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United States v. Young

United States District Court, D. Maryland

March 22, 2018

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
v.
JOSEPH YOUNG, Defendant.

          MEMORANDUM OPINION

          Ellen Lipton Hollander United States District Judge

         Joseph Young, a member of the Black Guerilla Family gang (“BGF”), was one of 44 defendants indicted in 2013 on charges that included Racketeering Conspiracy, under the Racketeering Influenced Corrupt Organizations Act (“RICO”), 18 U.S.C. § 1961 et seq.; conspiracy to distribute and possess with intent to distribute controlled dangerous substances; and money laundering conspiracy. The charges were rooted in a pervasive criminal enterprise at the Baltimore City Detention Center (“BCDC”), a facility for pretrial detainees. The defendants generally consisted of two groups: BGF members who were inmates at BCDC, and corrupt correctional officers who worked at BCDC and helped to facilitate the enterprise. The Second Superseding Indictment (ECF 869) alleged that the racketeering enterprise spanned the period from 2007 to November 2013. Id. ¶ 11 at 6.[1]

         Eight of the defendants, including Young, proceeded to a jury trial at which Judge J. Frederick Motz presided.[2] The trial began on November 17, 2014, and on February 5, 2015, the jury returned a verdict of guilty as to Young and four other defendants. ECF 1425; ECF 1426. Two of the five convicted defendants were BGF gang members who had been inmates at BCDC and three were correctional officers who worked at BCDC.

         On June 24, 2015, Judge Motz imposed a fifteen-year sentence on Young. See ECF 1709 (Judgment docketed 6/30/15). On appeal to the Fourth Circuit, the court affirmed the convictions but vacated and remanded for resentencing of Young. ECF 1992; see United States v. Carrington, et al., 700 F. App'x 224 (4th Cir. 2017). The case has been returned to me for resentencing.[3]

         For the reasons that follow, I find that defendant has a total offense level of 31 and a criminal history category of IV.

         I. Procedural Background

         Young, known as “Monster, ” was convicted of Count One, under 18 U.S.C. § 1962(d), charging racketeering conspiracy through a pattern of five racketeering activities: conspiracy to distribute controlled substances, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846; distribution and possession with intent to distribute controlled substances, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841; bribery of a public employee (Maryland Code, Crim. Law Art. § 9-201); extortion and extortion by verbal threat (Maryland Code, Crim. Law Art. §§ 3-701, 3-705); and money laundering, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1956. In addition, the jury convicted Young of Count Two, charging conspiracy to distribute controlled substances, i.e., oxycodone, including Percocet and Oxycontin; buprenorphine; marijuana; and alprazolam. And, Young was found guilty of Count Three, charging money laundering conspiracy, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1956(h). See ECF 1425 (Jury Verdict); ECF 1426 (signed jury verdict).

         Thereafter, an Amended Presentence Report (ECF 1643, “PSR”) was prepared, dated May 7, 2015. The PSR found a Base Offense Level of 26, pursuant to §§ 2D1.1, 2S1.1, and 2E1.1 of the United States Sentencing Guidelines (“U.S.S.G., ” the “Sentencing Guidelines, ” or the “Guidelines”), based on a drug quantity attributable to the defendant involving between 5.9 to 8.9 grams of oxycodone. Id. ¶ 26. That drug quantity corresponded to an offense level of 20, to which several enhancements were applied. Id. This resulted in a total offense level of 32. Id. ¶ 34. With a criminal history category of V (id. ¶ 44), the PSR reflected a Guidelines Range of imprisonment of 188 to 235 months. Id. ¶ 76.

         Young disputed the facts and the guidelines calculations, including as to the drug quantity attributable to him and his role in the offense. See ECF 1643, ¶ 35. Young's version of events is set forth in ¶ 18 of the PSR. In light of the disputes, the probation agent expressly deferred to Judge Motz for resolution of them. Id. Both sides submitted sentencing memoranda. ECF 1685 (government); ECF 1686 (Young).

