United States District Court, D. Maryland
W. Grimm, United States District Judge
Locklear filed a civil rights Complaint on December 27, 207..
ECF NO.1. Based on the Complaint's allegations that
Locklear was a target of gang violence, Att., ECF No. 1-1,
the Court issued a show cause order, ECF No.3. Locklear
subsequently filed letters on April 26, 2018, June 4, 2018,
and June 20, 2018 that the Court treated as requests for
preliminary injunctions. ECF Nos. 11, 18, 21. The Court
ordered Defendants to respond to each of these requests, ECF
Nos. 13, 19, 27, and the Defendants have complied, ECF Nos.
16, 20, 27. Locklear submitted another letter on July 9,
2018, restating his allegations that his life is in danger.
ECF No. 25. To date, the Court has denied injunctive relief
as to the first and second show cause orders. See
ECF No. 10, 22.
having reviewed Locklear's allegations, I conclude that
he has failed to demonstrate that he is in imminent danger
and thus will deny the third and fourth requests for
preliminary injunctions. Further, Locklear's filings are
becoming increasingly speculative, placing an unnecessary
burden on the Court's resources to review meritle's
requests tor injunctive relief. Locklear is cautioned that
the Court may impose limitations on future filings should
this behavior persist.
preliminary injunction is "an extraordinary remedy"
that "may only be awarded upon a clear showing that the
plaintiff is entitled to such relief." Winter v.
Natural Res. De!. Council Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 22 (2008).
To obtain a preliminary injunction, the plaintiff must
"establish that  he is likely to succeed on the
merits,  he is likely to suffer irreparable harm in the
absence of preliminary relief,  the balance of equities
tips in his favor, and  an injunction is in the public
interest." Id. at 20; see Dewhurst v.
Century Aluminum Co., 649 F.3d 287, 290 (4th Cir. 2011).
"A preliminary injunction cannot be issued unless all
four of these elements are met, and '[p]laintiff bears
the burden of establishing that each of these factors
supports granting the injunction.'" Williams v.
JP Morgan Chase Bank, No. RDB-16-00312, 2016 WL 509426,
at *3 (D. Md. Feb. 4, 2016) (slip op.) (quoting Direx
Israel, Ltd. v. Breakthrough Med. Corp., 952 F.2d 802,
812 (4th Cir. 1991) (citation and quotation marks omitted)).
"[T]he burden placed upon Plaintiffs to state a claim
for a preliminary injunction is high." EndoSurg
Med., Inc. v. EndoMaster Med, Inc., 71 F.Supp.3d 525,
538 (D. Md. 2014); see Fowler v. Wells Fargo Home
Mortgage, Inc., No. GJH-15-1084, 2015 WL 2342377, at *2
(D. Md. May 13, 2015) (same). As particularly relevant to
this case, the requirement that one establish a likelihood of
suffering irreparable harm is not satisfied by suggesting a
mere possibility of such harm. Winter, 555 U.S. at
22 ("Issuing a preliminary injunction based only on a
possibility of irreparable harm is inconsistent with our
characterization of injunctive relief as an extraordinary
remedy that may only be awarded upon a clear showing that the
plaintiff is entitled to such relief."); De Simone
v. VSL Pharm., Inc., 133 F.Supp.3d 776, 799 (D. Md.
2015) ("The irreparable harm to be suffered must be
neither remote nor speculative, but actual and
imminent." (internal quotation marks omitted)).
all four filings, Locklear has made several particularized
allegations of threats to his safety, each of which is
separately discussed below. The Court concludes that Locklear
has not established the, four Winter factors-in
particular, the likelihood of irreparable harm-as to any of
alleged repeatedly that a gang issued a "contract
HIT" against him because he was formerly housed with a
homosexual inmate and for other reasons. Compl. Art. 1;
see also Apr. 26, 2018 Req. for Prelim. Inj. 1; July
9, 2018 Ltr. I already have denied injunctive relief as to
this claim, Apr. 12, 2018 Order; June 25, 2018 Order, and I
mention it here only for the purpose of fully cataloguing
Locklear's allegations. Of all the allegations, this
allegation perhaps came the closest to warranting injunctive
relief, as it identified a specific, serious threat
Locklear's safety and provided some detail to raise the
threat above the speculative level.
Defendants' sworn statements that Locklear would not be
housed with or have contact with gang members established
that this threat of harm was not likely to occur, even if it
remained remotely possible. Indeed, as detailed below,
Defendants have assigned Locklear a new cellmate on multiple
occasions based on his complaints. Thus, Locklear was not
entitled to preliminary injunctive relief as to this claim
because he could not satisfy the second Winter
alleged in his second request for a preliminary injunction
that his life was in danger while Isaac Smith was his
cellmate because Smith was "beefing with [B]loods."
Apr. 26, 2018 Req. for Prelim. Inj. 1. As noted in the Order
denying Plaintiffs second request for injunctive relief,
Plaintiff was subsequently assigned a different cellmate.
June 25, 2018 Order 3. Thus, this request was moot by the
time the Court addressed it.