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Enow v. Baucom

United States District Court, D. Maryland

February 15, 2018

NDOKEY ENOW, #435845, 1990859 Plaintiff
RICKY FOXWELL, Warden, TALMADAGE REEVES, MD, Defendants NDOKEY ENOW, #435845, 1990859 Plaintiff,
RICKY FOXWELL, Warden, WALTER WEST, Assistant Warden, STEPHEN ELLIOTT, Lieutenant, MIKE MUIR, Case Management Supervisor, PAUL KNIGHT, CMS II, Defendants.



         Ndokey Enow is incarcerated at Eastern Correctional Institution (ECI) in Westover, Maryland. This Memorandum will consider three of his cases, all filed after he was assigned three strikes under the Prisoner Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”), 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). In the first two cases, Enow v. Baucom, et al., No. PWG-16-4042, and Enow v. Foxwell, et al., No. PWG-17-850, [1] his complaints asserted the imminent danger exception to § 1915(g), but a number of his claims did not satisfy the exception and were dismissed without prejudice, subject to be refiled with the full fee. What remain in Baucom, PWG-16-4042 are his claims regarding inadequate medical treatment for blurred vision and a concussion. Now pending in that case are Enow's summary judgment motion and the defendants' motions to dismiss or, in the alternative, for summary judgment, which I will decide in defendants' favor because the majority of the defendants cannot be liable on the facts as pleaded, and the undisputed facts show that the remaining defendant, Ben Oteyza, M.D., was not deliberately indifferent to Enow's serious medical needs.

         In Foxwell, PWG-17-850, what remain are Enow's claims that his psychotropic medication was discontinued and that he is suffering from inadequate ventilation. Now pending in Foxwell, PWG-17-850, are the Defendants' motions to dismiss or, in the alternative, for summary judgment. I will dismiss the claims against Warden Ricky Foxwell but deny Defendant Talmadge Reeves, M.D.'s motion without prejudice to filing a supplemental motion to address, if he can, the issues of disputed fact that he failed to address in his motion, which precluded resolution of the claims against him on summary judgment.

         In the third case, Enow v. Foxwell, et al., No. PWG-17-2312, Enow asserts that he is viewed by other inmates as a government informer, and, as a consequence, his life is in danger. He once again invokes the imminent danger exception to § 1915(g). Now pending are Enow's Motion for a Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction and “Motion for Supplemental Evidence in Opposition to Defendant's Order to Show Cause to Plaintiff's Motion for a Preliminary Injunction, ” both of which I will deny because Enow has not shown either a likelihood of irreparable harm if the motion is not granted or a likelihood of success on the merits. And, because only a subset of his numerous claims in that case actually allege imminent danger, I will direct Defendants to file an answer or dispositive motion only with regard to those claims.


         Enow is a frequent filer, with over a dozen unsuccessful cases in this Court. See Appendix (chart of prior cases). Enow's multiple case filings impose a significant burden on both the Clerk's office and the Court, thereby earning him three strikes under the PLRA. See ECF No. 10 in Enow v. Feinstein, et al., No. PWG-15-3348 (assigning Enow a third “strike” under § 1915(g)) Consequently, he is barred from filing civil actions unless he pays the filing fee or demonstrates that he is in imminent danger of serious physical injury. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). Undeterred by the application of the PLRA, Enow has continued to file civil lawsuits, such as those considered here, and only a small subset of the claims he has alleged have been found sufficient to proceed under the standard set forth under § 1915(g). See Enow v. Baucom, et al., No. PWG-16-3553 (D. Md.) (dismissed for failure to address or satisfy “imminent danger” exception to § 1915(g)); Enow v. Green, et al., No. PWG-16-3554 (D. Md.) (dismissed for failure to address or satisfy “imminent danger” exception); Enow v. Green, et al., No. PWG-16-3917 (D. Md.) (dismissed for failure to pay full filing fee and amend complaint after court determined no claims satisfied imminent danger exception); Enow v. Baucom, et al., No. PWG-16-4042 (D. Md.) (all but two claims dismissed without prejudice for failure to satisfy “imminent danger” exception); Enow v. Wolfe, et al., No. PWG-17-341 (D. Md.) (claims satisfied “imminent danger” exception); Enow v. Foxwell, et al., No. PWG-17-850 (D. Md.) (claims of past harm dismissed; claims suggesting imminent danger proceeding); Enow v. Foxwell, et al., No. PWG-17-2312 (D. Md.) (claims satisfied “imminent danger” exception).[2] It is evident that he is attempting to evade the filing fee by claiming, without support, that his claims involve an imminent threat of serious physical injury. As this Court has previously warned, Enow's “serial unsubstantiated claims of physical injury will not go unnoticed and any future cases filed by Enow will be evaluated in light of what is pleaded, but also in light of all the unsubstantiated claims that he has filed to date.” Order 2, ECF No. 32 in Enow v. Dovey, No. PWG-16-615 (D. Md.).