         As noted, sentencing was held on June 24, 2015. ECF 1707. The PSR assigned a four-level enhancement for role in the offense, with which the government agreed. See U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1(a). But, Judge Motz awarded only a two-level increase. In all other respects, Judge Motz adopted the PSR. See ECF 1747 (Sentencing Transcript); ECF 1710 (Statement of Reasons); ECF 1715 (Amended Statement of Reasons). Therefore, Judge Motz found a total offense level of 30, a criminal history category of V, and an advisory sentencing guidelines range of 151 to 188 months' incarceration. Id.

         The government sought a twenty-year sentence. But, Judge Motz imposed concurrent terms of fifteen years (180 months) as to Counts One, Two, and Three, as well as three years of supervised release and a $300 special assessment. See ECF 1709. Thereafter, Young noted an appeal to the Fourth Circuit. ECF 1712.

         In an unpublished opinion issued July 25, 2017, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed the convictions of Young and all of the codefendants who were convicted at trial. ECF 1992. However, it vacated Young's sentence and remanded for resentencing. Id.; see Carrington, 700 F. App'x 224.

         The Fourth Circuit determined that Judge Motz “failed to resolve the factual disputes” raised by Young concerning the guidelines calculation as to “the drug quantity or offense role . . . .” Carrington, 700 F. App'x at 234. Moreover, Judge Motz did not “indicate that resolution was unnecessary because neither issue would affect [the court's] sentencing decision.” Id. (citing Fed. R. Crim. P. 32(i)(3)(B)). Rather, Judge Motz adopted the findings of the PSR, even though the PSR “did not make any findings regarding drug attribution or offense role for the district court to adopt . . . .” Id. Therefore, the Court vacated the sentence and remanded for resolution of the factual disputes and for resentencing. Id. [4]

         The government's resentencing memorandum is at ECF 2006, with several exhibits, and is supplemented by ECF 2013. The defendant's resentencing memorandum is at ECF 2016, with sixteen exhibits docketed at ECF 2067-1 to ECF 2067-16.[5] The government's reply is at ECF 2031, with numerous exhibits. Other government sentencing submissions are docketed at ECF 2042; ECF 2043; ECF 2057; ECF 2070; ECF 2076; ECF 2081; and ECF 2084.[6] Additional defense submissions are docketed at ECF 2032; ECF 2039; ECF 2040; ECF 2044; ECF 2045; ECF 2050; ECF 2051; ECF 2064; ECF 2065; ECF 2067; ECF 2080; and ECF 2083. As the copious submissions suggest, counsel for both sides have advocated vigorously for their respective positions.

         In response to issues raised by the Court, the government, through the case agent, FBI Special Agent Sarah Lewis, recently conducted interviews of two codefendants, both of whom testified at trial: Tavon White and Katera Stevenson. White was a BGF member, the leader of the nefarious operations at BCDC, and the lead defendant. He pleaded guilty before me on August 6, 2013. ECF 290. The FBI reinterviewed White on December 6, 2017. The Form 302 of the interview of White is docketed at ECF 2043-2. Katera Stevenson pleaded guilty before me on September 17, 2013. ECF 316. She was reinterviewed on December 7, 2017. The Form 302 of the recent interview of Ms. Stevenson is docketed at ECF 2043-1.

         Young vigorously objects to the Court's consideration of such evidence. He has moved to exclude the recent interview of White, as it took place years after the events at issue. See ECF 2050; see also ECF 2044; ECF 2051; ECF 2064; ECF 2065. Among other things, Young argues that White's recent statements contradict White's trial testimony.[7]

         The government opposes the motion. ECF 2057. It argues that the interviews were conducted because the Court “seemed unsatisfied” with the government's evidence at resentencing, and notes that White's recent interview merely provides “greater specificity about the Percocet business at BCDC and . . . Young's knowledge” of it. Id. at 2. Moreover, the government maintains that the Court may consider such evidence, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3661. Id. Young has replied. ECF 2064.

         In order to resolve the issues of drug quantity attributable to Young and his role in the offense, I need not consider the recent interviews of White or Stevenson. Because I decline to consider ECF 2043-1 and ECF 2043-2, I need not resolve the parties' dispute as to whether the Court is entitled to consider such statements.

         In addition to the numerous submissions by counsel, evidence and argument were presented at resentencing hearings held on November 28, 2017, November 30, 2017, December 13, 2017, and March 1, 2018. ECF 2036; ECF 2041; ECF 2046; ECF 2078.

