United States District Court, D. Maryland
Richard D. Bennett United States District Judge.
March 23, 2012, a jury convicted Petitioner Charles Leonard
Galloway (“Petitioner” or “Galloway”)
of conspiracy to distribute and possess with intent to
distribute heroin, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846. This
Court sentenced Galloway to 292 months of imprisonment and
five years of supervised release. (ECF No. 364.) Petitioner
subsequently appealed his conviction, raising several
arguments, which the United States Court of Appeal for the
Fourth Circuit denied. United States v. Galloway,
749 F.3d 238 (4th Cir. 2014). Currently pending before this
Court are Petitioner's Motion to Vacate, Set Aside or
Correct Sentence Under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (ECF No. 458),
Petitioner's Motion to Appoint Counsel (ECF No. 476), and
Petitioner's Motion to Amend the Motion to Vacate Under
28 U.S.C. § 2255 (ECF No. 512.) For the following
reasons, Petitioner's Motion to Amend (ECF No. 512) is
GRANTED; Petitioner's Motion to Appoint Counsel
(ECF No. 476) is DENIED; and Petitioner's Motion to Vacate,
Set Aside or Correct Sentence Under 28 U.S.C. § 2255
(ECF No. 458) is DENIED.
December 15, 2010, a federal grand jury returned an
indictment charging the Petitioner and co-defendants with
conspiracy to distribute and possess with intent to
distribute heroin in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846. (ECF
No. 1.) The Petitioner was also charged with one count of
possession with intent to distribute heroin, in violation of
21 U.S.C. § 841; one count of possession of a firearm in
furtherance of drug trafficking, in violation of 18 U.S.C.
§ 924(c); and one count of being a felon in possession
of a firearm, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g).
Id. On December 16, 2011, the Government filed a
notice pursuant to 21 U.S.C. § 851 of its intention to
seek enhanced penalties based on the Petitioner's 2000
conviction for CDS-Unlawful Manufacturing in Baltimore City.
(ECF No. 169.)
initially retained private counsel. (ECF No. 90.) On December
31, 2011, Petitioner sent a letter to his counsel and to this
Court detailing his dissatisfaction with his counsel's
efforts on his behalf. (ECF No. 194.) On January 6, 2012,
counsel filed a motion to strike her appearance which this
Court granted. (ECF No. 195.) On February 15, 2012, this
Court held a lengthy hearing regarding Petitioner's
desire to represent himself, ultimately granting
Petitioner's request and appointing the Federal Public
Defender to act as shadow Court stated that the Petitioner
would be brought to the courthouse to review discovery
materials while in custody. (Id.) On March 9, 2012,
this Court held a hearing on pre-trial motions where it
afforded Petitioner the option of traveling to access
discovery daily. (ECF No. 474-4 at 7:24.)
five day trial, a jury convicted Galloway of conspiracy to
distribute and possess with intent to distribute heroin, in
violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846. (ECF No. 292.) On July 11,
2012, this Court sentenced the Petitioner to 292 months of
imprisonment and five years of supervised release. (ECF No.
364.) On appeal, the Fourth Circuit rejected Defendant's
claims and affirmed his conviction. See United States v.
Galloway, 749 F.3d 238 (4th Cir. 2014). On October 6,
2014, the Supreme Court of the United States denied
Defendant's petition for a writ of certiorari. See
United States v. Galloway, 135 S.Ct. 215 (2014). On
October 9, 2015 Petitioner moved to vacate his sentence
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255. (ECF No. 458.)
Court recognizes that Petitioner is pro se and has
accorded his pleadings liberal construction. See Erickson
v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007). Under 28 U.S.C.
§ 2255, a prisoner in custody may seek to vacate, set
aside or correct his sentence on four grounds: (1) the
sentence was imposed in violation of the Constitution or laws
of the United States, (2) the court was without jurisdiction
to impose the sentence, (3) the sentence was in excess of the
maximum authorized by law, or (4) the sentence is otherwise
subject to a collateral attack. Hill v. United
States, 368 U.S. 424, 426-27 (1962) (citing 28 U.S.C.
