United States District Court, D. Maryland
SHAEEN C. JENKINS, Petitioner
TIMOTHY STEWART, WARDEN, Respondent
RICHARD D. BENNETT, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE.
is Shaeen Jenkins' Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241, challenging the Bureau of
Prisons' (BOP's) determination that he did not
qualify for early release under the BOP's Residential
Drug Abuse Program (RDAP) because his crime of conviction
involved the use of violence. ECF No. 1. Petitioner
subsequently filed a supplement to his Petition and a Motion
to Appoint Counsel. ECF Nos. 4, 5. Counsel for Respondent has
filed a Motion to Dismiss, or in the Alternative, For Summary
Judgment. ECF No. 9. Respondent's Motion shall be
reviewed as one for summary judgment. Although advised of his
right to do so, ECF No. 10, Petitioner did not respond to
Respondent's dispositive Motion and the time for doing so
review of these filings, the Court finds no need for an
evidentiary hearing. See Rules 1(b), 8(a), Rules
Governing Section 2254 Cases in the United States District
Courts and Local Rule 105.6. For the reasons that
follow, Petitioner's Motion to Appoint Counsel shall be
DENIED, Respondent's Motion for Summary Judgment shall be
GRANTED, and the Petition shall be DENIED AND DISMISSED.
2015, Petitioner was convicted in the U.S. District Court for
the District of Vermont on the charge of possession of
cocaine base with the intent to distribute in violation of 21
U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), and he was sentenced to 64 months
imprisonment. ECF No. 1 at 1; ECF No. 9-1 at 2-3. Petitioner
is presently an inmate at the Federal Correctional
Institution in Cumberland, Maryland, and has a projected
release date of June 7. 2019. ECF No. 1 at 1; ECF No. 9-1 at
action, Petitioner challenges the BOP's determination
that he is ineligible for early release under 18 U.S.C.
§ 3621(e) because his conviction involved the use of
violence. ECF No. 1 at 6-8. Petitioner disputed the BOP's
determination via an informal resolution request, a formal
request for administrative remedy, a regional administrative
remedy appeal, and a central office administrative remedy
appeal. ECF No. 1-2 at 3-4, 6, 8. His argument was rejected
at each step. Id. at 3, 5, 7, 9.
his § 2241 Petition and Supplement, Petitioner presents
six grounds for relief, which can be grouped into the
following claims: (1) his constitutional rights are being
violated because he is presently "illegally
incarcerated" (ECF No. 1 at 8); (2) the BOP's
determination that he committed a violent act in connection
with the offense of conviction is incorrect, inconsistent
with the record, and not in compliance with federal
regulations (ECF No. 1 at 6-8); and (3) challenges to the
content of his presentence report, his underlying arrest, and
counsel's effectiveness (ECF No. 1 at 7; ECF No. 4 at
1-2). In his request for relief, Petitioner states that he
wants the Court to "credit early release of one year for
the completion of the R-dap program. Pre-sentencing report to
be corrected to reflect that 'no violence'
occur." ECF No. 1 at 8.
dispositive Motion is styled as a Motion to dismiss under
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) or, in the
alternative, for summary judgment under Rule 56. A motion
styled in this manner implicates the court's discretion
under Rule 12(d) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
See Kensington Vol. Fire Dep't, Inc. v. Montgomery
Cnty., 788 F.Supp.2d 431, 436-37 (D. Md. 2011).
Ordinarily, a court "is not to consider matters outside
the pleadings or resolve factual disputes when ruling on a
motion to dismiss." Bosiger v. U.S. Airways,
510 F.3d 442, 450 (4th Cir. 2007). However, under Rule
12(b)(6), a court, in its discretion, may consider matters
outside of the pleadings, pursuant to Rule 12(d). If the
court does so, "the motion must be treated as one for
summary judgment under Rule 56," and "[a] 11
parties must be given a reasonable opportunity to present all
the material that is pertinent to the motion."
Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(d). When the movant expressly captions its
motion "in the alternative" as one for summary
judgment and submits matters outside the pleadings for the
court's consideration, the parties are deemed to be on
notice that conversion under Rule 12(d) may occur; the court
"does not have an obligation to notify parties of the
obvious." Laughlin v. Metro. Wash. Airports
Auth, 149 F.3d 253, 261 (4th Cir. 1998). Because both
parties have filed and relied on declarations and exhibits,
the Motion shall be treated as one for summary judgment.
judgment is appropriate only "if the pleadings,
depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on
file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there
is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the
moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of
law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). Rule 56(c) mandates entry of
summary judgment "against a party who fails to make a
showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element
essential to that party's case." Celotex Corp.
v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). In deciding
whether there is a genuine issue of material fact, the
evidence of the non-moving party is to be believed and all
justifiable inferences must be drawn in favor of the
non-moving party. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby,
Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986). "Only disputes over
facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the
governing law will properly preclude the entry of summary
judgment. Factual disputes that are irrelevant or unnecessary
will not be counted." Id. at 248.
moving party has the burden of proving that summary judgment
is appropriate. Once the moving party makes this showing,
however, the opposing party may not rest upon mere
allegations or denials, but rather must, by affidavits or
other means permitted by the Rule, set forth specific facts
showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. See
Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e). Further, complaints filed by a pro se
litigant are liberally construed to allow the development of
a potentially meritorious case. See Cruz v. Beto,
405 U.S. 319 (1972).
brings this action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241, the
federal habeas statute which allows a prisoner to file suit
against the BOP for "a violation of the Constitution or
laws or treaties of the United States." 28 U.S.C. §
2241(c)(3); Rose v. Hodges,423 U.S. 19, 21 (1975).
The pertinent federal statute in Petitioner's case, 18
U.S.C. § 3621(b), authorizes the BOP to implement drug
abuse treatment programs such as the Residential Drug Abuse
Treatment Program ("RDAP") and permits possible
early release upon successful RDAP completion. 18 U.S.C.
§ 3621(e)(2)(B) (participant's prison term
"may be ...