         II. The Presentence Report and the Guidelines

         The Sentencing Guidelines are at the center of the parties' disputes. The PSR grouped Counts One, Two, and Three together for Guidelines calculation purposes, pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 3D1.2(b) and (d). ECF 1643, ¶ 25. The parties do not dispute this grouping. When counts are grouped together, the appropriate offense level is determined by “the highest offense level of the counts in the Group.” U.S.S.G. § 3D1.3(a). Therefore, I must determine the offense level for each count, and apply the highest. In performing these calculations, it is helpful to review the other findings of the PSR.

         The applicable guideline for a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1962(d), the racketeering offense, is found in U.S.S.G. § 2E1.1(a). It provides that the Base Offense Level is the greater of (1) 19 or (2) “the offense level applicable to the underlying racketeering activity.” The PSR uses the conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 1956, for money laundering, as the “underlying racketeering activity.” ECF 1643 (PSR), ¶ 26. The Guidelines section applicable to money laundering offenses is § 2S1.1. That section, in turn, specifies to apply “the offense level for the underlying offense from which the laundered funds were derived.” U.S.S.G. § 2S1.1(a)(1). The “underlying offense, ” according to the PSR, is the conspiracy to distribute and possess with intent to distribute controlled substances (“CDS”), in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 846. ECF 1643, ¶ 26. The Guidelines section for drug-related offenses is found in § 2D1.1.

         According to ¶ 26 of the PSR (ECF 1643), Young's offense conduct involved 5.9 to 8.9 grams of oxycodone, the equivalent of 40 to 60 kilograms of marijuana. When the PSR was prepared in May 2015, that amount corresponded to a Base Offense Level of 20. U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(b) pertains to “Specific Offense Characteristics.” According to the PSR, because Young used or directed the use of violence, two levels were added under § 2D1.1(b)(2). See ECF 1643, ¶ 26. Further, because the object of the offense was the distribution of a controlled substance in a correctional or detention facility, two levels were added under § 2D1.1(b)(4). Id. And, because the defendant bribed or attempted to bribe a law enforcement officer (i.e., correctional officer) to commit the offense, two levels were added under § 2D1.1(b)(11). Id. This gave Young an offense level of 26 for purposes of § 2D1.1.

         As noted, the Base Offense Level for the money laundering count, determined in this case by § 2S1.1(a)(1), is the “offense level for the underlying offense.” Because the PSR determined the drug offense to be the underlying offense for the money laundering count, the Base Offense Level under § 2S1.1 is 26. ECF 1643, ¶ 26. Paragraph 27 of the PSR indicated that, because the defendant was convicted under 18 U.S.C. § 1956, two levels were added under § 2S1.1(b)(2)(B), giving Young an offense level of 28 for the money laundering count.

         Although the PSR included no further discussion of the RICO count, it is implied that the offense level for that count would also be 28. This is because, as noted, the offense level for the RICO count under § 2E1.1 is either 19 or the offense level for the most serious underlying racketeering activity, whichever is higher. Accordingly, the offense level under § 2E1.1 would be either 19, the alternative minimum Base Offense Level for racketeering conduct, per § 2E1.1 cmt. 3; 26, for the drug conspiracy; or 28, for the money laundering. As 28 is the highest level, it becomes the Base Offense Level and the final offense level for § 2E1.1.

         In addition, in ¶ 29 of the PSR, four levels were added under U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1(a) for role in the offense. In particular, the defendant was deemed an organizer or leader of a criminal activity involving five or more participants.

         Therefore, according to the PSR, Young had a total offense level of 32. In addition, the defendant had a criminal history score of ten points, which established a criminal history category of V. ECF 1643; ¶ 44. The score of ten points was based on Young's three prior convictions (id. ¶¶ 39-41), and the PSR's finding that Young was on probation at the time of the underlying offenses. Id. ¶ 43.[8] From my review of the record, it does not appear that Young contested his criminal history. See ECF 1686; ECF 1747 (Sentencing Transcript).

         According to ¶ 76 of the PSR, based on a final offense level of 32 and a criminal history category of V, Young's advisory sentencing guideline range called for a period of incarceration of 188 to 235 months.

