United States District Court, D. Maryland
XINIS UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Christopher Edward Chamberlain, an inmate at the Central
Maryland Correctional Facility in Sykesville, Maryland, has
filed a Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 2254 in which he collaterally attacks his 2011
conviction for second-degree assault and third-degree sexual
offense. ECF No. 1. Respondents have filed a limited Answer
in which they argue that the Petition should be dismissed as
untimely. ECF No. 6. Pursuant to Hill v. Braxton,
277 F.3d 701 (4th Cir. 2002), Chamberlain was afforded an
opportunity to explain why the Petition should not be
dismissed as time-barred. ECF No. 7. Chamberlain responded on
July 2, 2018, and again on July 13, 2018, stating that
post-conviction counsel had advised him to file this
Petition. ECF Nos. 8, 9. Upon review of the submitted
materials, the Court finds no need for an evidentiary
hearing. See Rule 8(a), Rules Governing Section 2254
Cases in the United States District Courts; D. Md. Local R.
105.6. For the reasons set forth below, the Petition will be
DISMISSED as time-barred.
25, 2011, Chamberlain was convicted in the Circuit Court for
Charles County of second-degree assault and third-degree
sexual offense. See ECF No. 6-1, p. 10. On August 2,
2011, the Circuit Court sentenced Chamberlain to an
eight-year term of imprisonment. Id. at pp. 8-9;
see also ECF No. 1. Chamberlain then appealed his
convictions and sentence. ECF No. 6-1, p. 8. On the same day,
Chamberlain also moved for reconsideration of his sentence
before the Circuit Court. On July 27, 2012, The Maryland
Court of Special Appeals affirmed Chamberlain's
conviction and sentence. See ECF No. 6-2.
Thereafter, on November 19, 2012, the Maryland Court of
Appeals denied Chamberlain's petition for a writ of
certiorari. Chamberlain v. State, 429 Md. 304
(2012). Chamberlain did not seek further review in the United
States Supreme Court and, therefore, the judgment and
sentence became final for direct appeal purposes on February
19, 2013. See Sup. Ct. Rule 13.1 (requiring petition
for writ of certiorari to be filed within 90 days of the date
of judgment from which appeal is sought). On August 13, 2014,
the Circuit Court denied Chamberlain's motion to
reconsider his sentence. Id. at p. 5.
two years later, on February 9, 2017, Chamberlain filed a
petition for post-conviction relief in the Circuit Court for
Charles County. Id. at p. 3; see also ECF
No. 1, p. 3. The petition was denied on December 18, 2017.
Id. Chamberlain then applied for leave to appeal,
which the Court of Special Appeals denied on April 4, 2018,
with the mandate issuing on May 4, 2018. Id. at pp.
2-3; ECF No. 6-2, pp. 24-26.
filed the instant Petition on April 29, 2018. See Houston
v. Lack, 487 U.S. 266, 276 (1988) (holding that a
prisoner's submission is deemed to have been filed on the
date it was deposited in the prison mailing system). In the
Petition, Chamberlain contends that both trial and
post-conviction counsel rendered ineffective assistance. ECF
No. 1 at pp. 5-6.
assert that the Petition should be dismissed as time-barred
because it was filed well beyond the one-year limitations
period set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d). ECF No. 6.
Respondents point out that not only had Chamberlain's
conviction become final on February 2013, but also that over
two years elapsed between the August 13, 2014 denial of
reconsideration of sentence and his filing a state-post
conviction petition. Id. at pp. 4-5. Finally,
Respondents contend that Chamberlain has not provided
sufficient cause to excuse timely failure to file his
Petition, and so it must be dismissed as time-barred.
See ECF Nos. 8, 9.
petition for a writ of habeas corpus may be granted only for
violations of the Constitution or laws of the United States.
28 U.S.C. § 2254(a) (2012). However, a petition is
subject to the following statutory limitations period:
(1) A 1-year period of limitation shall apply to an
application for a writ of habeas corpus by a person in
custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court. The
limitation period shall run from the latest of-
(A) the date on which the judgment became final by the
conclusion of direct review or the expiration of the time for
seeking such review;
(B) the date on which the impediment to filing an application
created by State action in violation of the Constitution or
laws of the United States is removed, if the applicant was
prevented from filing by such State action;
(C) the date on which the constitutional right asserted was
initially recognized by the Supreme Court, if the right has
been newly recognized by the Supreme Court and made
retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review; or
(D) the date on which the factual predicate of the claim or
claims presented could have been discovered through the