United States District Court, D. Maryland
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
W. TITUS UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE.
March 18, 2016, Petitioner Rashard Wilson
(“Wilson”) filed a Motion to Vacate, Set Aside,
or Correct a Sentence Under 28 U.S.C. § 2255
(“§ 2255 Motion”). ECF No. 455. On January
26, 2017, Wilson filed a supplement to his § 2255
Motion. ECF No. 483. On August 2, 2017, the Court denied
Wilson's § 2255 Motion. ECF Nos. 503, 504. On
appeal, the Fourth Circuit remanded the case back to this
Court to review the additional issue raised in Wilson's
Supplement-an issue previously omitted from the Court's
analysis. ECF Nos. 522, 525.
argues in his Supplement that this Court should vacate his
sentence and resentence him without a career offender
enhancement under the United States Sentencing Guidelines
(“U.S.S.G.”) because of new case law: Mathis
v. United States, 136 S.Ct. 2243 (2016) and United
States v. Hinkle, 832 F.3d 569 (5th Cir. 2016). ECF No.
483. After reviewing Mathis, Hinkle, and
Wilson's earlier conviction, this Court's decision to
deny Wilson's § 2255 Motion remains unaltered.
defendant in Mathis v. United States pleaded guilty
to being a felon in possession of a firearm. 136 S.Ct. at
2250. He had five prior convictions for burglary under Iowa
law. Id. Under the Armed Career Criminal Act
(“ACCA”), certain federal defendants who had
three prior convictions for a violent felony-including
burglary-received a 15-year mandatory minimum sentence.
Id. at 2247. Under the Iowa statute, however, the
location element of burglary was broader than that of generic
burglary. Id. at 2250. More specifically, under the
Iowa statute, a burglary could be committed by unlawfully
entering “any building, structure, or land, water,
or air vehicle, ” while under the generic version,
a burglary could be committed by unlawfully entering only
“a building or other structure.” Id.
Because the location element of burglary under the Iowa
statute was broader than the location element for burglary
under generic law, the Supreme Court held that Mathis's
burglary convictions could not be used to enhance his
sentence under the ACCA. Id. at 2257.
United States v. Hinkle, the Fifth Circuit cited
Mathis and applied the same reasoning to career
offender status within the meaning of the U.S.S.G. 832 F.3d
at 570-71. Hinkle, who pleaded guilty to possession with
intent to distribute cocaine, had a prior felony conviction
for burglary and for delivery of a controlled substance under
Texas law. Id. at 570. Under the Texas statute and
in contrast to the U.S.S.G., however, delivery of a
controlled substance could be committed by offering to sell
it. Id. at 572. Because the delivery element of
Hinkle's Texas conviction was broader than the delivery
element under the U.S.S.G., the Fifth Circuit held that the
defendant's prior Texas conviction for delivery of a
controlled substance could not be used to classify him as a
career offender under the U.S.S.G. Id. at 576-77.
Wilson argued that his prior conviction in Prince
George's County Circuit Court for possession with intent
to distribute a controlled substance should not have been
used to classify him as a career offender under the U.S.S.G.
based on the holdings in Mathis and Hinkle.
See ECF No. 483. However, after comparing the
Maryland statute with the definition of a controlled
substance offense under the U.S.S.G., Wilson's argument
fails. When Wilson possessed a controlled substance with the
intent to distribute it in 2009, the Maryland statute read as
as otherwise provided in this title, a person may not:
(1) manufacture, distribute, or dispense a controlled
dangerous substance; or
(2) possess a controlled dangerous substance in sufficient
quantity reasonably to indicate under all circumstances an
intent to manufacture, distribute, or dispense a controlled
Md. Code Ann., Crim. Law § 5-602 (LexisNexis 2006)
the U.S.S.G., a controlled substance offense is defined as
The term “controlled substance offense” means an
offense under federal or state law, punishable by
imprisonment for a term exceeding one year, that prohibits
the manufacture, import, export, distribution,
or dispensing of a controlled substance (or a
counterfeit substance) or the possession of a controlled
substance (or a counterfeit substance) with intent
to manufacture, import, export, distribute, or
U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 4B1.2(b) (U.S.
Sentencing Comm'n 2018) (emphasis added).
Maryland statute and the definition of a controlled substance
offense under the U.S.S.G. are nearly identical. A defendant
is guilty if he or she essentially (1) manufactures,
distributes, or dispenses a controlled substance or (2)
possesses a controlled substance with the intent to
manufacture, distribute, or dispense it. There is no
additional language in the Maryland statute sufficient to
make it broader than the definition under the U.S.S.G. As