United States District Court, D. Maryland
W. GRIMM UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
September 21, 2017, Jordan Matthew Grant, a resident of
Lanham, Maryland, filed this fee-paid complaint against
eighteen named defendants and approximately twenty-two
“John Doe Officers.” Compl., ECF No. 1-3. Mr.
Grant raises claims for “trespass, ”
“trespass on the case, ” and “kidnapping,
” which stem from the issuance of a warrant and
Grant's arrest on August 24, 2017 in Montgomery County,
Maryland on charges of armed robbery, conspiracy to commit
armed robbery, first-degree assault, and use of a firearm by
a felon convicted of a violent crime. See Compl.
¶ 13. Those charges were nolle prossed on
September 22 and November 6, 2017. See State v.
Grant, State Court Docket 2D00373431.
thirteen-page complaint and attached affidavit and exhibits
allege that police officers, armed with weapons, stopped him
while he was traveling in his automobile, pulled him out of
his vehicle, handcuffed and shackled him. He claims the
vehicle was searched without his consent and he was
“kidnapped” and taken by police car to the
Montgomery County Police Department. Id. T h e
remaining portion of the complaint contains little or no
facts; rather, it is replete with legal citations and
conclusions. Id. at 5-10. Grant requests damages, as
well as declaratory and injunctive relief. Id.
¶¶ 50-65 .
Complaint does not fully discuss what actions were taken by
each of the defendants, but he provides a list of their names
and addresses, as well as an affidavit and exhibits, which
help to illustrate the alleged involvement of some of the
defendants in his state criminal case. Compl. 11- 13; ECF;
Aff., ECF No. 1-4; Pl.'s Ex., ECF No. 1-5.
Complaint does not expound on the jurisdictional basis for
his filing suit in this federal court. His civil cover sheet
indicates that he wishes to allege that defendants engaged in
tortious conduct. ECF No. 1-1. However, this Court is a court
of limited original jurisdiction and does not sit to review
every claim related to alleged tortious conduct involving
non-federal parties. Unless the Plaintiff alleges claims that
arise under federal law, this Court's authority to
resolve state- law claims must be pursuant to a federal
district court's diversity of citizenship jurisdiction.
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332, diversity jurisdiction
exists when the parties are of diverse citizenship and the
amount in controversy exceeds $75, 000. Here, the parties are
not diverse and Grant's tort claims may not proceed in
Wobensmith is not referenced in the complaint, affidavit, or
exhibits. The court takes judicial notice that John C.
Wobensmith is currently the Secretary of State for the State
of Maryland. Because Grant does not allege that
Wobensmith was personally involved in his arrest, detention
and prosecution, the claim against this defendant shall be
Grant is alleging that his arrest, detention and prosecution
were unlawful. Such allegations would invoke this Court's
civil rights jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1343 and may
proceed under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Grant's list of
defendants, affidavit, and exhibits are somewhat instructive
as to his claims against the eighteen named defendants. He
has presumably named (1) Assistant State's Attorney Janna
Domico for her prosecutorial actions; (2) Court Commissioners
Carlson, Zepeda, and Onwuzuruike for their actions in
authorizing an arrest warrant and setting the conditions of
Grant's release and bond; and (3) District Court Judge
Joseph Dugan, Jr. for approving and signing the application
for a search and seizure warrant. Pl.'s Ex.
the alleged actions of Court Commissioners Carlson, Zepeda,
and Onwuzuruike and Judge Dugan occurred in their
quasi-judicial and judicial capacities. “Quasi-judicial
immunity extends to those persons performing tasks so
integral or intertwined with the judicial process that these
persons are considered an arm of the judicial officer who is
immune.” Bush v. Rauch, 38 F.3d 842, 847 (6th
Cir. 1994). The doctrine of absolute quasi-judicial immunity
has been accepted and applied to court support personnel
because of “‘the danger that disappointed
litigants, blocked by the doctrine of absolute immunity from
suing the judge directly, will vent their wrath on clerks,
court reporters, and other judicial adjuncts.'”
Kincaid v. Vail, 969 F, 2d 594, 601 (7th Cir. 1992)
(quoting Scruggs v. Moellering, 870 F.2d 376, 377
(7th Cir. 1989)). Court Commissioners Carlson, Zepeda, and
Onwuzuruike are entitled to absolute quasi-judicial immunity
for their actions in approving warrants and setting
conditions of release and bond. See Horsey v. State
Comm'r #2112, 2014 WL 2548130, at *1-2 (D. Md.
2014). Grant's claim against Judge Dugan is subject to
absolute immunity for actions taken in his judicial capacity.
See Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 9-11 (1991);
Forrester v. White, 484 U.S. 219, 226-27 (1988);
Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 355-56 (1978).
Grant's complaint against Assistant State's Attorney
Domico for prosecuting him on the charges is subject to
dismissal. Assistant State's Attorney Domico is
absolutely immune from damage liability for actions taken in
her prosecutorial capacity, because the decision whether to
prosecute plainly falls under such protected actions. See
Van de Camp v. Goldstein, 555 U.S. 335, 341-43 ((2009);
Burns v. Reed, 500 U.S. 478, 486 (1991); Imbler
v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 431 (1976); Springman v.
Williams, 122 F.3d 211, 213-14 (4th Cir. 1997);
Lyles v. Sparks, 79 F.3d 372, 376-77 (4th Cir.
1996); Franklin v. Office of Baltimore City State's
Attorney, WDQ-14-2356, 2015 WL 799416 at *3-4 (holding
that the prosecutor was entitled to immunity when the charges
were disposed of by a nolle prosequi because doing
so was “‘at the core of [their]
responsibilities' because it related to “whether to
proceed with a prosecution.'” (citing Springman
v. Williams, 122 F.3d at 213-14).
claims against defendants Wobensmith, Dugan, Domico, Carlson,
Zepeda, and Onwuzuruike are dismissed. The remaining
defendants shall respond, either by answer or appropriate
motion, to the complaint. A separate order follows.
on September 25, 2017, this court issued an Order Regarding
Motions, ECF No. 2. Apparently in response, Plaintiff, on
October 12, 2017, filed ECF No. 3, a “response”
to that Order. It is a rambling, incomprehensible filing
which provides no basis for any relief, assuming it was
possible to discern what relief Plaintiff seeks. It is
therefore denied, and Plaintiff shall comply with the Order
regarding the filing of motions, ECF No. 2.
 I take judicial notice of the state
court docket on the Maryland Judiciary Case Search website,