United States District Court, D. Maryland
DEBORAH K. CHASANOW United States District Judge.
court issued an Order on September 6, 2018, granting
Plaintiff 28 days to file a supplemental complaint in the
above-captioned case. ECF No. 3. Plaintiff has complied with
the Order (ECF No. 4), but for reasons stated herein, the
complaint will be dismissed. Plaintiff's pending motion
to proceed in forma pauperis will be granted.
directive to supplement the complaint, the court noted that
Plaintiff did not describe the type of property lost when his
cellmate and members of a prison gang allegedly stole it from
his cell and correctional staff at Maryland Correctional
Institution-Jessup did not intervene quickly enough to
prevent the loss. ECF No. 1. In his supplemental complaint,
Plaintiff provides the following list of property stolen from
him and for which he seeks compensation: one X-box game
system; two X-box controllers; one X-box hard drive (250 GB);
four X-box games; two pairs of shoes; one bowl; three blue
towels; one laundry bag; one watch; three pairs of boxer
shorts; three grey t-shirts; six pairs of ankle socks; one
sewing kit; one art set; eight music CDs; and one TV remote
control. ECF No. 4 at pp. 3-4.
as here, the loss of property does not implicate a protected
constitutional right such as a First Amendment right to
access to the courts, freedom of religion, or free speech,
there is no viable federal constitutional claim stated.
Plaintiff does not have a due process right that is
implicated under the facts he asserts. In the case of lost or
stolen property, sufficient due process is afforded to a
prisoner if he has access to an adequate post-deprivation
remedy. See Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 540
(1981), overruled on other grounds by Daniels v.
Williams, 474 U.S. 327 (1986). The right to seek damages
and injunctive relief in Maryland's courts constitutes an
adequate post deprivation remedy. See Juncker v.
Tinney, 549 F.Supp. 574, 579 (D. Md.
1982). The Supreme Court extended its
Parratt holding to intentional deprivations of
property. See Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 533,
104 S.Ct. 3194, 3203 (1984). Therefore, assuming
Plaintiff's personal property was stolen as he alleges
and assuming correctional staff were in some respect
responsible for the loss, such a claim does not rise to a
constitutional violation.The complaint presented here will be
dismissed under the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e).
See Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989);
see also Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 32
(1992); Cochran v. Morris, 73 F.3d 1310, 1315 (4th
Cir. 1996); Nasim v. Warden, 64 F.3d 951, 954-55
(4th Cir. 1995).
is hereby notified that he may be barred from filing future
suits in forma pauperis if he continues to file
federal civil rights actions that are subject to dismissal
for failure to state a claim on which relief may be granted
under §1915(e) or under Fed .R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).
Plaintiff is reminded that under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g) he
will not be granted in forma pauperis status if he
has “on 3 or more prior occasions, while incarcerated
or detained in any facility, brought an action or appeal in a
court of the United States that was dismissed on the grounds
that it is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim
upon which relief may be granted, unless the prisoner is
under imminent danger of serious physical injury.”
separate Order which follows, the complaint will be
 Plaintiff may avail himself of
remedies under the Maryland's Tort Claims Act and through
the Inmate Grievance Office.
 Although Juncker dealt with
personal injury rather than property loss, its analysis and
conclusion that sufficient due process is afforded through
post deprivation remedies available in the Maryland courts
also applies to cases of lost or stolen property, given
Juncker's reliance on Parratt in
dismissing Plaintiff's due process claim.
 In rejecting a prisoner's Fourth
Amendment claim to an expectation of privacy in his cell, the
Supreme Court stated that denying such a claim did not
“mean that [a prisoner] is without a remedy for
calculated harassment unrelated to prison needs. Nor does it
mean that prison attendants can ride roughshod over
inmates' property rights with impunity. The Eighth
Amendment always stands as a protection against ‘cruel
and unusual punishments.' By the same token, there are
adequate state tort and common-law remedies available to