         At Young's sentencing in June 2015, the government argued that Young's Base Offense Level was a 20, because the criminal drug activity involved at least 5.9 to 8.9 grams of oxycodone. ECF 2006 at 3. At the time of the initial sentencing, that particular drug quantity corresponded to an offense level of 20. The government described that quantity as just “a tiny amount” of oxycodone. Id. However, because of changes to the drug quantity tables that went into effect in November 2015, pursuant to Amendment 782, that quantity would now equate to an offense level of 18. See U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(c). Nevertheless, the government maintains that defendant remains a Level 20 under the revised guidelines.[9]

         According to the government, 35 codefendants agreed to plead guilty to crimes giving them a Base Offense Level of 20, including defendant's girlfriend, Raylanair Reese. See ECF 2057 at 18-19. Four others who were convicted at trial were also found to have a Base Offense Level of 20. Id. The government asserts that it selected a guideline level of 20 “as the floor offense level” because it “was such an absurdly small amount of drugs that none of the defendants could argue” that the quantity was not foreseeable. ECF 2031 at 10.

         Both parties seem to agree that the first step in calculating Young's guidelines sentence is to determine the quantity of CDS for which he is accountable. Therefore, I turn to that issue.

         III. Drug Offense

         A. Guidelines Factors

         As noted, because Young has been convicted of a RICO offense, U.S.S.G. § 2E1.1(a) applies. It provides that the Base Offense Level is either (1) 19 or (2) the “offense level applicable to the underlying racketeering activity.” Here, there are effectively two levels of underlying activity, because § 2S1.1 refers to an “underlying offense from which the laundered funds were derived.” The underlying offense from which the laundered funds were derived is the conspiracy to distribute and possess with intent to distribute CDS, and therefore the Court looks to §2D1.1 as the applicable guideline. Under § 2D1.1(a)(5), the offense level is determined based on: 1) the quantity and type of drugs involved (laid out in § 2D1.1(c)) and (2) the applicable Specific Offense Characteristics, set forth in § 2D1.1(b).

         Young insists that the Specific Offense Characteristics in Chapter Two do not apply when determining the offense level under U.S.S.G. § 2E1.1(a)(2). ECF 2083 at 1. He argues, ECF 2016 at 29:

If the offense level from the amount of drugs reasonably forseeable to Mr. Young yields an offense level below 19, then the enhancements under USSG sec. 2D1.1(b) do not apply. As a result, the requested enhancements for bringing drugs into a correctional facility (sec. 2D1.1(b)(4)), for use of violence (sec. 2D1.1(b)(2) and for bribery (sec. 2D1.1(b)(11) do not apply here. (Emphasis added).

         Young points out that Application Note 3 states that the court is to apply the enhancements under Chapter Three. ECF 2083 at 1. Further, he notes that § 2E1.1(a)(2) does not refer to U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3(a), which in turn includes Chapter Two enhancements. Id. at 2. He asserts, id. at 1: “Had the Commission intended for Chapter 2 to apply, all it had to do was add [it] to the Note. It chose not to.” Therefore, he contends that if the Base Offense Level indicated by §2D1.1(a) (as to the quantity of drugs) is less than 19, the Court does not consider the Specific Offense Characteristics of §2D1.1(b). ECF 2016 at 19.[10]

         Initially, the government appeared to agree with Young's view of the guidelines, based on the government's statements in its briefing and in court, and from its ongoing insistence that Young and other defendants who were involved in the conspiracy had an offense level of at least 20. See, e.g., ECF 2031 at 21. At the hearing on March 1, 2018, the Court questioned counsel as to this issue, and invited memoranda. See ECF 2081 (government); ECF 2083 (Young); ECF 2084 (government's reply). The government now contends that the Specific Offense Characteristics are included in the calculation under § 2E1.1(a)(2).

         To the extent that defendant believes that enhancements under § 2D1.1 do not apply if the Base Offense Level is below 19, he is incorrect. U.S.S.G. § 1B1.5(b)(1) states: “An instruction to use the offense level from another offense guideline refers to the offense level from the entire offense guideline (i.e., the base offense level, specific offense characteristics, cross references, and special instructions) . . . .” (Emphasis added.)

