United States District Court, D. Maryland
TERRANCE PEVIE, Inmate Identificaiion No. 404-424, Plaintiff,
KEITH LYONS, Warden, JCI, SCOTT D. SNYDER, Maintenance Manager, ALLEN GANG, Chiefof Security, individually and in their official capacities,  Defendants.
THEODORE D. CHUANG, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Pevie, an inmate now confined at Eastern Correctional
Institution ("ECI") in Westover, Maryland, has
filed a civil action against Jessup Correctional Institution
("JCI") personnel Warden Keith Lyons ("the
Warden"); Scott D. Snyder, Maintenance Manager; and
Allen Gang, Chief of Security, for allegedly failing to
repair exposed electrical wires that caused serious injury to
Pevie while he was incarcerated at JCI. Pevie claims that
Defendants thus violated his constitutional rights under the
Eighth and Fourteenth Amendmenss to the United States
Constitution and seeks declaratory relief and monetary
damages against each Defendant in his individual and official
capacity. Defendants Snyder and Gang have yet to be properly
pending before the Court is the Wardenss Motion to Dismiss
or, in the Alternative, Motion for Summary Judgment. In
response, Pevie filed a Motion to Dismiss or, in the
Alternative, Motion for Summary Judgmen,, which the Court
construes as a memorandum in opposition to the Wardenss
Motion. Upon review of the submitted materials, the Court
finds that no hearing is necessary. See D. Md. Local
R. 105.6. For the reasons set forth below, the Wardenss
Motion is GRANTED, and the claims against the unserved
Defendants, Snyder and Gang, are DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE.
morning of November 14, 2015, Pevie was participating in
recreation in a dayroom in the B-Building of JCI when he
backed into an uncovered electrical outlet with exposed wires
and was electrocuted. An officer found Pevie on the floor in
an unresponsive state. Pevie was taken to the prison
infirmary by stretcher, received medical treatment for leg
blisters and minor burns caused by the electrical shock, and
was observed for several hours prior to discharge back to his
cell. In an administraiive remedy procedure grievance
("ARP"), Pevie claimed additional injuries,
including second-degree burns to his lower left leg and
injuries to his head and neck caused by falling while
unconscious. Medical records do not corroborate that he
suffered these additional injuries.
to Pevie, in the months prior to Pevie's injury, fellow
inmate Eric W. Fuller had noticed the exposed wiring and
brought the issue to "several officers'
attention," but they failed to report this
"fire/safety hazard to maintenance to be fixed."
CompI. 3, ECF NO.1. Fuller provided an unsworn statement that
was attached to Pevie's ARP that confirmed that he had
reported the exposed wiring to several officers.
ARP was denied at the institutional and commissioner level
before it was reviewed by the Inmate Grievance Office
("IGO"). On January 3, 2017, Administrative Law
Judge Michelle W. Cole ("ALJ") concluded that the
Division of Correction ("DOC") "was negligent
when it failed to repair the exposed electrical outlet in the
recreation room" and awarded Pevie $1, 100 in
compensation for his pain and suffering. ALJ Op. at 9-10, ECF
No. 1-3. The ALJ's proposed findings and award were
affirmed by Stephen T. Moyer, Secretary of the Department of
Public Safety and Correctional Services, on February 2, 2017.
present Complaint, Pevie asserts that the "unsafe
conditions" and "negligence of staff and
maintenance" arising from the failure to repair the
exposed wiring constituted cruel and unusual punishmen,, in
violation of the Eighth Amendmen,, and a violation of his
right to due process of law under the Fourteenth Amendmen..
In the Complaint, Pevie makes no specific allegations against
the Warden, Snyder, or Gang. In his Opposition, however,
Pevie more specifically alleges that Defendants "had
actual knowledge of the dangerous conditions" and
"the knowledge was gained in sufficient time to give the
defendants a[n] opportunity to remove or warn" him of
the dangerous condition. Opp'n at 1, ECF No. 25. He
further asserts that a "supervisor may also be sued for
ignoring or failing to react to a widespread health or safety
problem." Id. He also claims for the first time
that "[e]very Wednesday both defendants (Lyon and Gang)
plus their whole administraiion team visit the segregation
building along with mental health doctors to see if any
inmates have problems or concerns while on lock up" and
that "2 or 3 weeks prior to me getting hurt defendants
(Lyon and Gang) stood in front of the broken outlet socket
along with the rest of his administraiion team. Lyon could be
heard asking officers who were with him 'why wasntt the
socket fixed and to fix it immediately.'" Mem.
Opp'n at 3, ECF No. 25-2.
declaration submitted with the Motion, the Warden asserts
that he expects JCI staff to comply with directives and
policies relating to inmate housing and facility conditions.
He further states that when responding to an ARP, he relies
on the review and investigation by JCI staff in determining
whether to approve a proposed response to the ARP.
Motion, the Warden seeks dismissal of the Complaint or
summary judgment in his favor on several grounds, including
that: (I) the Warden is not personally liable for Pevie's
alleged injuries; (2) Pevie fails to state an Eighth
Amendment or due process claim; and (3) the Warden is
entitled to qualified immunity.
Warden has filed his Motion as a Motion to Dismiss, or, in
the Alternative, for Summary Judgment. Typically, when
deciding a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 12(b)(6), the Court considers only the complaint
and any attached documents "integral to the
complaint." Sec 'y of State for
Defense v. Trimble Navigation Ltd., 484 F.3d 700, 705
(4th Cir. 2007). To the extent that grounds for dismissal are
based solely on the contents of the Complaint, the Court may
dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) if the complaint does not allege
enough facts to state a plausible claim for relief.
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). A claim
is plausible when the facts pleaded allow "the Court to
draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable
for the misconduct alleged." Id. Although
courts should construe pleadings of self-represented
litigants liberally, Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S.
89, 94 (2007), legal conclusions or conclusory statements do
not suffice, Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. The Court must
examine the complaint as a whole, consider the factual
allegations in the complaint as true, and construe the
factual allegations in the light most favorable to the
plaintiff. Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 268
(1994); Lambeth v. Ed of Comm 'rs of Davidson
Cty., 407 F.3d 266, 268 (4th Cir. 2005).
12(d) requires courts to treat a Rule 12(b)(6) motion as a
motion for summary judgment where matters outside the
pleadings are considered and not excluded. Fed.R.Civ.P.
12(d). Before converting a motion to dismiss to one for
summary judgmen,, courts must give the nonmoving party
"a reasonable opportunity to present all the material
that is pertinent to the motion." Id.
"Reasonable opportunity" has two requirements: (1)
the nonmoving party must have some indication that the court
is treating the Rule 12(b)(6) motion as a motion for summary
judgmen,, and (2) the nonmoving party "must be afforded
a reasonable opportunity for discovery" to obtain
information essential to oppose the motion. Gay v.
Wall,761 F.2d 175, 177 (4th Cir. 1985) (citation
omitted). Here, the notice requirement has been satisfied by
the title of the Motion. To show that a reasonable
opportunity for discovery has not been afforded, the
nonmoving party must file an affidavit or declaration under
Rule 56(d) explaining why "for specified reasons, it
cannot present facts essential to justify its
opposition," Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(d), or otherwise put the
district court on notice of the reasons why summary judgment
is premature. See Harrods, Ltd. v. Sixty Internet Domain
Names,302 F.3d 214, 244-45 (4th Cir. 2002). Here, Pevie