         Further, Enow's long, prolix, and repetitive filings impose additional burdens on this Court. For example, Enow's complaint in Baucom, PWG-16-4042, one of the cases now under review, presents claims that have already been raised in Enow v. Baucom, PWG-16-3553. Likewise, in four different cases, Enow presented the same claim that he was assaulted by correctional officers on April 18, 2016 while on his way to an adjustment hearing. See Baucom, PWG-16-3553; Green, PWG-16-3554; Green, PWG-16-3917; Wolfe, PWG-17-341. Further, Enow's complaints are often internally repetitive, unnecessarily reiterating the facts of a given case in multiple filings. Compare Compl. 6-11, ECF No. 1 in Foxwell, PWG-17-850, with Pl.'s Mem. in Supp. of Opp'n to Foxwell Mot. 2-6, ECF No. 20-1 in Foxwell, PWG-17-850; Compare Compl. 6-17, ECF No. 1 in Dovey, PWG-16-615, with Pl.'s Aff. in Supp. of Opp'n 1-5, 9-16, ECF No. 25-3 in Dovey, PWG-16-615 (making substantially similar statements, but in slightly different order). He often restates allegations from his verified complaint and/or supplements to the complaint in affidavits. Similarly, he includes copies of the same exhibits multiple times during the pendency of a single action. E.g., Med. Recs. 1-26, ECF No. 1-2, and Med. Recs., ECF No. 27-2 in Baucom, PWG-16-4042 (substantially the same medical records accompanying Complaint and Opposition to Motion to Dismiss).

         Enow's history of burdensome and abusive filings prompted this Court on November 27, 2017, to impose certain limits on his filings in all his current and future civil, non-habeas cases: Enow's filings may be no more than 10 single sided pages unless he first obtains the Court's permission; he may verify his complaints but may not accompany his pleadings with his own affidavits; his exhibits may not exceed 25 pages unless permitted by the Court; and, in the future, if he files another claim that does not satisfy the imminent danger standard at 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g), whether accompanied by actual claims of imminent of danger or not, he will be required to show cause why he should be denied the privilege of filing any forma pauperis proceedings. Order, ECF No. 38 in Baucom, PWG-16-4042. While these procedures have lessened the burdensomeness of Enow's vexatious filings, they have not done so sufficiently to deter him from abusing the imminent danger exception to § 1915(g) of the PLRA. For that reason I will impose new restrictions on his filing of new lawsuits that seek to invoke this exception, designed to enable the Court to determine more readily whether his claims of imminent danger are plausible, or, as has been the case so frequently in the past, without merit.


         In reviewing a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, a court “must accept as true all of the factual allegations contained in the complaint and draw all reasonable inferences [from those facts] in favor of the plaintiff.” Hall v. DirectTV, LLC, 846 F.3d 757, 765 (4th Cir. 2017). Further, a pro se plaintiff's pleadings are “to be liberally construed” and are “held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007). However, even a pro se litigant's complaint must be dismissed if it does not allege a “plausible claim for relief.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009).

