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Feather-Gorbey v. Warden

United States District Court, D. Maryland

November 6, 2018

MICHAEL S. FEATHER-GORBEY Petitioner
v.
WARDEN, FCI-CUMBERLAND Respondent

          MEMORANDUM OPINION

          RICHARD D. BENNETT UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

         In this Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §2241, Petitioner Michael Gorbey alleges that the Federal Bureau of Prisons (BOP) has improperly denied him access to the Interstate Agreement on Detainers Act (IADA) process for a detainer filed against him by the State of Virginia for an alleged violation of probation. ECF 1. In response, Respondent filed a Motion to Dismiss or for Summary Judgment (ECF 5), which is opposed by Gorbey (ECF 7). Respondent filed a Reply. ECF 8. There is no need for a hearing to determine the issues pending before the Court. See Local Rule 105.6. For the reasons stated herein, the petition shall be dismissed and Respondent's motion, construed as a Motion for Summary Judgment, shall be granted.

         Background

         Gorbey, who is serving a term of 252 months in the BOP, asserts that he has an active detainer lodged against him by the State of Virginia, for an “alleged felony probation violation in Fauquier County, Virginia.” ECF 1 at p. 9.[1] He claims that under Virginia law, this is a new felony entitling him to a fast and speedy trial. Id. He asserts that despite that fact, the BOP is “openly denying me access to the IADA process resulting in prejudices.” Id.

         Gorbey further explains that the detainer was lodged on April 25, 2017, by the State of Virginia's “use of an illegal or otherwise unconstitutional 2010 Capias . . . issued some 1 month outside the 7 year statute of limitations.” ECF 1 at p. 10. He states there was a 2003 Capias which expired and the 2010 Capias was “issued by the Court clerk without being order[ed] to do so by the Court in violation of double jeopardy and or collateral estoppel.” Id. He characterizes this action as a “malicious abuse of process.” Id.

         On October 18, 2017, Gorbey states, the Fauquier Circuit Court ordered another Capias issued, which he claims is 7 years, 4 months beyond the expiration of the 2003 Capias. Id.

         Gorbey claims that because the detainer and capias were active at his original sentencing by the District of Columbia court in 2008 and at his remand sentencing in 2014, his “sentence categories” were increased by one level, “extending the length of my present sentence.” Id. at p. 11. Gorbey expects to be resentenced again because of other alleged sentencing errors by the D.C. Superior Court and the detainer again presents a problem with raising his sentencing guidelines, but the BOP will not allow him access to the IADA process to have the open charges addressed. Id. Further, Gorbey asserts that the detainer prohibits him from progressing to a lower security prison, or to participate in programming such as entry to a halfway house. Id.

         As relief, Gorbey seeks an Order from this Court directing the BOP to “promptly file IADA fast and speedy trial demands to Fauquier Circuit Court” and unspecified compensatory damages. Id. at p. 12.

         Respondent asserts that the petition should be dismissed because an alleged violation of the IADA does not state a sufficient ground for habeas relief and, in any event, the BOP properly concluded that Gorbey's detainer is not one to which the IADA process applies. ECF 5-1.

         Standard of Review

          Summary Judgment is governed by Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a) which provides that:

The court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

         The Supreme Court has clarified that this does not mean that any factual dispute will defeat the motion:

By its very terms, this standard provides that the mere existence of some alleged factual dispute between the parties will not defeat an otherwise properly supported motion for summary judgment; the requirement is ...

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