United States District Court, D. Maryland
Lipton Hollander United States District Judge
Young, a member of the Black Guerilla Family gang
(“BGF”), was one of 44 defendants indicted in
2013 on charges that included Racketeering Conspiracy, under
the Racketeering Influenced Corrupt Organizations Act
(“RICO”), 18 U.S.C. § 1961 et seq.;
conspiracy to distribute and possess with intent to
distribute controlled dangerous substances; and money
laundering conspiracy. The charges were rooted in a pervasive
criminal enterprise at the Baltimore City Detention Center
(“BCDC”), a facility for pretrial detainees. The
defendants generally consisted of two groups: BGF members who
were inmates at BCDC, and corrupt correctional officers who
worked at BCDC and helped to facilitate the enterprise. The
Second Superseding Indictment (ECF 869) alleged that the
racketeering enterprise spanned the period from 2007 to
November 2013. Id. ¶ 11 at 6.
of the defendants, including Young, proceeded to a jury trial
at which Judge J. Frederick Motz presided. The trial began
on November 17, 2014, and on February 5, 2015, the jury
returned a verdict of guilty as to Young and four other
defendants. ECF 1425; ECF 1426. Two of the five convicted
defendants were BGF gang members who had been inmates at BCDC
and three were correctional officers who worked at BCDC.
24, 2015, Judge Motz imposed a fifteen-year sentence on
Young. See ECF 1709 (Judgment docketed 6/30/15). On
appeal to the Fourth Circuit, the court affirmed the
convictions but vacated and remanded for resentencing of
Young. ECF 1992; see United States v. Carrington, et
al., 700 F. App'x 224 (4th Cir. 2017). The case has
been returned to me for resentencing.
reasons that follow, I find that defendant has a total
offense level of 31 and a criminal history category of IV.
known as “Monster, ” was convicted of Count One,
under 18 U.S.C. § 1962(d), charging racketeering
conspiracy through a pattern of five racketeering activities:
conspiracy to distribute controlled substances, in violation
of 21 U.S.C. § 846; distribution and possession with
intent to distribute controlled substances, in violation of
21 U.S.C. § 841; bribery of a public employee (Maryland
Code, Crim. Law Art. § 9-201); extortion and extortion
by verbal threat (Maryland Code, Crim. Law Art. §§
3-701, 3-705); and money laundering, in violation of 18
U.S.C. § 1956. In addition, the jury convicted Young of
Count Two, charging conspiracy to distribute controlled
substances, i.e., oxycodone, including Percocet and
Oxycontin; buprenorphine; marijuana; and alprazolam. And,
Young was found guilty of Count Three, charging money
laundering conspiracy, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §
1956(h). See ECF 1425 (Jury Verdict); ECF 1426
(signed jury verdict).
an Amended Presentence Report (ECF 1643, “PSR”)
was prepared, dated May 7, 2015. The PSR found a Base Offense
Level of 26, pursuant to §§ 2D1.1, 2S1.1, and 2E1.1
of the United States Sentencing Guidelines (“U.S.S.G.,
” the “Sentencing Guidelines, ” or the
“Guidelines”), based on a drug quantity
attributable to the defendant involving between 5.9 to 8.9
grams of oxycodone. Id. ¶ 26. That drug
quantity corresponded to an offense level of 20, to which
several enhancements were applied. Id. This resulted
in a total offense level of 32. Id. ¶ 34. With
a criminal history category of V (id. ¶ 44),
the PSR reflected a Guidelines Range of imprisonment of 188
to 235 months. Id. ¶ 76.
disputed the facts and the guidelines calculations, including
as to the drug quantity attributable to him and his role in
the offense. See ECF 1643, ¶ 35. Young's
version of events is set forth in ¶ 18 of the PSR. In
light of the disputes, the probation agent expressly deferred
to Judge Motz for resolution of them. Id. Both sides
submitted sentencing memoranda. ECF 1685 (government); ECF
noted, sentencing was held on June 24, 2015. ECF 1707. The
PSR assigned a four-level enhancement for role in the
offense, with which the government agreed. See
U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1(a). But, Judge Motz awarded only a
two-level increase. In all other respects, Judge Motz adopted
the PSR. See ECF 1747 (Sentencing Transcript); ECF
1710 (Statement of Reasons); ECF 1715 (Amended Statement of
Reasons). Therefore, Judge Motz found a total offense level
of 30, a criminal history category of V, and an advisory
sentencing guidelines range of 151 to 188 months'
government sought a twenty-year sentence. But, Judge Motz
imposed concurrent terms of fifteen years (180 months) as to
Counts One, Two, and Three, as well as three years of
supervised release and a $300 special assessment.
