 906, 909 (3d Cir. 1985),
and Above the Belt, Inc. v. Bohannan Roofing, Inc.,
99 F.R.D. 99, 101 (E.D. Va. 1983)). The grounds for
reconsideration are purposefully narrow to prevent the motion
from being used to “‘ask the Court to rethink
what the Court had already thought through-rightly or
wrongly.'” Potter, 199 F.R.D. at 552
(quoting Above the Belt, 99 F.R.D. at 101). As Judge
Grimm noted in Wonasue v. University of Maryland Alumni
Association, “[t]hese ‘rules of constraint .
. . make sense when a district court is asked to reconsider
its own order' because ‘[w]ere it otherwise, then
there would be no conclusion to motions practice, each motion
becoming nothing more than the latest installment in a
potentially endless serial that would exhaust the resources
of the parties and the court-not to mention its
patience.'” Civil No. PWG-11-3657, 2013 WL 6178041,
at *1 (D. Md. Nov. 22, 2013) (quoting Pinney v. Nokia,
Inc., 402 F.3d 430, 452-53 (4th Cir. 2005)) (dicta)
(internal quotations omitted).
does not suggest that any of the narrow grounds for
reconsideration are met here. Instead, CPG reiterates its
arguments from its Motion for Leave to File a Second Amended
Complaint. ECF 104 at 3-7; ECF 107 at 7-12. CPG maintains
that it “sought to clarify its obligation under the
lease for the flooded warehouse, ” and that any
proposed amendments would not prejudice Harleysville.
Id. The Order already addressed CPG's arguments,
and CPG has provided no basis, in law or fact, for me to
reconsider that Order.
reasons discussed above, CPG's Motion for
Reconsideration, ECF 104, is DENIED.
the informal nature of this letter, it will be flagged as an