         A “plaintiff's obligation to provide the grounds of his entitlement to relief requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (brackets and internal quotation marks omitted). Nonetheless, the complaint does not need “detailed factual allegations” to survive a motion to dismiss. Id. at 555. Instead, “once a claim has been stated adequately, it may be supported by showing any set of facts consistent with the allegations in the complaint.” Id. at 563. To survive a motion to dismiss, “a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 677-78 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. “But where the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged -- but it has not ‘show[n]' -- ‘that the pleader is entitled to relief.'” Id. at 679 (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2)).

         “When faced with cross-motions for summary judgment, the court must review each motion separately on its own merits.” Rossignol v. Voorhaar, 316 F.3d 516, 523 (4th Cir. 2003). Summary judgment is proper when the moving party demonstrates, through “particular parts of materials in the record, including depositions, documents, electronically stored information, affidavits or declarations, stipulations..., admissions, interrogatory answers, or other materials, ” that “there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a), (c)(1)(A); see Baldwin v. City of Greensboro, 714 F.3d 828, 833 (4th Cir. 2013). If the party seeking summary judgment demonstrates that there is no evidence to support the nonmoving party's case, the burden shifts to the nonmoving party to identify evidence that shows that a genuine dispute exists as to material facts. See Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 585-87 & n.10 (1986). The existence of only a “scintilla of evidence” is not enough to defeat a motion for summary judgment. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 251 (1986). Instead, the evidentiary materials submitted must show facts from which the finder of fact reasonably could find for the party opposing summary judgment. Id.

         LIABILITY UNDER § 1983

         In Baucom, PWG-16-4042, and Enow, PWG-17-850, Enow brings § 1983 claims of deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs, in violation of the Eighth Amendment, against his medical providers and other defendants.[3] All but the medical providers contend that Enow fails to state a claim against them because he does not allege their personal involvement in his medical care.

         Section 1983 requires a showing of personal fault, whether based upon the defendant's own conduct or another's conduct in executing the defendant's policies or customs. See Monell v. New York City Dep't of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690 (1978); West v. Atkins, 815 F.2d 993, 996 (4th Cir. 1987), rev'd on other grounds, 487 U.S. 42 (1988) (no allegation of personal involvement relevant to the claimed deprivation); Vinnedge v. Gibbs, 550 F.2d 926, 928 (4th Cir. 1977) (in order for an individual defendant to be held liable pursuant to § 1983, it must be “affirmatively shown that the official charged acted personally in the deprivation of the plaintiff's rights”) (quoting Bennett v. Gravelle, 323 F.Supp. 203, 214 (D. Md. 1971), aff'd, 451 F.2d 1011 (4th Cir. 1971)). Moreover, an individual cannot be held liable under § 1983 under a theory of respondeat superior.[4] See Monell, 436 U.S. at 690; Love-Lane v. Martin, 355 F.3d 766, 782 (4th Cir. 2004) (no respondeat superior liability under § 1983). Thus, to establish § 1983 liability, a plaintiff must show that a defendant was personally involved in the alleged deprivation of his constitutional rights, Vinnedge, 550 F.2d at 928-29, or establish the defendant's liability as a supervisor, see Shaw v. Stroud, 13 F.3d 791, 799 (4th Cir. 1994) Supervisory liability may attach under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 if (1) the defendant had actual or constructive knowledge that a subordinate was engaged in conduct that posed a pervasive risk of a constitutional injury; (2) the defendant's response to that knowledge was so inadequate as to show deliberate inference to or tacit authorization of the alleged offensive practices; and (3) there was an affirmative causal link between defendant's inaction and the alleged constitutional injury. Shaw, 13 F.3d at 799.