See ECF 1709. Thereafter, Young noted an appeal to
the Fourth Circuit. ECF 1712.
unpublished opinion issued July 25, 2017, the United States
Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed the
convictions of Young and all of the codefendants who were
convicted at trial. ECF 1992. However, it vacated Young's
sentence and remanded for resentencing. Id.; see
Carrington, 700 F. App'x 224.
Fourth Circuit determined that Judge Motz “failed to
resolve the factual disputes” raised by Young
concerning the guidelines calculation as to “the drug
quantity or offense role . . . .” Carrington,
700 F. App'x at 234. Moreover, Judge Motz did not
“indicate that resolution was unnecessary because
neither issue would affect [the court's] sentencing
decision.” Id. (citing Fed. R. Crim. P.
32(i)(3)(B)). Rather, Judge Motz adopted the findings of the
PSR, even though the PSR “did not make any findings
regarding drug attribution or offense role for the district
court to adopt . . . .” Id. Therefore, the
Court vacated the sentence and remanded for resolution of the
factual disputes and for resentencing. Id.
government's resentencing memorandum is at ECF 2006, with
several exhibits, and is supplemented by ECF 2013. The
defendant's resentencing memorandum is at ECF 2016, with
sixteen exhibits docketed at ECF 2067-1 to ECF
2067-16. The government's reply is at ECF 2031,
with numerous exhibits. Other government sentencing
submissions are docketed at ECF 2042; ECF 2043; ECF 2057; ECF
2070; ECF 2076; ECF 2081; and ECF 2084. Additional
defense submissions are docketed at ECF 2032; ECF 2039; ECF
2040; ECF 2044; ECF 2045; ECF 2050; ECF 2051; ECF 2064; ECF
2065; ECF 2067; ECF 2080; and ECF 2083. As the copious
submissions suggest, counsel for both sides have advocated
vigorously for their respective positions.
response to issues raised by the Court, the government,
through the case agent, FBI Special Agent Sarah Lewis,
recently conducted interviews of two codefendants, both of
whom testified at trial: Tavon White and Katera Stevenson.
White was a BGF member, the leader of the nefarious
operations at BCDC, and the lead defendant. He pleaded guilty
before me on August 6, 2013. ECF 290. The FBI reinterviewed
White on December 6, 2017. The Form 302 of the interview of
White is docketed at ECF 2043-2. Katera Stevenson pleaded
guilty before me on September 17, 2013. ECF 316. She was
reinterviewed on December 7, 2017. The Form 302 of the recent
interview of Ms. Stevenson is docketed at ECF 2043-1.
vigorously objects to the Court's consideration of such
evidence. He has moved to exclude the recent interview of
White, as it took place years after the events at issue.
See ECF 2050; see also ECF 2044; ECF 2051;
ECF 2064; ECF 2065. Among other things, Young argues that
White's recent statements contradict White's trial
government opposes the motion. ECF 2057. It argues that the
interviews were conducted because the Court “seemed
unsatisfied” with the government's evidence at
resentencing, and notes that White's recent interview
merely provides “greater specificity about the Percocet
business at BCDC and . . . Young's knowledge” of
it. Id. at 2. Moreover, the government maintains
that the Court may consider such evidence, pursuant to 18
U.S.C. § 3661. Id. Young has replied. ECF 2064.
order to resolve the issues of drug quantity attributable to
Young and his role in the offense, I need not consider the
recent interviews of White or Stevenson. Because I decline to
consider ECF 2043-1 and ECF 2043-2, I need not resolve the
parties' dispute as to whether the Court is entitled to
consider such statements.
addition to the numerous submissions by counsel, evidence and
argument were presented at resentencing hearings held on
November 28, 2017, November 30, 2017, December 13, 2017, and
March 1, 2018. ECF 2036; ECF 2041; ECF 2046; ECF 2078.