§ 2255). “[A]n error of law does not provide a
basis for collateral attack unless the claimed error
constituted ‘a fundamental defect which inherently
results in a complete miscarriage of justice.'”
United States v. Addonizio, 442 U.S. 178, 185 (1979)
(quoting Hill, 368 U.S. at 428).
scope of a § 2255 collateral attack is far narrower than
an appeal, and a “‘collateral challenge may not
do service for an appeal.'” Foster v.
Chatman, 578 U.S., 136 S.Ct. 1737, 1758 (2016) (quoting
United States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152, 165 (1982)).
Thus, procedural default will bar consideration under §
2255 of any matters that “could have been but were not
pursued on direct appeal, [unless] the movant show cause and
actual prejudice resulting from the errors of which he
complains.” United States v. Pettiford, 612
F.3d 270, 280 (4th Cir. 2010) (citing United States v.
Mikalajunas, 186 F.3d 490, 492-93 (4th Cir. 1999)).
Petitioner's Motion to Vacate (ECF No. 458) is
one-year statute of limitations applies to § 2255
petitions. 28 U.S.C. § 2255(f). The limitations period
runs from the latest of: (1) the date on which the judgment
of conviction becomes final; (2) the date on which the
impediment to making a motion created by governmental action
in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States
is removed, if the movant was prevented from making a motion
by such governmental action; (3) the date on which the right
asserted was initially recognized by the Supreme Court, if
that right has been newly recognized by the Supreme Court and
made retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review;
or (4) the date on which the facts supporting the claim or
claims presented could have been discovered through the
exercise of due diligence. Id.; see also
Whiteside v. United States, 775 F.3d 180, 183 (4th Cir.
conviction becomes final for the purpose of starting the
one-year limitations period when the opportunity to appeal
expires. See Clay v. United States, 537 U.S. 522,
524-25 (2003); United States v. Sosa, 364 F.3d 507,
509 (4th Cir. 2004). The Supreme Court of the United States
denied Galloway's petition for writ of certiorari on
October 6, 2014. Petitioner therefore initially had until
October 6, 2015 to file his § 2255 motion. The
Government has challenged the timeliness of Petitioner's
Motion to Vacate. However, on September 14, 2015, Petitioner
requested an extension of time to file his § 2255 Motion
to Vacate. This Court granted Petitioner's request and
extended the deadline to file to October 14, 2015. (ECF Nos.
450 and 451.) Petitioner filed on October 9, 2015.
Petitioner's motion is therefore timely.
raises nine claims in his Motion to Vacate, six of which are
procedurally defaulted. This Court first addresses the
non-procedurally defaulted claims.
Three Claims Properly Before this Court i. Petitioner's
Access to Discovery
argues that this Court violated his due process rights by
requiring that Petitioner access discovery while physically
present at the courthouse. Where security is a concern, the
right to discovery is not unfettered. See United States
v. Galloway, 749 F.3d 238 (4th Cir. 2014) (finding
“that the limitations the court imposed were
reasonable” and observing that the Petitioner failed
“to show any prejudice from the arrangement”);
see also United States v. Sarno, 73 F.3d
1470, 1492 (9th Cir. 1995) (holding that while a pro
se petitioner's “access to discovery materials
was hardly optimal, ” the “limitations imposed on
him were reasonable”); United States v.
Bisong, 645 F.3d 384, 396 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (observing
that, “[e]ven assuming that pro se defendants
have a Sixth Amendment right to discovery in preparing their
defense, ” a defendant arguing such a claim “must
demonstrate prejudice in order to prevail”).
decision to restrict Petitioner's access to discovery
materials to a room on the sixth floor of the courthouse
stemmed from having had “enormous security issues with
respect to federal detention facilities.” (ECF No.
474-3 at 42.) As clarified during pretrial proceedings,
“[w]hatever room you want to have set up at the
Maryland correctional facility center . . . it can be set up
on the sixth floor lock up here…” Id.
Petitioner received “perfect privacy” with
“access to all of the evidence” and the liberty
to “take as much time” as desired. Id.
at 371. Accordingly, this Court accommodated Petitioner's
access to discovery whilst mitigating serious security
Petitioner's Counsel ...