United States District Court, D. Maryland
M.R., by and through her parents, N.R. and A.R., N.R. and A.R., Plaintiffs,
v.
AZIN TAJDAR, Defendant.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
THEODORE D. CHUANG, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Plaintiffs
M.R, who is three years old, and her parents have filed a
civil action against Defendant Azin Tajdar alleging that
Tajdar discriminated against M.R. on the basis of disability
by failing to make reasonable accommodation for M.R. at
Tajdar's home day care facility and dismissing her from
the program. Plaintiffs assert claims under Title III of the
Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA"), 42 U.S.C.
§§ 12181-12189 (2012), and anti-discrimination
provisions of the Maryland Code, as well as for common law
negligence. Presently pending before the Court is
Tajdar's Motion to Dismiss. Upon review of the pleadings
and briefs, the Court finds that no hearing is necessary.
See D. Md. Local R. 105.6. For the reasons set forth
below, Defendants' Motion is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED
IN PART.
BACKGROUND
M.R. is
a three-year-old child who has been diagnosed with autism. In
January 2015, her parents, A.R. and N.R., enrolled M.R., then
an infant, as a full-time attendee at Kids and Tots, the
state-licensed day care program run by Tajdar at her home in
Potomac, Maryland. By law, Kids and Tots is permitted to
enroll a maximum number of eight children at one time. The
monthly fee for infants is higher than the fee for toddlers.
Beginning
in October 2016, A.R. and N.R. became concerned about M.R.,
specifically her failure to use language and her social
isolation. With Tajdar's assistance, they consulted
M.R.'s pediatrician and the Montgomery County Public
Schools ("MCPS") Infants and Toddlers Program to
identify whether M.R. has a disability and could qualify for
educational programming through MPCS. On November 23, 2016,
MCPS concluded that M.R. has a disability and developed an
Individualized Family Service Plan ("IFSP") for
her, which stated that MCPS would provide educational
services for M.R. both at Plaintiffs' home and at Kids
and Tots. MCPS accommodated Tajdar's schedule in planning
the biweekly services, which began on January 9, 2017. On
February 9, 2017, M.R. was formally diagnosed with autism.
On
March 8, 2017, Tajdar suggested that A.R. and N.R. request
that MCPS provide and fund an Applied Behavior Analysis
intervention ("ABA") for M.R. MCPS agreed to the
request. Tajdar also requested that M.R.'s ABA take place
in a small nap room, rather than in the classroom space where
M.R. had received IFSP services for the previous two months.
A.R. and N.R. agreed, and M.R.'s ABA began to take place
in the nap room on March 23, 2017. A few days later, on March
27, 2017, Tajdar told A.R. that she "would not provide
M. either the classroom or the nap room for her ABA services
10 hours a week." Am. Compl. ¶ 37, ECF No. 13.
During a meeting on March 30, 2017, Tajdar told A.R. and N.R.
that she was not obligated to provide accommodations for
M.R., that M.R.'s ABA could not take place in the
classroom because "it wouldn't be fair to the other
kids and it wouldn't be fair to me," and that she
would no longer have space for M.R. in the nap room because a
new infant was enrolling in the program. Id.
¶¶ 40-41. Tajdar told A.R. and N.R. that she had to
"draw a line" and that they would have to move M.R.
to another day care program. Id. ¶ 42. In a
follow-up email that same day, Tajdar confirmed this
conversation and repeated that she could not provide M.R. a
private room for the ABA "due to limited space and
resources" and that a new infant was starting at the day
care on April 17. Id. ¶ 43. Because eight
children, including M.R., were enrolled at Kids and Tots at
that time, and because the monthly fee for infants is higher
than for toddlers, Plaintiffs allege that by expelling M.R.,
Tajdar "was able to open up a more profitable spot for
the new infant." Id. ¶ 44.
As a
result of M.R.'s expulsion from Kids and Tots, A.R. and
N.R. had to take time off from work, adjust their schedules,
arrange for all MCPS services to take place in their home,
and search for a new day care program with an immediate
opening for a two-year-old child with autism. On April 17,
2017, they enrolled M.R. at Potomac Valley Academy at an
additional expense and with a significantly longer daily
commute. The expulsion disrupted M.R.'s routine "in
a way that was particularly troubling to a child with
autism." Id. ¶ 51. It also resulted in
great stress to A.R., who was pregnant, leading to an
emergency room visit, high blood pressure, and an early
induction.
On
December 29, 2017, Plaintiffs filed their Complaint in this
Court. On March 26, 2018, Plaintiffs filed an Amended
Complaint, in which they alleged failure to accommodate a
disability (Count I) and intentional disability
discrimination (Count II) under the ADA and its implementing
regulations and under Maryland anti-discrimination statutes,
Md. Code Ann., State Gov't §§ 20-302, 20-304,
and 20-305 (West 2015). They also assert a state law tort
claim of negligence (Count III). Plaintiffs seek compensatory
and punitive damages, a declaratory judgment, an injunction
requiring Tajdar to make reasonable accommodations and allow
M.R. can return to her day care program, attorney's fees,
and costs.
DISCUSSION
In her
Motion, Tajdar seeks dismissal of all counts of the Amended
Complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
12(b)(6). First, Tajdar argues that the ADA claim must be
dismissed because the ADA does not authorize private claims
for monetary damages or declaratory relief and Plaintiffs
have not established standing to seek injunctive relief.
Second, they argue that the Maryland statutory claims must be
dismissed because the relevant statute does not provide a
private right of action for a claim of disability
discrimination in public accommodations. Finally, they argue
that Plaintiffs have failed to state a plausible negligence
claim under Maryland law.
I.
Legal Standard
To
defeat a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 12(b)(6), the complaint must allege enough facts to
state a plausible claim for relief. Ashcroft v.
Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). A claim is plausible
when the facts pleaded allow "the court to draw the
reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the
misconduct alleged." Id. Legal conclusions or
conclusory statements do not suffice. Id. The Court
must examine the complaint as a whole, consider the factual
allegations in the complaint as true, and construe the
factual allegations in the light most favorable to the
plaintiff. Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 268
(1994); Lambeth v. Bd. of Comm'rs of Davidson
Cty., 407 F.3d 266, 268 (4th Cir. 2005).
II.
ADA
In
Counts I and II, Plaintiffs allege that Tajdar intentionally
discriminated against M.R. and failed to accommodate her
disability by expelling her from the day care program, in
violation of the ADA. Under Title III of the ADA, "[n]o
individual shall be discriminated against on the basis of
disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the goods,
services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or
accommodations of any place of public accommodation by any
person who owns, leases (or leases to), or operates a place
of public accommodation." 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a). Day
care facilities are places of public accommodation within the
meaning of the ADA. Id. § 12181(7)(K). The ADA
further provides that discrimination includes "a failure
to make reasonable modifications in policies, practices, or
procedures, when such modifications are necessary to
afford" services to individuals with disabilities,
unless the modification would "fundamentally alter the
nature" of the services provided. Id. ยง
12182(b)(2)(A)(ii). A person without a disability may also
bring a claim for discrimination under Title III of ...