Searching over 5,500,000 cases.


searching
Buy This Entire Record For $7.95

Download the entire decision to receive the complete text, official citation,
docket number, dissents and concurrences, and footnotes for this case.

Learn more about what you receive with purchase of this case.

Dixon v. Dovey

United States District Court, D. Maryland

November 19, 2018

KEVIN LEON DIXON, Petitioner,
v.
RICHARD DOVEY, Warden, and ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE STATE OF MARYLAND, Respondents.

          MEMORANDUM OPINION

          THEODORE D. CHUANG UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

         Petitioner Kevin Leon Dixon, an inmate at the Maryland Correctional Training Center in Hagerstown, Maryland, has filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 in which he collaterally attacks his 2008 conviction for second-degree assault. Respondents have filed a Limited Answer in which they argue that the Petition should be dismissed as untimely. Pursuant to Hill v. Braxton, 277 F.3d 701, 707 (4th Cir. 2002), Dixon was afforded an opportunity to explain why the Petition should not be dismissed as time-barred. The Court then received from Dixon a filing in which he asks the Court 11 questions seeking details about the assault for which he was convicted and asserts that he is incarcerated for second-degree assault "without any 'evidence' or 'proof.'" Limited Reply at 1, ECF No. 11. Upon review of the submitted materials, the Court finds no need for an evidentiary hearing. See Rule 8(a), Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases in the United States District Courts; D. Md. Local R. 105.6. For the reasons set forth below, the Petition will be DISMISSED as time-barred.

         BACKGROUND

         On September 23, 2008, Dixon entered an Alford plea to second-degree assault in the Circuit Court for Somerset County, Maryland. He was sentenced to ten years of imprisonment with all but 18 months suspended, to be followed by five years of supervised probation. On October 20, 200,, the court amended Dixon's probation to include a requirement of sex offender registration. Dixon did not seek leave to appeal from the judgment.

         On August 9, 2010, Dixon was found guilty of violating the terms of his probation. As a result, on March 8, 2011, the circuit court imposed the remaining eight years and six months of his previously suspended sentence. Dixon sought leave to appeal that judgment on October 4, 2011. On October 19, 2011, his application was denied as untimely. Dixon did not seek further review of the denial.

         On May 27, 2014, Dixon filed a petition for post-conviction relief, which he supplemented on January 29, 2015. The circuit court construed Dixon's post-conviction petition as a motion to correct an illegal sentence, and on April 21, 2015, the court granted the motion to the extent that Dixon sought to strike the requirement that he register as a sex offender. The circuit court's ruling did not affect the ten-year sentence that had been imposed. Dixon did not seek leave to appeal that decision.

         Dixon filed the instant Petition on July 5, 2017. See Houston v. Lack, 487 U.S. 266, 276 (1988) (holding that a prisoner's submission is deemed to have been filed on the date it was deposited in the prison mailing system). On August 31, 2017, Dixon filed another petition for post-conviction relief in state court, which the circuit court dismissed on September 28, 2017.

         DISCUSSION

         In their Limited Answer, Respondents assert that the Petition should be dismissed as time-barred because it was filed well beyond the one-year limitations period of28 U.S.C. § 2244(d). In particular, Respondents highlight that, after Dixon's conviction became final, there were no state post-conviction or other collateral review proceedings pending in Dixon's case between: (1) April 7, 2011 and May 26, 2014 (over three years); and (2) May 21, 2015 and August 31, 2017 (over two years). These periods, individually and collectively, exceed one year. Although Dixon has sent correspondence to the Court following the filing of Respondents' Limited Answer, he has not addressed the timeliness of his Petition.

         I. Legal Standard

         A petition for a writ of habeas corpus may be granted only for violations of the Constitution or laws of the United States. 28 U.S.C. S 2254(a) (2012). Such a petition is subject to the following statutory limitations period:

(1) A 1-year period of limitation shall apply to an application for a writ of habeas corpus by a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court. The limitation period shall run from the latest of-
(A) the date on which the judgment became final by the conclusion of direct review or the expiration of the time for seeking such review;
(B) the date on which the impediment to filing an application created by State action in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States is removed, if the applicant was ...

Buy This Entire Record For $7.95

Download the entire decision to receive the complete text, official citation,
docket number, dissents and concurrences, and footnotes for this case.

Learn more about what you receive with purchase of this case.