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Talley v. Ocwen Loan Servicing, LLC

United States District Court, D. Maryland

June 6, 2018

OCWEN LOAN SERVICING, LLC, et al., Defendants.



         Pending before the Court are the motions to dismiss filed by Defendants Ocwen Loan Servicing, LLC (“Ocwen”) and BWW Law Group LLC (“BWW”) (collectively, the “Defendants”).[1] (ECF Nos. 25 & 26.) Having considered the submissions of the parties (ECF Nos. 20, 25, 26, 29, 32 & 33), I find that a hearing is unnecessary. See Loc. R. 105.6. For the reasons set forth below, the Defendants' motions will be granted and the case will be dismissed with prejudice.

         I. Introduction

         A. Plaintiff's Previous Litigation Before This Court

         This is the second case filed by Plaintiff Rochell Talley (“Talley”) regarding the foreclosure of his home that has come before this Court. Previously, on January 5, 2016, Talley filed a lawsuit in the Circuit Court for Prince George's County, Maryland (“Circuit Court”), challenging events related to the same mortgage loan and subsequent foreclosure of the property located at 9111 Duvall Road, Upper Marlboro, Maryland (“Property”) that are now at issue in this case. See Talley v. Ocwen Loan Servicing, No. RWT-16-389, 2016 WL 1321427 (D. Md. Apr. 5, 2016) (? Talley I ”), aff'd in part, vacated in part on other grounds, remanded sub nom. Talley v. Ocwen Loan Servicing, LLC, No. 16-1478, 2017 WL 218858 (4th Cir. Jan. 19, 2017).

         The essential facts underlying Talley I and this case are identical:

On May 23, 2005, the Plaintiff executed an Adjustable Rate Note payable to Defendant IndyMac, secured by a Deed of Trust on property at 9111 Duvall Road in Upper Marlboro, Maryland, which was recorded on July 13, 2005. The Plaintiff alleges that the loan “was immediately sold and securitized after closing.” The Plaintiff further alleges that the transfer was completed without notice to the Plaintiff, without required endorsements, and in violation of several laws. On August 20, 2014, Defendant Ocwen began foreclosure proceedings in Prince George's County Circuit Court, and on January 29, 2015, that court ordered that a foreclosure sale could be scheduled. The Plaintiff responded by filing two motions for temporary restraining orders, which the court denied.

Id. (internal citations omitted).

         After the defendants in Talley I removed the case to this Court, they moved to dismiss the complaint. Id. at *1. Included among the 16 counts of the complaint in Talley I was a claim for quiet title. (Id.) Talley I addressed this claim and others that challenged the defendants' standing to foreclose on the Property:

Much of Plaintiff s Complaint and his Opposition relate to his assertion that the foreclosure proceedings rely on fraudulent representations by the Defendants. The Plaintiff protests that the Defendants do not have standing to foreclose and so have engaged in a conspiracy to deceive the state court. These arguments are a collateral attack on the state court's judgments in the ongoing foreclosure action, in which the state court has already permitted the parties to schedule a foreclosure sale and denied Plaintiffs objections. “The Maryland courts and this Court, applying Maryland law, have consistently held that res judicata bars collateral attacks on foreclosure judgments entered in the Circuit Courts.” Jones v. HSBC Bank USA, N.A., No. RWT-09-2904, 2011 WL 382371, at *5 (D. Md. Feb. 3, 2011), aff'd, 444 Fed.Appx. 640 (4th Cir. 2011). Although the foreclosure proceeding has not been finalized, in denying the Plaintiff's motion to object, the state court necessarily ruled that the Defendants had standing to foreclose. Any ruling by this Court to the contrary would be improper.

Id. at *2 (internal citations omitted). The Court went on to dismiss all of Talley's claims with prejudice. Id. On appeal, the Fourth Circuit affirmed in part and reversed in part, remanding the case for this Court to determine whether Talley should be granted leave to amend. Talley, 673 Fed.Appx. 329. On remand, the Court granted Talley leave to file an amended complaint, but Talley instead sought to voluntarily dismiss the case. (ECF No. 44 in RWT-16-389.) The Court dismissed Talley I without prejudice on March 21, 2017. (ECF No. 48 in RWT-16-389.)

         B. Plaintiff's Complaint

         Talley filed the instant case in the Circuit Court on November 28, 2017. (ECF No. 2.) Ocwen timely removed the case to this Court on January 5, 2017.[2] (ECF No. 1.) In the Complaint, Talley asserts a single claim for quiet title. (ECF No. 2.) Talley requests that the Court “[d]eclare the Deed of Trust to be null and void” and “[d]eclare the promissory note to be declared fully discharged.” (Id. at 21.) Although the factual allegations of the Complaint are somewhat circuitous, at bottom, Talley alleges that Ocwen is not the “real party of interest” on his mortgage loan and seeks clarification as to who holds title to the Property.

         II. ...

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