United States District Court, D. Maryland
Xinis United States District Judge
April 20, 2018, the Clerk received Petitioner Charles Anthony
Dread's pleading on forms used to petition the Court for
a writ of habeas corpus. ECF No. 1. A $5.00 filing fee was
included, together with an 11-page attachment titled
“Petition for a Writ of Certiorari.” ECF No. 1-1.
After reading the Petition and its attachment and reviewing
Dread's prior state court actions found on the Maryland
Judiciary Case Search website, the Court nonetheless could not
discern the nature of the claim. The action was docketed and
construed as a habeas Petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2241,
and Dread was provided an opportunity to amend his Petition,
setting forth information concerning the matter he was
challenging. ECF No. 2. Dread has complied. ECF No. 3.
following information, gleaned from Dread's submissions
and information obtained from Maryland's electronic
docket,  leads to the conclusion that Dread is
seeking mandamus relief from this Court. In 1989, Dread,
employed as a trooper with the Maryland State Police, was
administratively charged for violating departmental policy.
ECF No. 3-5. A hearing was held before the Administrative
Hearing Board of the Department of Public Safety and
Correctional Services (“DPSCS”). See generally
ECF No. 3-4. On April 24, 1991, the Board then issued its
finding that Dread was guilty of four of six disciplinary
charges and recommended to the Maryland State Police through
its Superintendent that Dread be terminated from
employment. ECF No. 3-3, p. 1(referencing IAU No.
U-31-00037). The Superintendent agreed, and decided that
Dread's termination would be effective May 1, 1991,
unless Dread took disability retirement by that same date; if
Dread elected disability retirement, the disciplinary
termination would “be held in abeyance.”
16, 1996, Dread appealed the agency decision. See
Maryland State Police v. Dread, No. 03-C-96004893 (Cir.
Ct. Balto. Cty. 1996); ECF No. 3-1, p. 2-23, Memorandum of
Charles Dread. The appeal was denied on February 7, 1997.
Dread, No. 03-C-96004893, Docket Entry 15/2. Dread
appealed the dismissal to the Court of Special Appeals of
Maryland, where it was denied on September 22, 1997.
Id., Docket Entry 26. A writ of certiorari to the
Court of Appeals of Maryland was denied on February 13, 1998.
Id., Docket Entry 30. Although unclear, it appears
from the docket that Dread attempted to reopen appellate
proceedings on July 26, 2017. Id., Docket Entry 32.
On January 29, 2018, the Court of Special Appeals declined to
issue a writ of certiorari. Id., Docket Entry. 37.
The mandate issued on April 19, 2018. Id., Docket
seeks to compel a different result here, claiming that
Maryland State Police rules and policies were violated (ECF
No. 1, p. 5) and the “charging document” that led
to his termination was falsified (ECF No. 1, p. 3). Dread
also claims generally that his due process rights were
violated. ECF No. 3, p. 7. He asks this Court to reverse the
April 25, 1991 Superintendant's decision, exonerate him
of the disciplinary charges, and allow his official
retirement from the MSP at an “elevated rank, ”
and $4, 000, 000.00 in compensatory and punitive damages. ECF
No. 3, p. 7.
28 U.S.C. § 1361 a federal district court has original
jurisdiction of any action in the nature of mandamus to
compel an officer or employee of the United States or one of
its agencies to perform a duty owed to a petitioner. To meet
the requirements for mandamus relief, a petitioner must show
that: (1) he has the clear legal right to the relief sought;
(2) the respondent has a clear legal duty to do the
particular act requested; and (3) no other adequate remedy is
available. See In re First Fed. Savings and Loan
Ass'n of Durham, 860 F.2d 135, 138 (4th Cir. 1988);
Asare v. Ferro, 999 F.Supp. 657, 659 (D. Md. 1998).
Petitioner's failure to show any of these prerequisites
defeats a district court's jurisdiction to hear the case
under 28 U.S.C. § 1361. See National Association of
Government Employees v. Federal Labor Relations
Authority, 830 F.Supp. 889, 898 (E.D. Va. 1993).
Further, the issuance of a writ of mandamus under ' 1361
is an extraordinary remedy and is a matter of judicial
discretion. See Carter v. Seamans, 411 F.2d 767, 773
(5th Cir. 1969) (citations omitted). Dread has not met this
threshold burden in his pleadings. Moreover, Dread's
situation, as pleaded, does not present the kind of situation
where the Court's mandamus authority could or should be
extent Dread complains that his due process rights were
violated, this claim fares no better. Under the Eleventh
Amendment to the United States Constitution, a state, its
agencies and departments are immune from suits in federal
court brought by its citizens or the citizens of another
state, unless it consents to the suit. See Pennhurst
State Sch. and Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 100
(1984). Although the State of Maryland has waived its
sovereign immunity for certain types of cases brought in
state courts, see Md. Code Ann., State Gov't
§ 12-202(a), it has not waived its Eleventh Amendment
immunity to suit in federal court. Thus, Dread's
complaint against the Maryland State Police is barred by the
where a final judgment was reached on the merits in a prior
suit for identical claims involving identical parties or
their privies in the two suits, res judicata
precludes the later filed suit from proceeding. See
Pension Ben. Guar. Corp. v. Beverley, 404 F.3d 243, 248
(4th Cir. 2005); see also Meekins v. United Transp.
Union, 946 F.2d 1054, 1057 (4th Cir. 1991). Importantly,
“'[n]ot only does res judicata bar claims that were
raised and fully litigated, it prevents litigation of all
grounds for, or defenses to, recovery that were previously
available to the parties, regardless of whether they were
asserted or determined in the prior proceeding.'”
Id., quoting Peugeot Motors of America, Inc. v.
Eastern Auto Distributors, Inc., 892 F.2d 355, 359 (4th
Cir. 1989). In Dread's case, the facts and arguments set
forth in his complaint were previously known and available to
Dread in 1991 when he unsuccessfully challenged the agency
findings and termination of his employment. Thus, as the
Court explained in dismissing Dread's 2015 case against
the Secretary of the Maryland State Police, see Dread v.
Pallozzi, No. PWG-15-1649, ECF No. 5, this action is
barred by the doctrine of res judicata and must be
separate Order shall be entered in accordance with this
 Maryland Judiciary Case Search is
 “[A] court may properly take
judicial notice of ‘matters of public record' and
other information that, under Federal Rule of Evidence 201,
constitute ‘adjudicative facts.'”
Goldfarb v. Mayor & City Council of Baltimore,
791 F.3d 500, 508 (4th Cir. 2015); see Fed. R. Evid.
201(b) (stating that a “court may judicially notice a
fact that is not subject to reasonable dispute because it . .
. can be accurately and readily determined from sources whose
accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned”); see
also Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd.,
551 U.S. 308, 322 (2007); Katyle v. Penn Nat'l
Gaming, Inc., 637 F.3d 462, 466 (4th Cir. 2011);
Philips v. Pitt County Mem'l Hosp., 572 F.3d
176, 180 (4th Cir. 2009).
 Petitioner, who is African-American,
claims he allowed a white woman to sit in his patrol car
following a traffic accident. The woman later asserts that
she saw an unsecured handgun on the seat of the patrol car.
The gun later was determined to have been stolen. ECF No. 3,
pp. 6-7. Petitioner avers that his due process rights were
violated and that the gun was planted, ECF No. ...