United States District Court, D. Maryland
W. Grimm United States District Judge.
Kelly Martin filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 in the United States
District Court for the District of Columbia, claiming that
the United States Parole Commission's failure by to
provide him with a prompt parole revocation hearing violates
his rights to due process. Pet. 2, ECF No. 1. The case was
transferred to this Court because Martin is incarcerated in
Roxbury Correctional Institution in Hagerstown, a Maryland
prison. ECF No. 3. Respondent was directed to file a response
to the Petition and filed a Motion to Dismiss, or in the
Alternative, for Summary Judgment, along with a Memorandum in
Support. ECF Nos. 7, 7-1. Although he was advised of his
right to file an opposition and of the consequences of
failing to do so, see ECF No. 8, Martin has not
opposed the motion. Because Martin failed to exhaust his
administrative remedies and is not entitled to a revocation
hearing while he is serving his Maryland state sentence, the
Motion to Dismiss shall be granted and the Petition
was arrested and detained in the District of Columbia on
October 31, 2011 on charges of robbery and carrying a pistol
without a license in violation of District of Columbia Code
§§ 22-2801, 22-4502, and 22-4504, and he was
sentenced on June 1, 2012 to serve 34 months of imprisonment,
followed by three years of supervised release for those D.C.
law violations. Sentence Monitoring Computation Data 1-2, ECF
No. 7-2. He was released from D.C. prison on April 18, 2014,
and began his supervised release period. Id.; see
also Certificate of Supervised Release, ECF No. 7-3.
on supervised release, on August 7, 2014, Martin was arrested
in Maryland and taken into custody on state charges of armed
robbery, robbery, theft, possession of a firearm, reckless
endangerment, assault, and unauthorized use of a vehicle.
Warrant Application 2, ECF No. 7-4. Soon after, on August 25,
2014, a case analyst for the United States Parole Commission,
which handles parole release and revocation functions with
regard to District of Columbia offenders, requested a warrant
for Martin's arrest for violation of the terms of his
supervised release, and the warrant was issued the same day.
Warrant Application 1-3; Warrant, ECF No. 7-6. Martin was
found guilty of armed robbery and use of a firearm in a crime
of violence and sentenced to 14 years of imprisonment, a
sentence he currently is serving. State Ct. Docket 2-3, 8,
ECF No. 7-5. The warrant was revised to reflect the charges
for which Martin was found guilty. Warrant Supp., ECF No.
7-7. The warrant was lodged as a detainer with the Maryland
Department of Public Safety and Correctional Services while
Martin serves his state sentence in Maryland. Pet. 1;
Resp.'s Mem. 3.
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure apply to federal habeas
corpus proceedings to the extent they are not inconsistent
with any statutory provisions or the rules governing habeas
corpus proceedings. Rules Governing § 2254 Cases,
Rule 12. Additionally, if it plainly appears from the
petition and any attached exhibits that the petitioner is not
entitled to relief in the district court, the petition must
be dismissed. Id. at Rule 4. Respondent's motion
seeks review of the petition under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6),
requiring the Court to accept all well-pleaded allegations as
true and to construe the facts and reasonable inferences
derived therefrom in the light most favorable to the
petitioner. Venkatraman v. REI Sys., Inc., 417 F.3d
418, 420 (4th Cir. 2005) (citing Mylan Labs., Inc. v.
Matkari, 7 F.3d 1130, 1134 (4th Cir. 1993)); Ibarra
v. United States, 120 F.3d 472, 473 (4th Cir. 1997).
Rule 8(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires
only a "short and plain statement of the claim showing
that the pleader is entitled to relief." Migdal v.
Rowe Price-Fleming Int'l Inc., 248 F.3d 321, 325-26
(4th Cir. 2001); see also Swierkiewicz v. Sorema
N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 513 (2002) (stating that a complaint
need only satisfy the "simplified pleading
standard" of Rule 8(a)). Rule 8(e)(1) requires that each
averment of a pleading be "simple, concise, and
direct." This Court is not obliged to ferret through
pleadings, searching for viable claims.
Respondent accurately stated:
It is well-established that a person seeking judicial review
of agency actions (including parole decisions) must first
have exhausted available remedies within the agency. See
McKart v. United States, 395 U.S. 185, 193-95 (1969);
see also Parisi v. Davidson, 405 U.S. 34, 37 (1972)
("The basic purpose of the exhaustion doctrine is to
allow an administrative agency to perform functions within
its special competence[-]to make a factual record, to apply
its expertise, and to correct its own errors so as to moot
judicial controversies.")!;.] As such, a federal
prisoner seeking habeas review under 28 U.S.C. § 2241
must exhaust available administrative remedies. See
Branden v. 30 Judicial Cir. Ct., 410 U.S. 484, 489-92
(1973); McClung v. Shearin, 90 Fed.Appx. 444, 445
(4th Cir. 2004).
28 C.F.R. § 2.213(b), the Parole Commission "shall
review the detainer upon the request of the prisoner pursuant
to the procedure set forth in [28 C.F.R. §
2.47(a)(2)]." After the request is made by the subject
of the detainer, the Parole Commission has the option to:
(1) Withdraw the detainer and order reinstatement of the
prisoner to supervision upon release from custody; (2) Order
a dispositional revocation hearing to be conducted at the
institution in which the prisoner is confined; or (3) Let the
detainer stand until the new sentence is completed. Following
the execution of the Commission's warrant, and the
transfer of the prisoner to an appropriate federal facility,
an institutional revocation hearing shall be conducted.
28 C.F.R. § 2.213(b).
["]Proper exhaustion of administrative remedies demands
compliance with [the] agency's deadlines and other
critical procedural rules[."] Woodford v. Ngo,54 ...