United States District Court, D. Maryland
JOHN C. ROSERO, Plaintiff,
BALTIMORE CO. et al, Defendants.
Lipton Hollander United States District Judge.
plaintiff John C. Rosero filed suit under 42 U.S.C. §
1983 against Baltimore County (the “County”);
Baltimore County Executive Kevin Kamenetz; Arnold Jabolon,
the County's “Director of Permits Approvals and
Inspections;” Robyn Clark, a County Code Enforcement
Inspection Supervisor; and Paul Cohen, a Code Enforcement
Officer. ECF 1 (Complaint). The 35-page Complaint details Mr.
Rosero's repeated encounters with various defendants in
their attempts to inspect Mr. Rosero's property for
violations of the Baltimore County Zoning Regulations (the
“Regulations”). Id. Further, he alleges
that he “has been victimized continually” since
March 2014, and has been subject to “Racial and
National Origin discrimination because he is Hispanic.”
He also contends that he has been subjected to excessive
suit, Mr. Rosero alleges seven causes of action. Each is a
constitutional challenge to the Regulations and its
enforcement, based on Mr. Rosero's Fourth, Eighth, and
Fourteenth Amendment rights. Id.
with the Complaint, plaintiff filed a combined Motion for
Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction. ECF
2. The motion is accompanied by a memorandum of law (ECF 2-1)
(collectively, “Motion”), and a copy of the Code
Enforcement & Inspection Citation issued February 14,
2018, and reflecting a civil penalty of $23, 700. ECF 2-2.
The subject of the Motion concerns Mr. Rosero's most
recent interaction with certain defendants, who issued a
citation to Mr. Rosero in February 2018 for a violation of
Section 428 of the Baltimore County Municipal Code:
“Outside Storage of Unlicensed or Inoperative Motor
Vehicles on Residential Property.” ECF 2-2 (Code
Enforcement & Inspection Citation, or
noted, the Citation reflects a fine of $23, 700. Id.
at 1. Plaintiff seeks, ECF 2 at 1:
[A] temporary restraining order enjoining enforcement of the
unconstitutional Baltimore County Zoning Code insofar as it
(1) mandates warrantless home inspections without probable
cause; (2) criminally and financially punishes homeowners who
assert their Fourth Amendment rights to be free from such
searches; (3) fails to amount to a regulatory scheme
sufficient to permit the attainment of a warrant.
interpret this as a request to enjoin enforcement of the
Citation, and related sections of the Regulations, against
Rosero states that he served the Motion on Baltimore County,
“through email to Baltimore County on the date of its
filing.” ECF 2-1 at 25. However, none of the defendants
has responded to the suit or the Motion, nor have they
contacted the Court to indicate that the Motion has been
requests “waiver of the requirement to give security
pursuant to Rule 103(4).” Presumably, plaintiff is
referring to Local Rule 103.4, which provides that a
defendant may “file a motion requesting that [a
plaintiff] give security for costs if [the plaintiff] is not
a resident of this District.” That rule does not
presently apply. Fed.R.Civ.P. 65(c) does apply, however. It
provides that a “court may issue a preliminary
injunction or a temporary restraining order only if the
movant gives security in an amount that the court considers
proper to pay the costs and damages sustained by any party
found to have been wrongfully enjoined or restrained.”
hearing is necessary to resolve the Motion. See
Local Rule 105.6. For the reasons that follow, I shall deny
same analysis governs both a motion for preliminary
injunction and a request for temporary restraining order.
See Hoechst Diafoil Co. v. Nan Ya Plastics Corp.,
174 F.3d 411, 422 (4th Cir. 1999).
preliminary injunction is an extraordinary remedy never
awarded as of right.” Winter v. Natural Res. Def.
Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 24 (2008) (citing Munaf
v. Geren.553 U.S. 674, 689-90 (2008)); Real Truth
About Obama, Inc. v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 575 F.3d
342, 345 (4th Cir.2009), vacated on other grounds and
remanded, 130 S.Ct. 2371 (2010), reaff'd in part
and remanded, 607 F.3d 355 (4th Cir. 2010). A
preliminary injunction is a remedy that is
“'granted only sparingly and in limited
circumstances.'” Micro Strategy, ...