The Presentence Report and the Guidelines
Sentencing Guidelines are at the center of the parties'
disputes. The PSR grouped Counts One, Two, and Three together
for Guidelines calculation purposes, pursuant to U.S.S.G.
§ 3D1.2(b) and (d). ECF 1643, ¶ 25. The parties do
not dispute this grouping. When counts are grouped together,
the appropriate offense level is determined by “the
highest offense level of the counts in the Group.”
U.S.S.G. § 3D1.3(a). Therefore, I must determine the
offense level for each count, and apply the highest. In
performing these calculations, it is helpful to review the
other findings of the PSR.
applicable guideline for a violation of 18 U.S.C. §
1962(d), the racketeering offense, is found in U.S.S.G.
§ 2E1.1(a). It provides that the Base Offense Level is
the greater of (1) 19 or (2) “the offense level
applicable to the underlying racketeering activity.”
The PSR uses the conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 1956, for
money laundering, as the “underlying racketeering
activity.” ECF 1643 (PSR), ¶ 26. The Guidelines
section applicable to money laundering offenses is §
2S1.1. That section, in turn, specifies to apply “the
offense level for the underlying offense from which the
laundered funds were derived.” U.S.S.G. §
2S1.1(a)(1). The “underlying offense, ” according
to the PSR, is the conspiracy to distribute and possess with
intent to distribute controlled substances
(“CDS”), in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 846.
ECF 1643, ¶ 26. The Guidelines section for drug-related
offenses is found in § 2D1.1.
to ¶ 26 of the PSR (ECF 1643), Young's offense
conduct involved 5.9 to 8.9 grams of oxycodone, the
equivalent of 40 to 60 kilograms of marijuana. When the PSR
was prepared in May 2015, that amount corresponded to a Base
Offense Level of 20. U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(b) pertains to
“Specific Offense Characteristics.” According to
the PSR, because Young used or directed the use of violence,
two levels were added under § 2D1.1(b)(2). See
ECF 1643, ¶ 26. Further, because the object of the
offense was the distribution of a controlled substance in a
correctional or detention facility, two levels were added
under § 2D1.1(b)(4). Id. And, because the
defendant bribed or attempted to bribe a law enforcement
officer (i.e., correctional officer) to commit the
offense, two levels were added under § 2D1.1(b)(11).
Id. This gave Young an offense level of 26 for
purposes of § 2D1.1.
noted, the Base Offense Level for the money laundering count,
determined in this case by § 2S1.1(a)(1), is the
“offense level for the underlying offense.”
Because the PSR determined the drug offense to be the
underlying offense for the money laundering count, the Base
Offense Level under § 2S1.1 is 26. ECF 1643, ¶ 26.
Paragraph 27 of the PSR indicated that, because the defendant
was convicted under 18 U.S.C. § 1956, two levels were
added under § 2S1.1(b)(2)(B), giving Young an offense
level of 28 for the money laundering count.
the PSR included no further discussion of the RICO count, it
is implied that the offense level for that count would also
be 28. This is because, as noted, the offense level for the
RICO count under § 2E1.1 is either 19 or the offense
level for the most serious underlying racketeering activity,
whichever is higher. Accordingly, the offense level under
§ 2E1.1 would be either 19, the alternative minimum Base
Offense Level for racketeering conduct, per § 2E1.1 cmt.
3; 26, for the drug conspiracy; or 28, for the money
laundering. As 28 is the highest level, it becomes the Base
Offense Level and the final offense level for § 2E1.1.
addition, in ¶ 29 of the PSR, four levels were added
under U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1(a) for role in the offense. In
particular, the defendant was deemed an organizer or leader
of a criminal activity involving five or more participants.
according to the PSR, Young had a total offense level of 32.
In addition, the defendant had a criminal history score of
ten points, which established a criminal history category of
V. ECF 1643; ¶ 44. The score of ten points was based on
Young's three prior convictions (id.
¶¶ 39-41), and the PSR's finding that Young was
on probation at the time of the underlying offenses.
Id. ¶ 43. From my review of the record, it does
not appear that Young contested his criminal history.
See ECF 1686; ECF 1747 (Sentencing Transcript).
to ¶ 76 of the PSR, based on a final offense level of 32
and a criminal history category of V, Young's advisory
sentencing guideline range called for a period of
incarceration of 188 to 235 months.