         Section 2E1.1(a)(2) instructs the Court to use the “offense level applicable to the underlying racketeering activity.” Under § 2E1.1, the district court must “calculate independently the total offense level of each separate underlying offense and then select whichever is greatest (or 19, if that number is greater).[]United States v. Pratt, 728 F.3d 463, 480 (5th Cir. 2013). In turn, to establish that offense level, the court must consider all of §2D1.1. As the Pratt Court explained, 728 F.3d at 480: “Unlike most other sections in Chapter Two, section 2E1.1 of the Guidelines does not provide for adjustments based on special offense characteristics, presumably because the district court will have already calculated the special offense characteristics applicable to the offense constituting the underlying racketeering activity.” See also United States v. Anderson, 526 F.3d 319, 327 (6th Cir. 2008) (calculating the offense level for money laundering, and stating that the offense level included § 2D1.1's Base Offense Level plus Specific Offense Characteristics).

         The defendant argues, inter alia, that by his calculation, the total marijuana equivalent attributable to him is “6, 700 grams (from oxycodone) plus 200 grams (from suboxone) and 20 grams from the phone call about marijuana, ” for a total of 7 kilos, which amounts to an offense level of 12. ECF 2016 at 8. He acknowledges that, under § 2E1.1 of the Guidelines, the offense level is automatically increased to Level 19, because of the RICO conviction. But, he maintains that no enhancements apply. Conversely, the government insists that, using the current drug quantity table, the appropriate offense level begins at 20, before enhancements.

         Section 2E1.1 does not foreclose consideration of Specific Offense Characteristics if the Base Offense Level, based on drug quantity, is 19 or less, as the defense seems to suggest. Rather, regardless of the starting point (e.g., a Base Offense Level of 12), the court must consider the Specific Offense Characteristics. The correct offense level is derived, in this case, from the quantity and nature of the drugs attributable to Young, plus any applicable Specific Offense Characteristics, as defined in §2D1.1(b). Following this step, any applicable Specific Offense Characteristics of § 2S1.1 would be added. See § 2E1.1(a)(2). If that number is less than 19, Young's Base Offense Level under §2E1.1(a)(1) becomes 19. If that number is higher than 19, it becomes Young's Base Offense Level for the RICO offense, under § 2E1.1(a)(2).

         B. Legal Standard

         The analysis of drug quantity attributable to a defendant begins with reference to U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3, titled “Relevant Conduct (Factors that Determine the Guidelines Range).” Section 1B1.3(a) provides, in part, that the Base Offense Level shall be determined on the basis of the following:

(1) (A) all acts and omissions committed, aided, abetted, counseled, commanded, induced, procured, or willfully caused by the defendant; and
(B) in the case of a jointly undertaken criminal activity (a criminal plan, scheme, endeavor, or enterprise undertaken by the defendant in concert with others, whether or not charged as a conspiracy), all acts and omissions of others that were-
(i) within the scope of the jointly undertaken criminal activity,
(ii) in furtherance of that criminal activity, and
(iii) reasonably foreseeable in connection with that criminal activity;
that occurred during the commission of the offense of conviction, in preparation for that offense, or in the course of attempting to avoid detection or responsibility for that offense;

         Application Note 3A states, in part, that only “the conduct of others that meets all three criteria set forth in subdivisions (i) through (iii) … is relevant conduct under this provision.” If “the conduct of others does not meet any one of the criteria set forth in subdivisions (i) through (iii), the conduct is not relevant conduct under this provision.” Id. Further, Note 3B cautions: “Because a count may be worded broadly and include the conduct of many participants over a period of time, the scope of the ‘jointly undertaken criminal activity' is not necessarily the same as the scope of the entire conspiracy, and hence relevant conduct is not necessarily the same for every participant.”

         Note 3B addresses the timing of a defendant's entry into a conspiracy. It states: “A defendant's relevant conduct does not include the conduct of members of a conspiracy prior to the defendant joining the conspiracy, even if the defendant knows of that conduct . . . .”

