United States District Court, D. Maryland
December 27, 2017,  Timothy K. Locklear filed this 28 U.S.C.
§ 2254 habeas corpus petition attacking his 2014
convictions for first degree burglary, third degree burglary,
and second degree assault ECF No. 1. On February 15, 2018,
respondents filed a limited answer arguing that the petition
should be dismissed as untimely. ECF No. 5. Pursuant to
Hill v. Braxton, 277 F.3d 701 (4th Cir. 2002), the
court afforded Locklear an opportunity to explain why his
petition should not be dismissed as time-barred., ECF No. 6.
Locklear did not respond, and the time for doing so has
matter has been fully briefed. Upon review, the court finds
no need for an evidentiary hearing. See Rule 8(a),
Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases in the United States
District Courts; Local Rule 105.6 (D. Md. 2016); see
also Fisher v. Lee, 215 F.3d 438, 455 (4th Cir. 2000)
(petitioner not necessarily entitled to hearing under 28
U.S.C. § 2254(e)(2)). For the reasons set forth herein,
the court shall DENY the petition, DENY a certificate of
appealability, and DISMISS this action with prejudice.
a jury trial in the Circuit Court for Baltimore County,
Maryland, Locklear was convicted of first degree burglary,
third degree burglary, and second degree assault. ECF No. 5-
1 at 7. On May 22, 2014, Locklear was sentenced to a total of
20 years' imprisonment. Id. at 5, 7. On May 28,
2014, Locklear filed a timely notice of appeal. Id. at
7. The Maryland Court of Special Appeals affirmed
Locklear's criminal judgment on June 2, 2015, and issued
its mandate on July 6, 2015. Id. at 8. Locklear did
not seek further review in the Maryland Court of Appeals.
Thus, Locklear's criminal conviction became final for
purposes of 28 U.S.C! § 2244(d)(1)(A) on July 21, 2015,
when his time to seek certiorari review from the Court of
Appeals expired. See Md. Rule 8-302(a).
November 24, 2015, Locklear filed a petition for
post-conviction relief in the Circuit Court for Baltimore
County, which denied relief on June 29, 2016. ECF No. 5-1 at
8. On July 27, 2016, Locklear timely filed an application for
leave to appeal the post-conviction court's decision with
the Maryland Court of Special Appeals. Id. at 9;
see Md. Rule 4-408, 8-204(b)(2). The Court of
Special Appeals denied the application on February 16, 2017,
and issued its mandate on March 21, 2017. ECF No. 5-2.
filed the instant § 2254 petition on December 27, 2017.
ECF No. 1 at 15. The petition raises three claims pertaining
to the fact that his trial date "went beyond Hicks,
" ECF No. 1 at 7, an apparent reference to Hicks v.
State, 403 A.2d 356 (Md, 1979), which concerns the time
frame for bringing a defendant to trial and possible
"extraordinary cause[s]" warranting the extension
of this time frame. Two of Locklear's claims concern the
trial court's finding that good cause existed to delay
Locklear's trial and one claim concerns trial
counsel's alleged ineffective assistance for going
"behind [Locklear's] back on his own discretion and
set a court date beyond [his] hicks [date] ... with the
prosecut[o]r." ECF No. 1 at 5-8 (some capitalization
altered). According to Locklear's petition, he raised all
three grounds on direct appeal and in his petition for
respondents assert that Locklear's petition should be
dismissed because more than a year of untolled time elapsed
between the date Locklear's conviction became final and
the date he filed the instant petition. ECF No. 5 at 3-5. On
February 16, 2018, this court issued an order granting
Locklear 28 days to present an argument that his petition
should not be dismissed as untimely. ECF No. 6. Locklear has
application for writ of habeas corpus may be granted only for
violations of the Constitution or laws of the United States.
28 U.S.C., § 2254(a). However, timeliness is a threshold
consideration when examining petitioner's claims.
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d),, (1) A 1-year period of
limitation shall apply to an application for a writ of habeas
corpus by a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a
State court. The limitation period shall run from the latest
(A) the date on which the judgment became final by the
conclusion of direct review or the expiration of the time for
seeking such review;
(B) the date on which the impediment to filing an application
created by State action in violation of the Constitution or
laws of the United States is removed, if the applicant was
prevented from filing by such State action;
(C) the date on which the constitutional right asserted was
initially recognized by the Supreme Court, if the right has
been newly recognized by the Supreme Court and made
retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review; or
(D) the date on which the factual predicate of the claim or
claims presented could have been discovered through the
exercise of due diligence.
one-year period is, however, tolled while properly filed