Young's sentencing in June 2015, the government argued
that Young's Base Offense Level was a 20, because the
criminal drug activity involved at least 5.9 to 8.9 grams of
oxycodone. ECF 2006 at 3. At the time of the initial
sentencing, that particular drug quantity corresponded to an
offense level of 20. The government described that quantity
as just “a tiny amount” of oxycodone.
Id. However, because of changes to the drug quantity
tables that went into effect in November 2015, pursuant to
Amendment 782, that quantity would now equate to an offense
level of 18. See U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(c).
Nevertheless, the government maintains that defendant remains
a Level 20 under the revised guidelines.
to the government, 35 codefendants agreed to plead guilty to
crimes giving them a Base Offense Level of 20, including
defendant's girlfriend, Raylanair Reese. See ECF
2057 at 18-19. Four others who were convicted at trial were
also found to have a Base Offense Level of 20. Id.
The government asserts that it selected a guideline level of
20 “as the floor offense level” because it
“was such an absurdly small amount of drugs that none
of the defendants could argue” that the quantity was
not foreseeable. ECF 2031 at 10.
parties seem to agree that the first step in calculating
Young's guidelines sentence is to determine the quantity
of CDS for which he is accountable. Therefore, I turn to that
noted, because Young has been convicted of a RICO offense,
U.S.S.G. § 2E1.1(a) applies. It provides that the Base
Offense Level is either (1) 19 or (2) the “offense
level applicable to the underlying racketeering
activity.” Here, there are effectively two levels of
underlying activity, because § 2S1.1 refers to an
“underlying offense from which the laundered funds were
derived.” The underlying offense from which the
laundered funds were derived is the conspiracy to distribute
and possess with intent to distribute CDS, and therefore the
Court looks to §2D1.1 as the applicable guideline. Under
§ 2D1.1(a)(5), the offense level is determined based on:
1) the quantity and type of drugs involved (laid out in
§ 2D1.1(c)) and (2) the applicable Specific Offense
Characteristics, set forth in § 2D1.1(b).
insists that the Specific Offense Characteristics in Chapter
Two do not apply when determining the offense level under
U.S.S.G. § 2E1.1(a)(2). ECF 2083 at 1. He argues, ECF
2016 at 29:
If the offense level from the amount of drugs reasonably
forseeable to Mr. Young yields an offense level below 19,
then the enhancements under USSG sec. 2D1.1(b) do not apply.
As a result, the requested enhancements for bringing drugs
into a correctional facility (sec. 2D1.1(b)(4)), for use of
violence (sec. 2D1.1(b)(2) and for bribery (sec. 2D1.1(b)(11)
do not apply here. (Emphasis added).
points out that Application Note 3 states that the court is
to apply the enhancements under Chapter Three. ECF 2083 at 1.
Further, he notes that § 2E1.1(a)(2) does not refer to
U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3(a), which in turn includes Chapter Two
enhancements. Id. at 2. He asserts, id. at
1: “Had the Commission intended for Chapter 2 to apply,
all it had to do was add [it] to the Note. It chose not
to.” Therefore, he contends that if the Base
Offense Level indicated by §2D1.1(a) (as to the quantity
of drugs) is less than 19, the Court does not consider the
Specific Offense Characteristics of §2D1.1(b). ECF 2016
the government appeared to agree with Young's view of the
guidelines, based on the government's statements in its
briefing and in court, and from its ongoing insistence that
Young and other defendants who were involved in the
conspiracy had an offense level of at least 20. See,
e.g., ECF 2031 at 21. At the hearing on March 1,
2018, the Court questioned counsel as to this issue, and
invited memoranda. See ECF 2081 (government); ECF
2083 (Young); ECF 2084 (government's reply). The
government now contends that the Specific Offense
Characteristics are included in the calculation
under § 2E1.1(a)(2).
extent that defendant believes that enhancements under §
2D1.1 do not apply if the Base Offense Level is below 19, he
is incorrect. U.S.S.G. § 1B1.5(b)(1) states: “An
instruction to use the offense level from another offense
guideline refers to the offense level from the
entire offense guideline (i.e., the base
offense level, specific offense characteristics, cross
references, and special instructions) . . . .”