         Moreover, in discussing the application of the Guidelines with regard to drug conspiracies, Note 3D states, in part: “With respect to offenses involving contraband (including controlled substances), the defendant is accountable under subsection (a)(1)(A) for all quantities of contraband with which he was directly involved and, in the case of a jointly undertaken criminal activity under subsection (a)(1)(B), all quantities of contraband that were involved in transactions carried out by other participants, if those transactions were within the scope of, and in furtherance of, the jointly undertaken criminal activity and were reasonably foreseeable in connection with that criminal activity.” And, reasonable foreseeability “applies only in respect to the conduct (i.e., acts and omissions) of others under subsection (a)(1)(B).” Id.

         This case does not involve any substantial drug seizures. Therefore, under U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1, Application Note 5 is pertinent. It provides that, in such a case, the court may “approximate the quantity.”

         As noted, Young contends that the drug amount for which he can be held accountable under § 1B1.3 corresponds to a Base Offense Level of 12, according to the table in § 2D1.1(c). The government insists that the evidence readily establishes a drug quantity that corresponds to at least the current Level 20.

         The parties focus primarily on the defendant's involvement with oxycodone, the active ingredient in Percocet pills. Currently, in order to qualify for a Level 20, the defendant must have reasonably foreseen drug trafficking of at least 8.9 grams of oxycodone. The government correctly advises that 9 grams of oxycodone is equivalent to 9, 000 milligrams or just 300 oxycodone pills containing 30 milligrams each. ECF 2006 at 11; ECF 2057 at 15 n.3. See U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(c)(10) and § 2D1.1(c), cmt. 8(D), at page 166 (equating 1 gram of oxycodone to 6700 grams of marijuana, which equals 6.7 kilos). In its view, that is not a large quantity of oxycodone.

         Under U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3(a)(1)(B), the defendant is accountable for the conduct of others that was: “(i) within the scope of the jointly undertaken criminal activity, (ii) in furtherance of that criminal activity, and (iii) reasonably foreseeable in connection with that criminal activity.” In this regard, Young does not dispute his membership in BGF, but he observes that membership in BGF is not illegal. Moreover, Young insists that his membership and role in BGF is not the same as membership and role in the RICO conspiracy. According to the defendant, he was “a small, minor player in the RICO drug conspiracy” and “[t]his distinction affects directly” the guidelines calculation. ECF 2016 at 1; id. at 24. To illustrate, Young points out that his role in the drug network was not mentioned in the intercepted calls between Young and White. Id. at 24.

         Notably, Young argued at trial that, to the extent he was involved in a conspiracy, it was not the RICO conspiracy with Tavon White. However, the trial court thoroughly instructed the jury as to the RICO conspiracies (see ECF 1777, Tr. of 2/2/15), and the jury convicted Young of the RICO conspiracy. See ECF 1426.

         United States v. Bell, 667 F.3d 431, 441 (4th Cir. 2011), is instructive. There, the Fourth Circuit said: “In conspiracy cases, base offense levels are determined based on ‘all acts and omissions committed, aided, abetted, counseled, commanded, induced, procured, or willfully caused by the defendant, ' as well as the ‘reasonably foreseeable acts and omissions of others in furtherance of the jointly undertaken criminal activity.'” (Quoting U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3(a)(A) & (B)). The Court made clear that, with respect to controlled substances and jointly undertaken criminal activities, “the Guidelines hold a defendant ‘accountable for all the quantities of contraband with which he was directly involved and . . . all reasonably foreseeable quantities of contraband that were within the scope of the criminal activities that he jointly undertook.'” Bell, 667 F.3d at 441 (citation omitted).

         The case of United States v. Flores-Alvarado, 779 F.3d 250 (4th Cir. 2015), is also instructive. In that case, the defendant pleaded guilty to conspiracy to distribute and possess with intent to distribute 5 kilograms or more of cocaine and 1, 000 kilograms or more of marijuana. As to sentencing, the Fourth Circuit reversed the district court because it failed to make the requisite factual findings with respect to the drug quantity attributable to the defendant.

         In that case, the presentence report determined that the defendant was accountable for the equivalent of 31, 111.16 kilograms of marijuana, which included drug quantities found at locations in North Carolina and Kentucky. The defense filed numerous objections to the proposed drug quantity attributed to the defendant, including as to seizures from two residences involving other drug dealers. The government maintained that it was foreseeable to the defendant that, at those locations, the drug suppliers ...


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