United States District Court, D. Maryland
RICHARD D. BENNETT UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
April 14, 2014, Marvel Alegria ("Petitioner")
pleaded guilty to one count of Conspiracy to Interfere with
Interstate Commerce by Robbery, 18 U.S.C § 1951. (ECF
No. 25.) On September 23, 2014, Petitioner was sentenced to
57 months' imprisonment, (ECF No. 63), which was below
the guidelines recommendation of 63 months. Petitioner did
not appeal her conviction.
then incarcerated at FCI Hazelton, in Bruceton Mills, West
Virginia moved to vacate her sentence under 28 U.S.C. §
2255. (ECF No. 56.) Pending now is that Motion to Vacate (ECF
No. 56). Having reviewed the patties'
submissions, this Court finds that no hearing at this time is
necessary. See, e.g., United States v. Lemaster, 403
F.3d 216, 220-23 (4th Or. 2005) (holding that a hearing must
be held "[u]nless the motion and the files and records
conclusively show that the prisoner is entitled to no
relief...."); United States v.
White, 366 F.3d 291, 302 (4th Cir. 2004); see
also Local Rule 105.6 (D. Md. 2016). For the reasons set
forth below, Petitioner's Motion to Vacate (ECF No. 56)
January 16, 2014, Petitioner was indicted for one count of
Conspiracy to Interfere with Commerce by Robbery, 18 U.S.C.
§ 1951(a), one count of Using, Carrying, or Brandishing
A Firearm During and in Relation to a Crime of Violence, 18
U.S.C. § 924(c), two counts of Interference with
Commerce by Robbery, and two counts of Aiding and Abetting,
18 U.S.C. § 2. (ECF No. 1.) Petitioner pleaded guilty to
one count of Conspiracy to Interfere with Commerce by
Robbery, 18 U.S.C. § 1951(a). (ECF No. 25.) All other
charges were dismissed by the United States. (Id.)
This Court sentenced Petitioner to 57 months in prison
followed by three years of supervised release. (ECF No. 63 at
was released from federal custody and had a reentry hearing
before this court on March 15, 2018. (ECF No. 65). Petitioner
is currently serving her three year period of supervised
release. (ECF No. 63.)
26, 2016, Petitioner moved to vacate her sentence pursuant to
28 U.S.C. § 2255. (ECF No. 56.) On July 29, 2016, this
Court ordered the Government to respond to Petitioner's
Motion to Vacate. (ECF No. 57.) The Government responded in
opposition to the Motion to Vacate on January, 30, 2018. (ECF
Petitioner proceeds pro se, this Court must construe
her pleadings liberally. See Erickson v.
Partus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007); see also Alley v.
Yadkin County Sheriff Dept., No. 17-1249, 698 Fed.Appx.
141 (Mem) (4th Cir. Oct. 5, 2017) (citing Erickson
for the proposition that [P]ro se complaints and pleadings,
however inartfully pleaded, must be liberally construed and
held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings
drafted by lawyers").
28 U.S.C. § 2255, a prisoner in custody may seek to
vacate, set aside or correct his sentence on four grounds:
(1) the sentence was imposed in violation of the Constitution
or laws of the United States, (2) the court was without
jurisdiction to impose the sentence, (3) the sentence was in
excess of the maximum authorized by law, or (4) the sentence
is otherwise subject to a collateral attack. Hill v.
United States, 368 U.S. 424, 426-27 (1962) (citing 28
U.S.C. § 2255). "[A]n error of law does not provide
a basis for collateral attack unless the claimed error
constituted 'a fundamental defect which inherently
results in a complete miscarriage of justice."'
United States v. Addenda, 442 U.S. 178, 185 (1979)
(quoting Hill, 368 U.S. at 428).
scope of a § 2255 collateral attack is far narrower than
an appeal, and a '"collateral challenge may not do
service for an appeal."' Foster p. Chatman,
___U.S.___, 136 S.Ct. 1737, 1758 (2016) (quoting
United States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152, 165 (1982)).
Thus, procedural default will bar consideration under §
2255 of any matters that "could have been but were not
pursued on direct appeal, [unless] the movant . . . show[s]
cause and actual prejudice resulting from the errors of which
he complains." United States v. Pettiford, 612
F.3d 270, 280 (4th Cir. 2010) (citing United States v.
Mikalajunas, 186 F.3d 490, 492-93 (4th Cir.1999)).
one-year statute of limitations applies to § 2255
petitions. 28 U.S.C. § 2255(f). The limitations period
runs from the latest of:
(1) the date on which the judgment of conviction becomes
final; (2) the date on which the impediment to making a
motion created by governmental action in violation of the
Constitution or laws of the United States is removed, if the
movant was prevented from making a motion by such
governmental action; (3) the date on which the right asserted
was initially recognized by the Supreme Court, if that right
has been newly recognized by the Supreme Court and made
retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review; or
(4) the date on which the facts supporting the claim or
claims presented could have been discovered through the
exercise of due diligence.
Id; see also Whiteside v. United States, 775 F.3d
180, 183 (4th Cir. 2014). A conviction becomes final for the
purpose of starting the one-year limitations period when the
opportunity to appeal expires. See Clay , Untied
States,537 U.S. 522, 524-25 (2003); United ...