2E1.1(a)(2) instructs the Court to use the “offense
level applicable to the underlying racketeering
activity.” Under § 2E1.1, the district court must
“calculate independently the total offense level of
each separate underlying offense and then select whichever is
greatest (or 19, if that number is
greater).” United States v.
Pratt, 728 F.3d 463, 480 (5th Cir. 2013). In turn, to
establish that offense level, the court must consider
all of §2D1.1. As the Pratt Court
explained, 728 F.3d at 480: “Unlike most other sections
in Chapter Two, section 2E1.1 of the Guidelines does not
provide for adjustments based on special offense
characteristics, presumably because the district court will
have already calculated the special offense characteristics
applicable to the offense constituting the underlying
racketeering activity.” See also United States v.
Anderson, 526 F.3d 319, 327 (6th Cir. 2008) (calculating
the offense level for money laundering, and stating that the
offense level included § 2D1.1's Base Offense Level
plus Specific Offense Characteristics).
defendant argues, inter alia, that by his
calculation, the total marijuana equivalent attributable to
him is “6, 700 grams (from oxycodone) plus 200 grams
(from suboxone) and 20 grams from the phone call about
marijuana, ” for a total of 7 kilos, which amounts to
an offense level of 12. ECF 2016 at 8. He acknowledges that,
under § 2E1.1 of the Guidelines, the offense level is
automatically increased to Level 19, because of the RICO
conviction. But, he maintains that no enhancements apply.
Conversely, the government insists that, using the current
drug quantity table, the appropriate offense level begins at
20, before enhancements.
2E1.1 does not foreclose consideration of Specific Offense
Characteristics if the Base Offense Level, based on drug
quantity, is 19 or less, as the defense seems to suggest.
Rather, regardless of the starting point (e.g., a
Base Offense Level of 12), the court must consider the
Specific Offense Characteristics. The correct offense level
is derived, in this case, from the quantity and nature of the
drugs attributable to Young, plus any applicable Specific
Offense Characteristics, as defined in §2D1.1(b).
Following this step, any applicable Specific Offense
Characteristics of § 2S1.1 would be added. See
§ 2E1.1(a)(2). If that number is less than 19,
Young's Base Offense Level under §2E1.1(a)(1)
becomes 19. If that number is higher than 19, it becomes
Young's Base Offense Level for the RICO offense, under
analysis of drug quantity attributable to a defendant begins
with reference to U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3, titled
“Relevant Conduct (Factors that Determine the
Guidelines Range).” Section 1B1.3(a) provides, in part,
that the Base Offense Level shall be determined on the basis
of the following:
(1) (A) all acts and omissions committed, aided, abetted,
counseled, commanded, induced, procured, or willfully caused
by the defendant; and
(B) in the case of a jointly undertaken criminal activity (a
criminal plan, scheme, endeavor, or enterprise undertaken by
the defendant in concert with others, whether or not charged
as a conspiracy), all acts and omissions of others that were-
(i) within the scope of the jointly undertaken criminal
(ii) in furtherance of that criminal activity, and
(iii) reasonably foreseeable in connection with that criminal
that occurred during the commission of the offense of
conviction, in preparation for that offense, or in the course
of attempting to avoid detection or responsibility for that
Note 3A states, in part, that only “the conduct of
others that meets all three criteria set forth in
subdivisions (i) through (iii) … is relevant conduct
under this provision.” If “the conduct of others
does not meet any one of the criteria set forth in
subdivisions (i) through (iii), the conduct is not relevant
conduct under this provision.” Id. Further,
Note 3B cautions: “Because a count may be worded
broadly and include the conduct of many participants over a
period of time, the scope of the ‘jointly undertaken
criminal activity' is not necessarily the same as the
scope of the entire conspiracy, and hence relevant conduct is
not necessarily the same for every participant.”
addresses the timing of a defendant's entry into a
conspiracy. It states: “A defendant's relevant
conduct does not include the conduct of members of a
conspiracy prior to the defendant joining the conspiracy,
even if the defendant knows of that conduct . . . .”
in discussing the application of the Guidelines with regard
to drug conspiracies, Note 3D states, in part: “With
respect to offenses involving contraband (including
controlled substances), the defendant is accountable under
subsection (a)(1)(A) for all quantities of contraband with
which he was directly involved and, in the case of a jointly
undertaken criminal activity under subsection (a)(1)(B), all
quantities of contraband that were involved in transactions
carried out by other participants, if those transactions were
within the scope of, and in furtherance of, the jointly
undertaken criminal activity and were reasonably foreseeable
in connection with that criminal activity.” And,
reasonable foreseeability “applies only in respect to
the conduct (i.e., acts and omissions) of others
under subsection (a)(1)(B).” Id.
case does not involve any substantial drug seizures.
