United States District Court, D. Maryland
L. Russell, III United States District Judge.
MATTER is before the Court on Plaintiff Roger Wilson's
Motion for Leave to Proceed In Forma Pauperis (ECF No. 2).
The Motion is ripe for disposition, and no hearing is
necessary. See Local Rule 105.6 (D.Md. 2016). For
the reasons outlined below, the Court will grant Wilson's
Motion but dismiss his Complaint for failure to state a claim
upon which relief can be granted.
is a former federal prisoner who alleges that “for
about 2.5 years from 2009 to 2011” he “notified
defendant non-stop . . . about a court order he had striking
the violence from his record meaning he should have been
moved from the FCI to the camp & defendant
refused.” (Compl. at 5, ECF No. 1). Wilson further
states that the “defendant discriminated against [him]
by denying him the drug program because he had dreds when
there were numerous people with dreds in the drug
program.” (Id.). As a result of the failure to
put Wilson in the program, he served an extra year
incarcerated. (Id.). On March15, 2018, this civil
rights lawsuit seeking two million dollars in damages was
filed along with a Motion for Leave to Proceed In Forma
Pauperis. Because he appears indigent, the Court will grant
Standard of Review
filed this Complaint in forma pauperis pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915(a)(1), which permits an indigent litigant to
commence an action in this Court without prepaying the filing
fee. To guard against possible abuses of this privilege, the
statute requires dismissal of any claim that is frivolous or
malicious, or fails to state a claim on which relief can be
granted. 28 U.S.C. §1915(e)(2)(B)(i) and (ii). This
Court is mindful, however, of its obligation to liberally
construe self-represented pleadings, such as the instant
Complaint. See Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94
(2007). In evaluating such a Complaint, the factual
allegations are assumed to be true. Id. at 93
(citing Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S.
544, 555-56 (2007)).
liberal construction does not mean that this Court can ignore
a clear failure in the pleading to allege facts which set
forth a cognizable claim. See Weller v. Dep't of Soc.
Servs., 901 F.2d 387 (4th Cir. 1990); see also
Beaudett v. City of Hampton, 775 F.2d 1274, 1278 (4th
Cir. 1985) (stating a district court may not “conjure
up questions never squarely presented.”). In making
this determination, “[t]he district court need not look
beyond the complaint's allegations . . . . It must hold
the pro se complaint to less stringent standards than
pleadings drafted by attorneys and must read the complaint
liberally.” White v. White, 886 F.2d 721,
722-23 (4th Cir. 1989).
Court concludes that the Complaint, even when afforded a
liberal construction, fails to state a claim for at least
the Complaint is untimely. Even if the operative date for the
asserted cause of action is presumed to be 2012, or one year
after Wilson was released, that date would be at least six
years ago. “Section 1983 provides a federal cause of
action, but in several respects relevant here federal law
looks to the law of the State in which the cause of action
arose. This is so for the length of the statute of
limitations: It is that which the State provides for
personal-injury torts.” Wallace v. Kato, 549
U.S. 384, 387 (2007) (citing Owens v. Okure, 488
U.S. 235, 249-50 (1989); Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S.
261, 279-80 (1985)). In Maryland, the applicable statute of
limitations is three years. See Md. Cts & Jud.
Proc. Code Ann. § 5-101. Wilson's assertion that he
just found out he could sue, (Compl. at 5), does not toll the
the due process claim itself is defective. Wilson does not
have a right to access programs or to be released from his
lawful term of incarceration early. “[G]iven a valid
conviction, the criminal defendant has been constitutionally
deprived of his liberty to the extent that the State may
confine him and subject him to the rules of its prison system
so long as the conditions of confinement do not otherwise
violate the Constitution.” Meachum v. Fano,
427 U.S. 215, 224 (1976), see also Sandin v. Conner,
515 U.S. 472, 493 (1995) (requiring an atypical and
significant hardship as prerequisite to creation of a
constitutionally protected liberty interest). “There is
no constitutional or inherent right of a convicted person to
be conditionally released before the expiration of a valid
sentence.” Greenholtz v. Inmates of Nebraska Penal
& Corr. Complex, 442 U.S. 1, 7 (1979); see also
Jago v. Van Curen, 454 U.S. 14, 18 (1981) (mutually
explicit understanding that inmate would be paroled does not
create liberty interest).
Wilson does not sufficiently allege an equal protection
claim. Wilson asserts that he was denied entrance into the
drug program because of his hair style. An equal protection
claim requires Wilson to be treated differently from other
similarly situated individuals and that the unequal treatment
was the result of intentional or purposeful discrimination.
See City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc.,
473 U.S. 432, 439-40 (1985); Morrison v. Garraghty,
239 F.3d 648, 653 (4th Cir. 2001). To prevail under the Equal
Protection Clause, Wilson “must prove the decision
makers in his case acted with discriminatory purpose.”
McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 292 (1987). Here,
Wilson admits that there were others admitted to the program
who wore the same hairstyle. (Compl. at 5). Wilson fails to
explain how, in spite of the program admitting others with
his hairstyle, Defendants discriminated against him.
if the claims are construed as claims brought pursuant to the
Federal Tort Claims Act, Wilson has not included information
regarding administrative exhaustion for ...