         The Eighth Amendment prohibits cruel and unusual punishment. U.S. Const. amend. VIII. To prevail on an Eighth Amendment claim for denial of medical care, a prisoner must demonstrate that the actions of the defendants or their failure to act amounted to deliberate indifference to a serious medical need. See Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976); Jackson v. Lightsey, 775 F.3d 170, 178 (4th Cir. 2014). Deliberate indifference to a serious medical need requires proof that, objectively, the inmate was suffering from a serious medical need and that, subjectively, prison staff were aware of the need for medical attention but failed either to provide it or to ensure the needed care was available. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994). As the Fourth Circuit explained in Lightsey, deliberate indifference “is a higher standard for culpability than mere negligence or even civil recklessness, and as a consequence, many acts or omissions that would constitute medical malpractice will not rise to the level of deliberate indifference.” 775 F.3d at 178. Therefore, “[t]o show an Eighth Amendment violation, it is not enough that an official should have known of a risk; he or she must have had actual subjective knowledge of both the inmate's serious medical condition and the excessive risk posed by the official's action or inaction.” Id.

         The subjective component requires “subjective recklessness” in the face of the serious medical condition. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 839-40. “True subjective recklessness requires knowledge both of the general risk, and also that the conduct is inappropriate in light of that risk.” Rich v. Bruce, 129 F.3d 336, 340 n.2 (4th Cir. 1997). “Actual knowledge or awareness on the part of the alleged inflicter . . . becomes essential to proof of deliberate indifference ‘because prison officials who lacked knowledge of a risk cannot be said to have inflicted punishment.'” Brice v. Va. Beach Corr. Ctr., 58 F.3d 101, 105 (4th Cir. 1995) (quoting Farmer, 511 U.S. at 844). If the requisite subjective knowledge is established, an official may avoid liability “if [he] responded reasonably to the risk, even if the harm was not ultimately averted.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 844. Reasonableness of the actions taken must be judged in light of the risk the defendant actually knew at the time. Brown v. Harris, 240 F.3d 383, 390 (4th Cir. 2001).

         Of import here, “[a] prisoner's disagreement with medical providers about the proper course of treatment does not establish an Eighth Amendment violation absent exceptional circumstances.” Lopez v. Green, No. PJM-09-1942, 2012 WL 1999868, at *2-3 (D. Md. June 4, 2012) (citing Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841, 849 (4th Cir. 1985)); see Wester v. Jones, 554 F.2d 1285 (4th Cir. 1979). Further, “any negligence or malpractice on the part of . . . doctors in missing [a] diagnosis does not, by itself, support an inference of deliberate indifference.” Johnson v. Quinones, 145 F.3d 164, 166 (4th Cir. 1998). Without evidence that a doctor linked presence of symptoms with a diagnosis of a serious medical condition, the subjective knowledge required for Eighth Amendment liability is not present. Id. at 169 (actions inconsistent with an effort to hide a serious medical condition refute presence of doctor's subjective knowledge).

         Enow v. Baucom, et al., No. PWG-16-4042

         Enow initiated this case pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 by filing a verified Complaint, ECF No. 1, [5] a Motion for Leave to Proceed in Forma Pauperis, ECF No. 2, and a Motion for a Temporary Restraining Order, ECF No. 3.[6] I determined that Enow's claims of inadequate medical treatment for blurred vision and a concussion possibly posed imminent danger of serious physical injury, especially in light of the fact he is blind in one eye and suffering from ongoing headaches and other ailments that he attributes to a purported concussion. Order, ECF No. 5. I directed Defendants Wexford Health Sources, Inc. (“Wexford”), and Ben Oteyza, M.D. (collectively, the Medical Defendants) and Sharon Baucom, M.D., Director of Clinical Services for the Maryland Department of Public Safety and Correctional Services, and Warden Kathleen Green (collectively, the State Defendants) to respond to these specific claims. Id. As to the other claims raised in the Complaint, none of which suggested Enow was in imminent danger of serious physical injury, I instructed Enow that he must pay the filing fee to pursue them. Enow did not pay the filing fee; thus, his other claims will not be considered here.

         Enow filed a Motion for Summary Judgment, ECF No. 14, along with a Memorandum and an Affidavit in Support, both of which he verified, ECF Nos. 14-3, 14-4. Thereafter the Medical Defendants filed a Motion to Dismiss or, in the Alternative, Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment and Opposition to Enow's Motion. ECF No. 22. Enow and the Medical Defendants fully briefed their cross-motions, ECF Nos. 14-3, 22-3, 27, 30, and both parties provided exhibits in support of their positions, ECF Nos. 14-2, 14-4, 22-4, 22-5, 27-2. Enow's oppositions are verified. The State Defendants also filed a Motion to Dismiss or, in the Alternative, for Summary Judgment, ECF No. 31, which the parties briefed, ECF Nos. 31-1, 35, and for which both parties provided exhibits in support of their positions, ECF Nos. 31-2, 31-3, 35-1. A hearing is not necessary. See Loc. R. 105.6.