Therefore, under U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1, Application Note 5 is
pertinent. It provides that, in such a case, the court may
“approximate the quantity.”
noted, Young contends that the drug amount for which he can
be held accountable under § 1B1.3 corresponds to a Base
Offense Level of 12, according to the table in §
2D1.1(c). The government insists that the evidence readily
establishes a drug quantity that corresponds to at least the
current Level 20.
parties focus primarily on the defendant's involvement
with oxycodone, the active ingredient in Percocet pills.
Currently, in order to qualify for a Level 20, the defendant
must have reasonably foreseen drug trafficking of at least
8.9 grams of oxycodone. The government correctly advises that
9 grams of oxycodone is equivalent to 9, 000 milligrams or
just 300 oxycodone pills containing 30 milligrams each. ECF
2006 at 11; ECF 2057 at 15 n.3. See U.S.S.G. §
2D1.1(c)(10) and § 2D1.1(c), cmt. 8(D), at page 166
(equating 1 gram of oxycodone to 6700 grams of marijuana,
which equals 6.7 kilos). In its view, that is not a large
quantity of oxycodone.
U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3(a)(1)(B), the defendant is accountable
for the conduct of others that was: “(i) within the
scope of the jointly undertaken criminal activity, (ii) in
furtherance of that criminal activity, and (iii) reasonably
foreseeable in connection with that criminal activity.”
In this regard, Young does not dispute his membership in BGF,
but he observes that membership in BGF is not illegal.
Moreover, Young insists that his membership and role in BGF
is not the same as membership and role in the RICO
conspiracy. According to the defendant, he was “a
small, minor player in the RICO drug conspiracy” and
“[t]his distinction affects directly” the
guidelines calculation. ECF 2016 at 1; id. at 24. To
illustrate, Young points out that his role in the drug
network was not mentioned in the intercepted calls between
Young and White. Id. at 24.
Young argued at trial that, to the extent he was involved in
a conspiracy, it was not the RICO conspiracy with Tavon
White. However, the trial court thoroughly instructed the
jury as to the RICO conspiracies (see ECF 1777, Tr.
of 2/2/15), and the jury convicted Young of the RICO
conspiracy. See ECF 1426.
States v. Bell, 667 F.3d 431, 441 (4th Cir. 2011), is
instructive. There, the Fourth Circuit said: “In
conspiracy cases, base offense levels are determined based on
‘all acts and omissions committed, aided, abetted,
counseled, commanded, induced, procured, or willfully caused
by the defendant, ' as well as the ‘reasonably
foreseeable acts and omissions of others in furtherance of
the jointly undertaken criminal activity.'”
(Quoting U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3(a)(A) & (B)). The Court
made clear that, with respect to controlled substances and
jointly undertaken criminal activities, “the Guidelines
hold a defendant ‘accountable for all the quantities of
contraband with which he was directly involved and . . . all
reasonably foreseeable quantities of contraband that were
within the scope of the criminal activities that he jointly
undertook.'” Bell, 667 F.3d at 441
case of United States v. Flores-Alvarado, 779 F.3d
250 (4th Cir. 2015), is also instructive. In that case, the
defendant pleaded guilty to conspiracy to distribute and
possess with intent to distribute 5 kilograms or more of
cocaine and 1, 000 kilograms or more of marijuana. As to
sentencing, the Fourth Circuit reversed the district court
because it failed to make the requisite factual findings with
respect to the drug quantity attributable to the defendant.
case, the presentence report determined that the defendant
was accountable for the equivalent of 31, 111.16 kilograms of
marijuana, which included drug quantities found at locations
in North Carolina and Kentucky. The defense filed numerous
objections to the proposed drug quantity attributed to the
defendant, including as to seizures from two residences
involving other drug dealers. The government maintained that
it was foreseeable to the defendant that, at those locations,
the drug suppliers ...