United States District Court, D. Maryland
LIPTON HOLLANDER UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
civil rights litigation arises from a traffic stop and arrest
of plaintiff Amanda Boyce on December 7, 2013. See
ECF 5 (“Amended Complaint”). On November 22,
2017, Boyce filed suit against Baltimore City Police Officer
Steven Dorn, “John Doe Officers 1-5”, and
“John Doe Supervisors 1-10”,  in their
individual and official capacities. Id. Boyce
alleges violations of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments,
pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1988.
is not at issue. In Count II, plaintiff alleges
“supervisory violations” of the Fourth and
Fourteenth Amendments by the unnamed supervisors.
Id. Count III is lodged against the
“Individual Defendant Officers.” There, Boyce
alleges unlawful arrest, in violation of the Fourth and
Fourteenth Amendments. Id. Count IV, which is lodged
against the Individual Defendant Officers, asserts use of
excessive force. Count V, against the Individual Officers,
asserts “failure to intervene.” Id. In
Count VI, plaintiff asserts a claim of conspiracy against all
defendants. Finally, Count VII, lodged against all
defendants, alleges “abuse of process.”
Dorn, the only named defendant, has moved to dismiss the
Amended Complaint (ECF 6), supported by a memorandum of law
(ECF 6-1) (collectively, the “Motion”). He argues
that plaintiff's suit is barred by the applicable statute
of limitations. Boyce opposes the Motion (ECF 7), with a
supporting memorandum of law. See ECF 7-1
(collectively, the “Opposition”). Dorn has
replied. See ECF 10
hearing is necessary to resolve the Motion. See
Local Rule 105.6. For the reasons that follow, I shall grant
to plaintiff, Dorn “was employed by the City of
Baltimore as a safety officer.” ECF 5, ¶ 7. The
“John Doe Supervisors” are “the individuals
tasked with supervising” Dorn, and include the
“Chief of Police and [other] related
supervisors.” Id. Plaintiff fails to describe
the “John Doe Officers” (see, e.g.,
id. at 2-4), but it would appear that they are
Dorn's fellow officers.
December 7, 2013, Boyce, “a white woman”, was
“driving her vehicle through a predominantly
African-American neighborhood” when “Dorn stopped
her for no legal reason.” Id. ¶ 11.
Plaintiff avers that she was “obeying all traffic
laws” and that she was “given no reason for the
vehicle stop.” Id. ¶¶ 12-13. Yet,
according to plaintiff, Dorn told plaintiff that her
“driver's license was suspended and that she had a
warrant for her arrest for an alleged ‘failure to
comply.'” Id. ¶ 15.
point during the traffic stop, Dorn handcuffed plaintiff.
Id. ¶ 17. According to Boyce, the handcuffs
were “secured . . . much too tightly.”
Id. ¶ 18. And, when Boyce asked Dorn to loosen
the handcuffs, Dorn refused to do so. ECF 5, ¶ 19.
Boyce contends that Dorn caused her “excruciating pain
by . . . twisting [her] arm behind her back in a manner and
direction it could not naturally be moved.”
Id. ¶ 17. Plaintiff also avers that Dorn told
her that “if she resisted . . . she would be
‘eating concrete.'” Id. ¶ 20.
Boyce insists that “at no time” did she resist
Dorn or display “any threatening behavior” to
Dorn or “the individually named Defendant
Officers.” Id. ¶¶ 25, 29. Further,
Boyce contends that she “did not have any . . . weapon,
or display an object that appeared to be a weapon.”
Id. ¶ 28. And, she avers that she did not pose
a “risk of flight.” Id. ¶ 31.
December 7, 2013, Boyce was transported to the “Police
Department” (id. ¶ 21) and her vehicle
was towed. Id. ¶ 23. After Dorn brought
plaintiff to “the Police Department, it was revealed
that there was no warrant for Plaintiffs arrest.”
Id. ¶ 21. Nonetheless, plaintiff was
“forced to spend the night at the Police
Department.” Id. ¶ 22. “All charges
against Plaintiff were subsequently dismissed.”
Id. ¶ 24.
contends that she “was racially profiled by Defendant
Dorn”, and that “none of the individually named
Defendant Officers observed Plaintiff commit any violent
felony or crime.” Id. ¶¶ 14, 27.
Further, Boyce asserts that defendants lacked a reason to
“deny [her] medical care or to arrest her”, and
lacked “probable cause to detain” her.
Id. ¶ 32. Boyce also claims that her vehicle
was unlawfully towed (id. ¶ 23), and that
“the individually named Defendant Officers ignored
[her] clear physical distress and denied her relief[.]”
Id. ¶ 26.
Boyce refers frequently to the Defendant Officers, the facts
asserted seem to pertain only to Dorn. But, she alleges that
the Defendant Supervisors failed to train, supervise, or
discipline officers of the Baltimore City Police Department,
despite receipt of ...