         Enow's Claims

         Enow claims that on January 15, 2015, an ophthalmologist diagnosed him with cataracts in both eyes and recommended that he remain under medical supervision. Compl. 4, ¶¶ 12-14, ECF No. 1. On March 5, 2015, a prison medical provider referred him to the optometry department for an eye examination for blurred vision in his left eye. Id. On March 18, 2015, an optometrist prescribed eyeglasses for him and scheduled him for a follow-up appointment. On April 20, 2015, an optometrist examined him and diagnosed him as legally blind in his right eye. Id. at 4, ¶ 14. He claims that on August 30, 2015, Dr. Alesha Spellman-Smith, an optometrist, completed a hospital specialty service request for Enow's ophthalmology consultation.

         Enow claims that he suffers recurring pain from his eye injury, macular degeneration, blurry distance vision, eye fatigue, light sensitivity, migraine headaches and watery, burning, and itching eyes, and complains that he has not been provided consultation with a physician qualified to assess and treat his eye condition. Id. at 14-15, ¶ 15. He alleges that he is in danger of permanent loss of vision in both eyes. Of note, Enow does not allege that Dr. Oteyza denied, hindered, or was otherwise involved in any decision concerning a referral to an ophthalmologist. He generally claims that medical records are not used to assist in diagnosis. Id. at 11, ¶ 22.

         Enow also maintains that he suffered a concussion on November 19, 2015, when a fellow inmate struck him in the head with a hard object, and has blackouts, constant cluster migraines headaches, and neck and back pain as a result. Id. at 6. He faults Dr. Oteyza for failing to order a CT scan or MRI and for not referring him to a physician who specializes in brain injury. Id. at 6. Enow asks for declaratory relief and compensatory damages of $300, 000.



         The Medical Defendants argue that Enow does not raise any claims against Wexford or specify any unconstitutional conduct by Wexford. Enow only alleges that Wexford, pursuant to a contract with the Division of Correction (“DOC”), provided medical services for DOC prisoners and employed Dr. Oteyza. Compl. 3, ¶¶ 5-6. As noted, Enow cannot state a claim against Wexford based on the actions of its employees under a theory of vicarious liability (respondeat superior). See Monell, 436 U.S. at 690; Love-Lane, 355 F.3d at 782.

         In his opposition, Enow argues that Wexford is liable under the doctrine of supervisory liability, but he does not provide any factual substantiation. Pl.'s Opp'n 11. As noted, supervisor liability may attach under § 1983 where a supervisor has actual or constructive knowledge of a subordinate's conduct that posed a pervasive risk of a constitutional injury. See Shaw, 13 F.3d at 799. As Enow fails to allege facts or provide exhibits or documentation to show that Wexford had either actual or constructive knowledge of any medical provider's alleged deliberate indifference to Enow's medical needs, he fails to state a claim against Wexford. For these reasons, the claims against Wexford are dismissed. See id.

         Dr. Oteyza

         Enow claims that Dr. Oteyza acted with deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs regarding his concussion, thereby providing him with constitutionally inadequate medical care in violation of the Eighth Amendment. Compl. 7, ¶ 19. He alleges that on November 19, 2015, he suffered a concussion. Id. at 6, ¶ 19. When Enow complained about resultant “blackouts, ” migraine headaches, and neck and back pain on December 18, 2015, Dr. Oteyza prescribed on 600 mg of Motrin and 500 mg of Roboxin for muscle relaxation. Id. Enow asserts that Oteyza ignored his request for an MRI or CT scan, and a consultation referral to a medical specialist in brain injury. Enow takes exception to Oteza's comments on the medical record ...

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